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ABSTRACT
This article puts the procedure of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in a completely new and previously
unexplored light. Rejecting the predominant view of ICTY procedure as a
hybrid between the adversarial system of the U.S. and the inquisitorial
system of civil law jurisdictions, this article shows that ICTY procedure is
best described through a third procedural model that does not fit in either of
the two traditional systems. This third procedural model is close to the
managerial judging system that has been adopted in U.S. civil procedure.
The article then explores some of the implications that the discovery of
managerial judging in ICTY has for both international and domestic
procedures. At the international level, the article not only provides the first
full-fledged model to explain ICTY procedure and its evolution over time, but
also questions the widespread assumption of international policy-makers
and scholars that every international criminal procedure has to be either
adversarial, inquisitorial, or somewhere along a straight line between what
are presumed to be the only two possible systems. At the national level, the
article explains why three systems that were initially adversarial have moved
in two different directions when faced with similar time pressures: U.S.
criminal procedure basically has remained close to the adversarial system,
while ICTY criminal procedure and U.S. civil procedure have moved toward
managerial judging. By explaining these different trajectories, the article not
only highlights features of U.S. domestic procedures and explains their
recent evolution, but also integrates ICTY criminal procedure and U.S.
criminal and civil procedures into wider debates about international criminal
procedure, managerial judging, and the globalization of law.
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INTRODUCTION.

From its inception in Nuremberg,1 international criminal justice has
presented new challenges to legal thought.2
By bringing together
international and criminal law, the term itself initially looked to be an
oxymoron. Under traditional definitions of law, international law was
considered to be “soft” law or no law at all, while criminal law was seen as the
exact opposite: the maximum exercise of state power through legal rules and
procedures.3 The central challenges for international criminal procedure
have been to determine what system would be best for prosecuting and trying
international crimes in international tribunals, and to describe the
proceedings under that system. Most policymakers and scholars have
assumed that the procedure must be a blend between the adversarial system
of the United States and other common law countries,4 and the inquisitorial
system5 of civil law jurisdictions.6

1 For analyses of the Nuremberg trial and the innovation it represented in international law, see,
e.g., YVES BEIGBEDER, JUDGING WAR CRIMINALS 27-49 (1999); Richard Overy, The Nuremberg trials:
international law in the making, in FROM NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE 1 (Philippe Sands ed. 2003);
TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS (1992).
2 For analyses of some of these challenges not only to international criminal justice but also to
national criminal justice systems in dealing with mass atrocities, see, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN
VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 25-51(1998); CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL (1996);
MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITIES, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW (1997); JUDITH N. SHKLAR,
LEGALISM 161-4 (1986); RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 27-67 (2000).
3 The locus classicus for the proposition that international law is “not properly so called,” since
by being “positive morality” it belongs more to the realm of the ethical than to that of the strictly
legal, is to be found in JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 112 and 124
(1995). See also FREDERICK POLLOCK, A FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 13 (1896). Since the challenge
posed by Austin to international law, most debates have been linked to a critique of classical legal
positivism as a viable conception of law in general and, therefore, of international law in particular.
For a varied mix of positions taken on the matter by legal theorists and internationalists, both from
diverse philosophical affiliations, see Robert Ago, Positive Law and International Law, 51 AJIL 691
(1957); James L. Brierly, Le fondement du caractère obligatoire du droit international, 23 RECUEIL
DES COURS DE L’ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 465 (1928); LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF
LAW 232-7 (2d ed. 1969); WOLFANG FRIEDMAN, LEGAL THEORY 385-391 (1947); H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 208-231 (1961); HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 18-89 (1952);
Hans Kelsen, The Essence of International Law, in THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS
IN HONOR OF LEO GROSS (Karl W. Deutsch & Stanley Hoffmann eds. 1968); HERSCH LAUTERPACHT,
PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION) 71-2 (1927); Hersch Lauterpacht, Règles générales du droit de la paix,
62 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L’ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 100 (1937); Roland Quadri, Le
fondement du caractère obligatoire du Droit international public, 80 RECUEIL DES COURS DE
L’ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 579 (1952); Alfred Verdross, La volonté collective des Etats
comme base du droit international et la renaissance de la doctrine classique, 16 RECUEIL DES COURS
DE L’ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 249 (1927).
4 Practitioners and scholars also use the expression “accusatorial” instead of “adversarial” to refer
to criminal procedure in common law jurisdictions and usually conceive the expressions
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The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia7
(hereinafter ICTY or the Tribunal)—the first international tribunal created
since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials half a century earlier—reflects this
assumption.8 The judges who designed the Tribunal’s procedure in 1994
basically followed an adversarial model.9 International scholars agree with
“accusatorial” and “adversarial” as exchangeable. Following this use, this article will use both
expressions as equivalent. For an attempt to establish a distinction between the terms "adversarial"—
as a way of finding facts and implementing norms—and "accusatorial"—that would include not only
adversary trial procedures but also a conception of the state as being neutral in disputes, see Abraham
S. Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal Procedure, 26
STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1017 (1974).
5 It is important to emphasize from the outset that this article will use the expressions
"adversarial system" and “inquisitorial system” as descriptive categories that respectively explain the
predominant conception of criminal procedure in common law and civil law jurisdictions,
respectively. This article will not use these expressions as normative categories. For instance, the
expression “adversarial system” is sometimes used in the United States as a normative ideal to refer
to a criminal procedure in which the rights of the defendant are fully respected, see, e.g., MIRJAN
DAMASKA, ADVERSARY SYSTEM, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 24, 25 (Sanford H. Kadish ed.,
1983), and the epitome of the adversarial system is the trial by jury. Similarly, the expression
"inquisitorial system" is sometimes used in a negative way to refer to authoritarian conceptions of
criminal procedure. However, this article will use these expressions only in a descriptive sense.
6 See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 364-88 (2003) (framing his analysis
of international criminal trials in terms of the adversarial and inquisitorial systems); Benjamin B.
Ferencz, Nurnberg Trial Procedure and the Rights of the Accused, 39 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND
CRIMINOLOGY 144 (1948-1949) (“The landmarks of international law which have been erected in
Nuremberg rest on a foundation of legal procedure which has satisfied the traditional safeguards of
Continental and American law”); Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Trends in International Criminal
Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague, Arusha, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 725, at 727 (1999) (“A
feature of the historic and modern international criminal trials is that they have been bench
trials…The approach to evidence has been to use elements from both the common law and civil law
systems. Thus, the presentation of evidence has followed the ‘adversarial model’, whereas the rules
governing the admissibility of evidence may be seen as more akin to the ‘inquisitorial’ model and
leave wide discretion to the judges”), at 729 (“The Charter gave the Nuremberg Tribunal wide
discretion when it came to the admissibility of evidence. Although the trials were adversarial and the
parties alone were responsible for calling the evidence, the judges were sitting without a jury, and the
common law rules designed to prevent jurors from hearing prejudicial evidence were discarded in
favour of a liberal approach akin to that of civil law systems.”); Alphons Orie, Accusatorial v.
Inquisitorial Approach in International Criminal Proceedings Prior to the Establishment of the ICC
and in the Proceedings Before the ICC, in II THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 1439 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds. 2002) (framing his analysis of international criminal
proceedings in terms of the adversarial and inquisitorial systems).
7 The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was created by UN Security Council
Resolution 827, S /RES/827 (1993), with the “purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia
between 1991 and a date to be determined,” as an attempt to “put an end to such crimes and to take
effective measures to bring to justice the persons who are responsible for them.”
8 See, e.g., Guillaume Champy, Inquisitoire-Accusatoire devant les juridictions pénales
internationales, 68 INT'L REV. PENAL L. 149 (1997).
9 See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, Statement by the President Made at a Briefing to Members of
Diplomatic Missions, IT/29, 11 February 1994, in VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, 1 AN
INSIDER’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 650
(1995). See also CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6, at 384 (pointing out that one
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characterization.10

this
When the Tribunal faced pressures to speed up its
docket,11 ICTY judges introduced substantial reforms that commentators
have described as a move from the adversarial to the inquisitorial system.12
of the reasons for the adoption of the largely adversarial system at ICTY and the ICTR was the
intellectual and psychological appeal of the Nuremberg and Tokyo models; and adding that perhaps
many felt that the adversarial system better safeguarded the right of the accused). In both the
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, it is believed that the adversarial system prevailed over the
inquisitorial. See CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6, at 376-84.
10 See, e.g., Gideon Boas, Developments in the Law of Procedure and Evidence at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court,
12 CRIMINAL LAW FORUM 167, at 175 (2001) (“The International Tribunal has an adversarial structure,
and for many years operated similarly to a stereotypical common law system”); May & Wierda, supra
note 6, 737-38 (referring to the procedures of ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda as essentially adversarial); Orie, supra note 6, at 1463 (stating that ICTY judges opted for a
largely adversarial approach when they adopted the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the
Tribunal), and at 1464 (“The Rules of Procedure and Evidence that were adopted by the judges…were
largely inspired by the Anglo-American tradition. The rules introduce a typical accusatorial type of
trial”); Vladimir Tochilovsky, Rules of Procedure for the International Criminal Court: Problems to
Address in Light of the Experience of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 1999 NILR 343, at 345 (“ICTY borrowed
principles of proceedings mostly from common-law jurisdictions. Drafters of ICTY Rules opted for
the common-law litigation model between two parties, where an indictment is a form of a lawsuit”);
Vladimir Tochilovsky, Legal Systems and Cultures in the International Criminal Court: The
Experience from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in INTERNATIONAL
AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 627, at 629 (Horst Fischer et al.
eds. 2001) (stating that the drafters of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted a
largely adversarial form of proceedings); SALVATORE ZAPPALÀ, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 2 (2003) (pointing out that the judges that drafted ICTY Rules of Procedure
and Evidence chose an accusatorial model).
11 On these pressures, see Section VI of this article.
12 See, e.g., Gideon Boas, Creating Law of Evidence for International Criminal Law: ICTY and
the Principle of Flexibility, 12 CRIMINAL LAW FORUM 41, at 57-58 (2001); Boas, Developments, supra
note 10, at 174 (“What all these amendments embody is a radical change in the focus of ICTY on trial
preparation. These amendments encompass continental law concepts whereby it is the court that
determines the nature and scope of the case and determines which evidence is best tested”); ANTONIO
CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW,supra note 6, at 387 (“[O]ver the years there has been a
gradual incorporation of significant features of the inquisitorial model into the procedural system of
ICTY and the ICTR, which initially was largely based on the adversarial scheme. The need to speed
up proceedings has been the primary rationale for this gradual change”); Daryl A. Mundis, From
'Common Law' Toward 'Civil Law': The Evolution of ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 14
LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 367 (2001); Orie, supra note 6, at 1463 (“Since the adoption of the original Rules,
the judges of ICTY have amended them more than twenty times. These amendments tend toward an
inquisitorial direction”) and at 1492 (“The subsequent development of the law of procedure in the ad
hoc Tribunals has on all major points been in the direction of the civil law”); Tochilovsky, Rule of
Procedure for the International Criminal Court, supra note 10, at 359 (“Although most of ICTY
Rules of Procedure were borrowed from the common-law systems, ICTY practice has proved that the
ad hoc Tribunal’s criminal proceedings are evolving into a real hybrid of the two major legal systems
in operation in the world today. The proceedings tend to combine a common-law contest between
two parties before uninformed judges and a civil-law scrutiny of evidence with active, informed
judges”); Tochilovsky, Legal Systems and Cultures in the International Criminal Court, supra note
10, at 632 (“It was mostly a wish to expedite trials and, for that purpose, to give the judges more
control over proceedings that prompter ICTY Judges to turn to a civil law practice”); SALVATORE
ZAPPALÀ, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 2 (2003) (“[P]ractice evidenced
the drawbacks of applying a purely accusatorial model to international criminal proceedings, and
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The main idea of this article is that ICTY procedure has moved not
toward the inquisitorial system, but toward a third model of criminal
procedure that fits in neither the adversarial nor the inquisitorial paradigm.
Curiously, this third model of criminal procedure is not unknown to U.S.
scholars and practitioners, because it presents substantial similarities to the
managerial judging system that U.S. civil procedure has adopted to handle
complex cases. By showing that managerial judging has arisen in ICTY, this
article not only provides a much better description of ICTY procedure, but
also integrates ICTY criminal procedure and U.S. criminal and civil
procedures into wider debates about international criminal procedure,
managerial judging, and the globalization of law.
By showing that ICTY has adopted a managerial judging system, this
article questions the way both international policymakers and scholars have
thought of international criminal proceedings since Nuremberg.13 These
analysts have understood international criminal procedure in a strictly
binary way.14 Their assumption has been that every international criminal
thus amendments were required. In amending the procedural system of the ad hoc Tribunals…some
inquisitorial elements were upheld, thereby diluting the originally adversarial imprint.”).
13 There has been a second position in ICTY to describe the Tribunal’s procedure as neither
adversarial nor inquisitorial but as unique in its kind. However, this second position has not
provided a description of what would characterize such a unique model of international criminal
procedure. Consequently, it is not particularly relevant or interesting for this article’s aim of
capturing which criminal procedure system or combination of systems can best describe the
procedure of ICTY and other international tribunals. This second position actually states the
uniqueness of the procedure of the Tribunal not in order to describe it, but rather to isolate the
interpretation of ICTY Statute and Rules from national legal systems and from the standards of
fairness that these national systems establish. For examples of this second position, see, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case IT-96-21-T, Decision on the Motion on Presentation of Evidence by the
Accused, May 1, 1997; Patrick L. Robinson, Ensuring Fair and Expeditious Trials at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 11 EJIL 569, at 588-89 (2000): “The
legal system established by the Statute and the Rules is neither common law accusatorial, nor civil
law inquisitorial, nor even an amalgam of both; it is sui generis. The key to the application of the
Statute and the Rules is the use of the appropriate interpretive technique which gives due weight to
the four principles set out in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention and the law of treaties; good faith,
textuality, contextuality and teleology…The Tribunal must ensure that, notwithstanding the
acknowledged peculiarities of its proceedings, an accused before it does not, in terms of his rights,
become a ‘poor cousin’ to his counterpart in domestic proceedings.” For an antecessor of such a
position regarding post-Second World War prosecutions, see, e.g, U.S. v. Carl Krauch, Motion for the
Reconsideration of a Ruling by the Tribunal (U.S. Mil. Trib. 1948), 15 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW 10 (1946-49), at 897
(1949).
14 See, e.g., Orie, Accusatorial v. Inquisitorial Approach in International Criminal Proceedings,
supra note 6, at 1440 (“Although this dichotomy has been criticized for giving no explanation for
many differences between the Anglo-American and continental traditional models, it still is widely
accepted”), and at 1442 (“An International Criminal Court should in its law of procedure be as
universal as possible. This means that it should be balanced in the degree to which it reflects each
one of the major criminal justice model systems. Because of its specific function it has to choose from
each of the major systems those elements that serve best the administration of justice. On therefore
can expect the law of procedure to be an amalgam of the major systems.”).
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procedure has to be either adversarial, inquisitorial, or somewhere along a
straight line between these two systems, which are presumed to be the only
possible options.15 This assumes that any reform to an international criminal
procedural regime must move that regime closer to one of these two
traditional legal systems and farther from the other, and that movement in
any other direction is impossible. One of the main aims of this article is to
question this binary thinking. The thesis of this article in this respect is that
there are more options available for designing and describing international
criminal procedure than the only two considered so far, and that not all that
happens in criminal procedure fits within the two traditional categories.
In order to prove this thesis, this article shows that the current
procedure of ICTY is best described using a third model of criminal
procedure that is neither adversarial nor inquisitorial. This third model—
which international criminal procedure analyses have completely overlooked
—is close to what has been called “managerial judging” in U.S. civil
procedure.16 The discovery of the managerial judging system in ICTY not
only questions this binary conception, but also puts the procedure of the
Tribunal in a completely new and previously unexplored light and provides a
much better description of what ICTY has been doing. In the managerial
judging system, criminal procedure is conceived as a managerial device run
by the court with collaboration of the parties in order to expedite the docket.
The judge actively manages cases toward this end. To do this, she actively
encourages the parties to reach agreements on factual and legal matters at
issue and tightly controls the way the parties run their cases. If the parties do
not voluntarily cooperate with the court to expedite their case, the court can
use various formal and informal sanctions to assure this collaboration. In
this way, this procedure redefines the prosecutor and the defendant as
collaborators with the court toward the goal of expedited process. Because of

15 There has been a recent tendency to analyze international criminal proceedings from the
perspective of human rights. But, these works are still emblazoned in the adversarial-inquisitorial
binary way of thinking about international criminal procedure because they analyze the tribunals
using these two categories and explore which of the two systems or which blend between them would
be more respectful of international standards of human rights. See CHRISTOPH J. M. SAFFERLING,
TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2001); SALVATORE ZAPPALÀ, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 14-15 (2003) (“Among concepts usually adopted in
comparative criminal procedure the distinction made between accusatorial and inquisitorial
criminal proceedings stand out. The purpose of this paragraph is not to discuss the validity of such
categories; on the contrary, it is accepted that this dichotomy is appropriate, at least for descriptive
purposes. Our intention is to adopt this categorization and apply it to international criminal
proceedings to try to explore the relationship between the provisions on the rights of the accused and
procedural mechanisms derived from one model or the other.”).
16 The classic description of managerial judging in U.S. civil procedure is found in Judith Resnik,
Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982). But the literature on this model is extensive. On
this literature, see the references cited in Section VII.

8

THE RISE OF MANAGERIAL JUDGING IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

[Vol. :

this transformation, the parties have much less control over their cases than
in the adversarial system.17
In showing that ICTY has moved in this direction,18 this article questions
the existing predominant analysis of ICTY procedure. According to that
analysis, ICTY criminal procedure started out close to the adversarial
system,19 but substantial reforms pushed it toward the inquisitorial system
from 1998 onwards.20
This article accepts the first part of that
characterization, because ICTY procedure was indeed primarily adversarial
during its early years.21 But the article challenges the second part by showing
that the post-1998 reforms have moved ICTY procedure not toward the
inquisitorial system, but toward managerial judging.22
Given that the managerial judging system also exists in U.S. civil
procedure, the discovery of managerial judging in ICTY also sheds light on
U.S. domestic procedures. Unlike U.S. civil procedure and ICTY procedure,
U.S. criminal procedure has remained close to the adversarial system despite
facing similar pressures to process cases faster.23 The article analyzes how it
is possible that three systems that were initially adversarial have moved in
two different directions when faced with similar time pressures. U.S.
criminal procedure has remained relatively close to the adversarial system,
while U.S. civil procedure and ICTY have moved toward managerial judging.
The article suggests that in the case of civil procedure, this may be related to

17 As mentioned, the classic description of this model is Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note
16. However, this article will develop its own version of this system, one that will be broader and at
the same time more detailed than the classic model (see Section VII).
18 See Section VIII.
19 See the bibliography cited supra note 10.
20 See the bibliography cited supra note 12.
21 See Sections 4 and 5.
22 See Sections 7, 8 and 9.
23 This article describes U.S. criminal procedure as adversarial, because it is still the parties who
have the main responsibility of carrying on the proceedings while the judge and the jury remain in a
relatively passive position limited to deciding issues presented by the parties. Some readers may
initially disagree with this characterization, though, given the extensive use of plea bargains in U.S.
criminal procedure, which may be considered a deviation from the adversarial system. Two
comments are on point. First, recall that this article uses the expression “adversarial system” as a
descriptive category that gives account of the predominant conception of criminal procedure in
common law jurisdictions. See supra note 5. So, normative conceptions of the adversarial system
that conceive it as inconsistent with plea bargains are not incompatible with this article’s approach.
In other words, one can state that, as a descriptive matter, plea bargains are an important part of U.S.
criminal procedure and still think that they should not be part of it. Furthermore, according to the
descriptive definition of the adversarial system that this article uses, criminal procedure in the
adversarial system is conceived as a dispute between two active parties before a passive umpire and
plea bargains would be part of the adversarial system in this descriptive sense. If the parties are
involved in a dispute, it is natural that they can negotiate and reach agreements about it.
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the parties’ status as private actors who cannot assume an official
responsibility to systematically expedite the docket.24
But the puzzle is more challenging regarding the different evolution of
U.S. and ICTY criminal procedures. This article suggests two broad reasons
for these divergent trajectories by analyzing differences between the U.S.
criminal justice system and ICTY. The first reason is that each of these
procedures presents a different institutional setting that has given judges
different opportunities to become active managers of cases. Relevant
differences here include different observance of the doctrine of separation of
powers, a narrower interpretation of the rights of defendants in ICTY, the
existence of grand juries and juries in U.S. criminal procedure but not in
ICTY, and, to move the U.S. system toward managerial judging, the need to
reach a broader consensus between the three branches of government than
ICTY requires.25
The second broad reason is that U.S. criminal procedure has had no
need to make the judge a more active case manager, because U.S.
prosecutors effectively have become the main managers of the criminal
justice system. This role is enabled by a strong enforcement apparatus,
grand juries, plea bargains for investigatory purposes, harsh criminal laws,
special statutes like RICO, and substantive criminal law that creates multiple
and overlapping offenses.26 ICTY prosecutors either have not had these tools
or gained them only gradually after the Tribunal’s procedure had already
moved toward managerial judging.27
By comparing U.S. civil and criminal procedures to ICTY procedure and
explaining their different trajectories in the face of similar pressures, this
article not only highlights features of U.S. domestic procedures and explains
their recent evolution, but also integrates U.S. domestic procedures into
debates about globalization of law. One of these debates is about the
convergence thesis, which holds that legal systems throughout the world are
gradually converging because they confront similar problems and
pressures.28 The comparative analysis of U.S. civil and criminal procedures

See Section X.
See infra footnotes 544-85 , and accompanying text.
26 See infra footnotes 586-612, and accompanying text.
27 See infra, footnotes 599, 602-604, and accompanying text.
28 On the debate about the convergence thesis, see, e.g., See THE GRADUAL CONVERGENCE (B.S.
Markesinis ed., 1994); Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converging, 45 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 52 (1996). For a discussion of the convergence thesis in criminal procedure, see, for
example, Diane Marie Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal Procedure in an
International Context, 75 IND. L.J. 809 (2000); Craig M. Bradley, The Convergence of the
Continental and the Common Law of Criminal Procedure, 7 CRIM. L.F. 471 (1996) (reviewing
24
25
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and ICTY shows that relatively similar systems may actually diverge in the
face of similar pressures.
This article will proceed in the following way. Sections II to V analyze
the first phase of the history of ICTY procedure—1994-1998—as a
competition between the adversarial and inquisitorial systems. This is
possible because during that period, the two traditional categories could
actually explain the evolution of this procedure. The basic difference
between these two systems is that in the adversarial system, criminal
procedure is conceived as a dispute between two active parties before a
passive judge and jury, while in the inquisitorial system, it is conceived as an
official investigation run by impartial officials who endeavor to determine the
truth.29
In Section II, the article shows that the competition between the
adversarial and inquisitorial systems—or any other procedural system—in
international criminal justice is actually broader than is usually supposed.
The adversarial and inquisitorial systems are not only two different
techniques for prosecuting and trying criminal cases, but also two different
procedural cultures that reflect two different basic conceptions of how
criminal prosecution and adjudication should be organized,30 two different
legal identities through which legal actors from common and civil law
countries define themselves,31 and two different ways to distribute powers
and responsibilities between the main actors and institutions of the criminal
justice system (courts, prosecutors, defense attorneys, etc.).32
By distinguishing the adversarial and inquisitorial systems at these four
levels, the article will provide theoretical tools to explain the evolution of
ICTY procedure over time. In Sections III to V, the article describes in detail
both the content of the adversarial and inquisitorial systems and the features
of ICTY procedure in its early years. The article shows that in its early years,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Phil Fennell et al. eds., 1995)); Nico Jörg et al.,
Are Inquisitorial and Adversarial Systems Converging?, in . CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN EUROPE: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY (Phil Fennell et al. eds., 1995).
29 The ideas of the dispute and the investigation have been used for comparative law purposes for
a long time. See, e.g., FAUSTIN HELIE, 5 TRAITE DE L'INSTRUCTION CRIMINELLE OU THEORIE DU CODE
D'INSTRUCTION CRIMINELLE 53 (1853).
30 For a conceptualization of the adversarial and inquisitorial systems as procedure cultures, see
Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea
Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL
LAW JOURNAL 1, 7-17 (2004).
31 This idea of using the adversarial and inquisitorial systems as legal identities is another new
idea explored in this article. For an analysis of common and civil law as identities, see H. PATRICK
GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD (2000).
32 On how the adversarial and inquisitorial systems differ regarding this point, see infra notes 7981, and accompanying text.
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ICTY criminal procedure was predominantly adversarial, despite certain
resistance to such a system by lawyers from civil law jurisdictions.33 The
initial procedure of ICTY was predominantly adversarial—even if it did not
have a jury or detailed rules of evidence—because it was party-driven, kept
judges in the role of passive umpires, and strongly favored live witnesses and
oral production of evidence at trial.34
In Section VI, the article shows that in the second phase of the history of
ICTY procedure—from 1998 onward—things have changed. The Tribunal
received intense criticism for the length of its trials and pace of its
proceedings,35 and international policymakers partly blamed the adversarial
system for these problems and decided to introduce substantial reforms.36
The two main reforms were to transform the passive judges of ICTY into
active managers of cases and to eliminate the preference for live witnesses
and oral production of evidence. In these ways, ICTY policymakers aimed to
speed up the docket.
Sections VII and VIII describe the managerial judging system in detail
and show that the reforms introduced in ICTY—and actually its whole
current procedure—are best explained by this model.37 These sections show
that ICTY has incorporated a substantial number of features of the
managerial judging system. These include, for instance, judges who are
active managers with the responsibility to expedite process; parties who are
not only zealous advocates of their positions but also collaborators with the
court in the goal to expedite process; formal and informal sanctions that
judges can apply when the parties do not comply with their assigned
expediting duties; expanded use of plea bargains; and judges’ active
encouragement of parties’ factual and legal agreements.38
In Section IX, the article analyzes two potential critiques to its main
argument that the reforms of ICTY criminal procedure are better described
as a move toward the managerial judging system rather than the inquisitorial
one. The first of these critiques is what the article calls the semantic critique.
According to this critique, this article’s disagreement with the all other
commentators’ analyses is not substantial, but merely semantic, in that our
disagreement arises from different definitions of the inquisitorial system.
Since we use different definitions, we reach different conclusions about ICTY

See infra notes 178, and accompanying text.
See especially Sections 4 and 5 on this point.
35 See infra notes 235-239, and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 240-261, and accompanying text.
37 A detailed description of the managerial judging system is provided in Section VII.
38 See Section VIII.
33

34
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reforms and procedure, but there is no real disagreement between us. The
article refutes the semantic critique in two ways. First, it shows that the
definition of the inquisitorial system used here is not substantially different
from the definition used by many commentators who have characterized
ICTY procedure as inquisitorial. Second, the article explains that beyond the
question of definitions, there is a real disagreement with other
commentators, because the debate is whether ICTY reforms have made its
procedure more like criminal procedure practices in civil law countries.
Other commentators implicitly or explicitly state that the reforms have done
this; this article shows that they have not.39
The second potential critique analyzed in Section IX is what this article
calls the hybridization critique. According to this critique, the new
procedure of ICTY fits in neither the adversarial nor the inquisitorial system
because it is merely a hybrid between them. Therefore, instead of proposing
a new model such as managerial judging to understand this procedure, it is
only necessary to describe which features of ICTY procedure correspond to
each of the two traditional systems. The article responds to this potential
critique primarily in two ways. First, it shows that some current features of
ICTY procedure that do not find any correlation in the predominant
contemporary conceptions of the adversarial and inquisitorial systems at the
national level. These features include the conception of the judge as an active
manager of cases to expedite the docket, and the conception of the parties as
collaborators with the court in the goal of expediting process. Thus, ICTY
procedure cannot simply be described as a hybrid between the two
traditional systems. Second, the article shows that even if there were some
influences of the inquisitorial system on ICTY reforms, these influences had
much less impact than did the goal of expediting the docket. It was this latter
goal that primarily shaped the reforms. In addition, any inquisitorial
influences on the reforms did not result in inquisitorial reforms or a move
toward the inquisitorial system, because the original inquisitorial ideas that
influenced the reforms were deeply transformed when translated from civil
law jurisdictions to the originally adversarial system of ICTY.40 For instance,
the inquisitorial idea of having active judges investigating the truth on their
own initiative was translated to ICTY as active judges controlling parties’
activities to expedite the process. This transformation is so deep that the

See infra notes 476-479, and accompanying text.
For analyses on the transformation that legal ideas and institutions may undergo when
transferred between legal systems, see Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations, supra
note 30; Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of 'Legal Transplants,' 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L.
111 (1997); Gunter Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends
Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998).
39

40
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reform itself cannot be characterized as inquisitorial, and thus it has not
moved ICTY procedure toward the inquisitorial system.41
Section IX explains that my disagreement with other commentators
does not originate from issues raised in the semantic and hybridization
critiques, but from a deeper phenomenon: a binary way of thinking about
international criminal procedure. The section shows that this binary way of
thinking has its origin not in the field of international criminal law, but in the
field of comparative criminal procedure.42 The latter field typically has used
the adversarial and inquisitorial systems as its only theoretical categories,
and has assumed that any criminal procedure in the world—or at least in the
West—must be adversarial or inquisitorial or at some point on the continuum
between these two poles.43 By showing that the managerial judging system
does not fit within this framework, the article questions this binary thinking
and calls for students of international and comparative criminal procedure to
think differently about their objects of study.
In Section X, the article explores a number of implications of the
discovery of managerial judging in ICTY. First, the section shows that the
managerial judging system not only provides a better description of both
ICTY procedure and the shift in the Tribunal’s predominant procedural
culture, but also highlights a shift in the way procedural powers and
responsibilities are distributed between the main actors of the Tribunal.
Unlike the adversarial system, in which the judge is a passive umpire and the
parties have the main power and responsibility for carrying on the
proceedings, in the managerial judging system the judge is the most powerful
figure who has the responsibility to make sure that the proceedings do not
get delayed because of the parties’ activities. In this sense, the rise of the
managerial judging system in ICTY reveals that there has been a transfer of
powers and responsibilities between institutional actors and professional
groups. Moving ICTY procedure from the adversarial to the managerial
judging system also has meant that judges have assumed powers and

41 These two as well as other responses to the hybridization critique are articulated infra notes
480-508, and accompanying text.
42 The basic difference between international and comparative criminal procedure is that while
the former analyzes the procedure of international criminal jurisdictions such as Nuremberg, Tokyo,
ICTY, ICTR and the ICC; the latter studies and compares criminal procedures from all over the
globe—including national and international.
43 See, e.g., SALVATORE ZAPPALÀ, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 10, at 14 (“Among concepts usually adopted in comparative criminal procedure the distinction
made between accusatorial and inquisitorial criminal proceedings stand out.”). A remarkable
exception here is MIRJAN DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY (1986), who develops
his own theoretical categories. Damaška’s work notwithstanding, the binary adversarial-inquisitorial
paradigm is still the predominant way to think about these issues.
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responsibilities formerly held by the office of the prosecutor and the defense
bar, and have become thereby the most powerful actors in the Tribunal.44
Section X also analyzes why ICTY judges chose not to move the
Tribunal’s procedure toward the inquisitorial system in the face of time
pressures. The section suggests two answers to this question. The first has to
do with characteristics of the inquisitorial system itself. With its emphasis on
determining the real truth, its written documentation of every single act of
the process and the high degree of formalization that comes with it, and its
distrust of consensual disposition of cases by the parties, the inquisitorial
system actually is not the fastest system for prosecuting and adjudicating
criminal cases.45 The second explanation is that the judges faced a situation
of path dependence.46 In other words, ICTY judges did not start from scratch
but from criminal procedural practices that were predominantly adversarial.
In this context, a shift from the adversarial to the managerial judging system
was much more feasible than a shift to the inquisitorial one.47 At first glance,
this result seems counterintuitive. Given that international criminal
tribunals have been created from scratch and the number of legal actors
participating in them is relatively low, one might assume that introducing
procedural reforms to these jurisdictions should be substantially easier than
in the national context. But the short history of ICTY warns against such an
assumption and illuminates the constraints on the evolution of criminal
procedure in international criminal tribunals.
Finally, Section X compares ICTY criminal procedure with U.S. civil and
criminal procedures. The section addresses why three procedural regimes
which started out close to the adversarial system have moved in two different

See Section X.
See infra notes 520-24, and accompanying text.
46 Questions of path dependence and the challenges it presents to legal analyses and legal reforms
have been recently explored in the literature of law and economics —i.e., in relation to issues like
corporate governance. See, for instance, Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path
Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999).
47 On the particularly challenging obstacles that procedural reforms face when importing legal
ideas and institutions from other legal traditions, see, e.g., Mirjan Damaska, The Uncertain Fate of
Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-American and Continental Experiences, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 839
(1997); Elisabetta Grande, Italian Criminal Justice: Borrowing and Resistance, 48 AM. J. COMP. L.
227 (2000); Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, in SELECTED WRITINGS
294, 310 (1978); John H. Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the United States, 43
AM. J. COMP. L. 545 (1995); John H. Langbein, The Influence of the German Emigrés on American
Law: The Curious Case of Civil and Criminal Procedure, in DER EINFLUSS DEUTSCHER EMIGRATEN
AUF DIE RECHTSENWICKLUNG IN DEN USA UND IN DEUTSCHLAND 321 (Marcus Lutter et al. eds., 1993);
Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations, supra note 30; William T. Pizzi &
Mariangela Montagna, The Battle to Establish an Adversarial Trial System in Italy, 25 MICHIGAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 429 (2004).
44
45
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directions when confronted by similar pressures to expedite their dockets.
U.S. criminal procedure has remained close to the adversarial ideal, while
U.S. civil procedure and ICTY have moved toward managerial judging. The
article suggests that in the case of U.S. civil procedure, the move toward
managerial judging is partly explained by the fact that the parties to civil
litigation are private actors who thus cannot assume an official, public
responsibility to systematically speed up the docket.48 In the case of U.S. and
ICTY criminal procedures, the section emphasizes the two broad distinctions
between these procedures already mentioned that explain the different paths
they have taken: the relative power that judges have in each of these
institutional settings, and the fact that U.S. criminal procedure has had no
need to move toward managerial judging because U.S. prosecutors have been
more successful managers of cases than their ICTY counterparts.49
By comparing ICTY with U.S. civil and criminal procedures, the article
helps to explain the trajectory that U.S. domestic procedures have followed in
the last decades and integrates these procedures into broader discussions on
globalization of law, such as the debate about the convergence thesis
described above. The divergent trajectories of ICTY and U.S. criminal
procedure also shows that an adversarial criminal procedure subjected to
external pressures to process cases more swiftly has at least two different sets
of options available to respond to those pressures: to maintain the
adversarial system by giving the prosecutor tools with which to manage cases
effectively, or to move toward managerial judging. Even if this article will
not analyze which of the two options is normatively better, it will leave the
ground ready for such analysis by showing that policymakers dealing with an
adversarial criminal procedure facing such pressures have these two options
available; and that, beyond the policy implications, these are two potential
paths that an adversarial system may take when subject to this kind of
pressures. In this way, this article will show that procedural models such as
managerial judging are useful platforms not only for explaining the recent
evolution of ICTY and U.S. domestic systems, but also for exploring future
modification and normative evaluations of international and domestic
procedures.

48
49

See infra footnote 543 , and accompanying text.
See infra footnotes 544-612, and accompanying text.
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II. THE COMPETITION OF THE ADVERSARIAL AND INQUISITORIAL SYSTEMS
IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
There is no question that the adversarial and inquisitorial systems of
common and civil law have been important in the creation and evolution of
international criminal procedure.50 It is because of that impact that the
evolution of at least part of international criminal procedure can be described
as a competition between these two systems. In the next three sections, this
article will analyze the first phase of the history of ICTY procedure—19941998—as a competition between adversarial and inquisitorial conceptions of
the criminal process. In order to do this, it is necessary to explain first what
this competition has been about. This competition is broader than most
would imagine, because it is a competition between not only two different
techniques of prosecuting criminal cases, but also two different procedural
cultures, two distinct legal identities, and two different ways to distribute
powers and responsibilities between the main actors in criminal procedure.
This section will demonstrate this point and develop theoretical tools that
will be used later to analyze the evolution of the procedure of ICTY and the
rise of the managerial judging system within it.
International criminal procedure has been conceived in terms of the
adversarial and inquisitorial systems, but these systems are much more older
than international criminal law. In fact, the differences between the criminal
procedures of common law and civil law traditions can be traced back as far
as the thirteenth century, when England and continental Europe developed
different systems to replace then-prevailing practices that had been in place

50 See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6, at 364-88 (framing
his analysis of international criminal trials in terms of the adversarial and inquisitorial systems);
Benjamin B. Ferencz, supra note 6, at 144 (1948-1949) (“The landmarks of international law which
have been erected in Nuremberg rest on a foundation of legal procedure which has satisfied the
traditional safeguards of Continental and American law”); Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Trends in
International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague, Arusha, supra note 6, at 727
(1999) (“A feature of the historic and modern international criminal trials is that they have been
bench trials…The approach to evidence has been to use elements from both the common law and civil
law systems. Thus, the presentation of evidence has followed the ‘adversarial model’, whereas the
rules governing the admissibility of evidence may be seen as more akin to the ‘inquisitorial’ model
and leave wide discretion to the judges”), at 729 (“The Charter gave the Nuremberg Tribunal wide
discretion when it came to the admissibility of evidence. Although the trials were adversarial and the
parties alone were responsible for calling the evidence, the judges were sitting without a jury, and the
common law rules designed to prevent jurors from hearing prejudicial evidence were discarded in
favour of a liberal approach akin to that of civil law systems.”); Alphons Orie, supra note 6, at 1439
(framing his analysis of international criminal proceedings in terms of the adversarial and
inquisitorial systems).
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Empire.51

since the fall of the Western Roman
While continental
jurisdictions started to develop bureaucracies in which professional officials
were put in charge of prosecuting, investigating and adjudicating criminal
cases, England placed greater reliance on lay persons to perform these
tasks.52
Both systems expanded all over the world through processes such as
colonization, civilization, modernization, and globalization.53 Both also
changed substantially over time,54 and, through a process of mutual influence
upon each other, adopted features or elements from one another.55 But even
today, and despite this persisting mutual influence, jurisdictions under
common and civil law present substantial differences in their respective
conceptions of criminal procedure.56 From at least the 19th century onward,
the adversarial and the inquisitorial have been the two main categories

51 For a description of the system of ordeals, trial by combat, and oaths prevalent in Europe prior
to the thirteenth century and an explanation of why this disappeared, see ROBERT BARTLETT, TRIAL BY
FIRE AND WATER (1986).
52 A classic account is ADHEMAR ESMEIN, HISTOIRE DE LA PROCEDURE CRIMINELLE EN FRANCE
(1882). There is an English edition of this work: ADHEMAR ESMEIN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (John Simpson trans., 1968) (1882). For contemporary accounts of these
developments, see FRANCO CORDERO, PROCEDURA PENALE 16-101 (2d ed. 1993); JOHN H. LANGBEIN,
PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE (1974); JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY
CRIMINAL TRIAL (2003); JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF (1977); JULIO B.J.
MAIER, 1 DERECHO PROCESAL PENAL § 5 (2d ed. 1996); JEAN-PIERRE ROYER, HISTOIRE DE LA JUSTICE
EN FRANCE: DE LA MONARCHIE ABSOLUE A LA REPUBLIQUE (2d ed. 1996).
53 On the expansion of the common law throughout the world, see KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN
KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 218-37 (3d ed. 1998). For a description of how the
inquisitorial system was imposed and developed in Latin America, see MAIER, supra note 52, §
5(D)(8). For an analysis of these developments in a number of African, Asian and Inter-American
countries, see JEAN PRADEL, DROIT PENAL COMPARE 186-201 (1995).
54 On these changes over time, see all the historical works cited supra note 52.
55 For a description of some of these influences from contemporary adversarial systems (mainly
the U.S.) on continental-European and Latin American ones, see Grande, supra note 47; Langer,
From Legal Transplants to Legal Translation, supra note 30. Classic examples of influences from
the adversarial on the inquisitorial include the introduction of oral and public trials and trials by jury
in most continental European countries during the XIX Century. For an analysis of these reforms,
see, for instance, the articles included in THE TRIAL BY JURY IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY 17001900 (Antonio Padoa Schioppa ed., 1987). A classic example of the inquisitorial model influencing
the adversarial one is the development of a public prosecution system by the United States as a
result of the influences of the Dutch and French criminal justice systems. See Albert J. Reiss, Jr.,
Public Prosecutors and Criminal Prosecution in the United States of America, 1975 THE JURIDICAL
REVIEW 1; ANDRÉ FOURNIER, CODE DE PROCEDURE CRIMINELLE DE L’ÉTAT DE NEW-YORK 9 (1893).
56 For recent accounts on these differences, see, e.g., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, A WORLDWIDE STUDY
(Craig M. Bradley ed. 1999); JOHN HATCHARD ET. AL., COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1996);
WILLIAM T. PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH (1999); STEPHEN C. THAMAN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE (2002).

18

THE RISE OF MANAGERIAL JUDGING IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

[Vol. :

differences.57

designed to capture these
As the differences have changed over
time, the content of these categories has also changed.58 But to the extent
that there are persisting differences between common and civil law
jurisdictions, the distinction between the adversarial and the inquisitorial
systems still has an important heuristic value.
In the adversarial system, criminal procedure consists of a dispute or
contest between two active parties before a passive professional judge and a
passive jury. The contest consists of the prosecution attempting to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed an offense, while
the defense tries to disprove this hypothesis. In the inquisitorial system,
criminal procedure consists of an official investigation, run by one or more
impartial officials of the state—judges and prosecutors—in order to
determine the truth. A number of features—which are analyzed in greater
detail in sections IV and V—characterize and distinguish the adversarial
system as against the inquisitorial system: a bifurcated court composed of a
professional judge and a jury, as against a unitary court dominated by
professional judges; judges as passive umpires, as against actively
investigating judges; the prosecutor conceived as a party in a contest with the
defense, as against the prosecutor conceived as an impartial official; broad
prosecutorial discretion, as against limited prosecutorial discretion; common
law rules of evidence, as against no detailed rules of evidence; and so on.59
Given these differences, the adversarial and inquisitorial systems handle
criminal cases and the human and material resources of the criminal justice
system differently. Thus, choosing between these two systems of criminal
procedure may have an impact on how accurately an international

57 The expressions “accusatorial” and “inquisitorial” were already in use during the XII century in
Europe “to distinguish a process that required the impetus of a private complainant to get under way
(processus per accusationem) from a process that could be launched in his absence (processus per
inquisitionem)” (DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY, supra note 43, at 3 (1986).
The modern use of these expressions, which conceives of the accusatorial and the inquisitorial not as
two different ways of initiating procedures but rather as two comprehensive procedural systems, was
likely to have developed during the XIX century. The first such usage of which I am aware is FAUSTIN
HÉLIE, 5 TRAITÉ DE L’INSTRUCTION CRIMINELLE OU THÉORIE DU CODE D’INSTRUCTION CRIMINALLE 4765 (1853).
58 On the different meanings of the adversarial and the inquisitorial not only in comparative law
but also in other contexts, see Mirjan Damaška, Adversary System, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND
JUSTICE 24 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983); and Máximo Langer, La Dicotomía acusatorio-inquisitivo
y la importación de mecanismos procesales de la tradición juridical anglosajona. Algunas
reflexiones a partir del procedimiento abreviado, in EL PROCEDIMIENTO ABREVIADO 97, at 102-111
(Julio B.J. Maier & Alberto Bovino eds., 2001).
59 For an analysis in detail of the content of the adversarial and inquisitorial systems as defined in
the text, see Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations, supra note 30.
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innocent60

jurisdiction distinguishes the guilty from the
and establishes the
historical background that led to mass atrocities,61 how swiftly cases are
investigated, prosecuted and adjudicated, how fair or unfair international
criminal proceedings are perceived to be by the public,62 and similar issues.
In this sense, the competition between the adversarial and inquisitorial
systems in the early years of ICTY can be understood as a competition
between two different techniques to handle international criminal cases, and
about which of these two techniques would better enable ICTY to achieve its
goals.63
But besides being a competition between two different sets of techniques
to handle criminal cases, it was also a competition between cultures.64 The
adversarial and inquisitorial systems are not only two different techniques,
but also two different conceptions of how criminal prosecution and

60 Of course, it is not easy to tell whether a certain system distinguishes between guilty and
innocent better than others. But even if it is difficult to tell this with certainty, it is still possible
andsensible to make assessments in this respect. For a sophisticated work that, based on 20th
century epistemology, articulates which features criminal law and criminal procedure have to possess
in order to be as accurate as possible in distinguishing guilty and innocent—especially in not
convicting the innocent—see LUIGI FERRAJOLI, DIRITTO E RAGIONE: TEORIA DEL GARANTISMO PENALE
(1989).
61 For instance, Madaleine Albright, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and former
U.S. Secretary of State, stated that the primary purpose of the Tribunal should be to “establish the
historical record before the guilty can reinvent the truth” (see Michael Scharf & Valerie Epps, The
International Trial of the Century? A "Cross-Fire" Exchange on the First Case Before the Yugoslavia
War Crimes Tribunal, 29 Cornell Int'l L.J. 635, 660 (1996)). On the work of ICTY in creating such a
historical record, see Richard A. Wilson, How Have International Criminal Tribunals Written
Histories of Mass Atrocities?, 27 Human Rights Quarterly (forthcoming 2005).
62 On the link between people’s perception of procedural fairness and their acceptance of the
procedure’s outcome, see, for instance, TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
63 On the goals of ICTY in particular and of international criminal justice in general, see, for
instance, Ninth Annual Report ICTY, August 14, 2002, para. 328 (the goals given to the Tribunal by
the U.N. Security Council have been to combat impunity and render justice to the victims of war
crimes and crimes against humanity); U.N. Under-Secretary General for Legal Affairs, Carl August
Fleishhauer, stated that ICTY had the goals of “ending war crimes, brining the perpetrators to justice
and breaking an endless cycle of ethnic violence and retribution” (see Scharf & Epps, supra note 61,
at 660).
64 The concept of culture has been recently under attack because it would suggest boundness,
homogeneity, coherence, stability, and structure whereas social reality would be characterized by
variability, inconsistencies, conflict, change and individual agency. See, e.g., Lila Abu-Lughod,
Writing against Culture, in RECAPTURING ANTHROPOLOGY: WORKING IN THE PRESENT (Richard G. Fox
ed. 1991); Roger M. Keesing, Theories of culture revisited, in ASSESSING CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 301
(Robert Borofsky ed. 1994). For a convincing defense of why it is possible to use the concept of
culture without assuming any of its allegedly problematic features, see Christoph Brumann, Writing
for Culture, 40 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY S1 (1999).
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adjudication should be carried
Hence, the adversarial and inquisitorial
systems can also be understood as two different procedural cultures.66 For
instance, judges in an adversarial system act as passive umpires not only as a
technique for handling criminal cases, but also because they and most other
actors in an adversarial system assume that this is the only proper way for a
judge to behave. Thus, if an individual judge behaves in too active a way—for
instance, by constantly questioning witnesses during trial—the other actors
in the system may consider this activism improper.67 Similarly, if a judge in
an inquisitorial system were to let the prosecution and defense run the trial
completely, this passivity might be considered an abdication of the proper
judicial role within an inquisitorial conception of criminal procedure.68
Within each of these cultures it is possible to distinguish two different
elements. First, each culture presents a set of basic ideas about what
prosecution and adjudication of criminal cases should entail. These sets of
basic ideas can be understood as two different structures of interpretation
and meaning through which the different participants in the criminal
adjudication process (prosecutors, judges, defense attorneys, etc.)
understand criminal procedure and their respective roles within the
system.69 The adversarial structure of interpretation and meaning includes,
among other features, a conception of criminal procedure as a contest
between two parties before a passive umpire, with prosecutorial discretion,
common law rules of evidence, and a bifurcated court composed of a judge
and a jury. The inquisitorial structure of interpretation and meaning
includes, among other features, a conception of criminal procedure as an
official investigation conducted by impartial officials, with limited

65 For an analysis of international criminal jurisdictions as an encounter of lawyers with different
cultural and legal backgrounds, see Tochilovsky, Legal Systems and Cultures in the International
Criminal Court, supra note 10, at 627.
66 For a conceptualization of the adversarial and inquisitorial systems as procedural cultures, see
Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations, supra note 30.
67 On the passive role of the judge in the United States during trial, see, e.g., Craig M. Bradley,
United States, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 395, 421-22 (Craig M. Bradley ed.,
1999).
68 On the active role of judges during trial in Germany as representative of civil law jurisdictions,
see, e.g., § 155, II and § 244, II StPO (German Criminal Procedure Code). For an analysis of these
provisions, see CLAUS ROXIN, STRAFVERFAHRENSRECHT 94-5 (1998).
69 I take the expression “structures of meaning” from Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Fact and
Law in Comparative Perspective, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE
ANTHROPOLOGY 167, at 182 (1983) (“The turn of anthropology … toward heightened concern with
structures of meaning in terms of which individuals and groups of individuals live out their lives, and
more particularly with the symbols and systems of symbols through whose agency such structures are
formed, communicated, imposed, shared, altered, reproduced, offers as much promise for the
comparative analysis of law as it does for myth, ritual, ideology, art, or classification systems, the
more tested fields of its application.” Id.)
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prosecutorial discretion, no detailed rules of evidence, and a unitary court
dominated by professional judges.70
Furthermore, to the extent that a particular set of ideas, or structure of
interpretation and meaning, is internalized by a substantial number of legal
actors within an adversarial or inquisitorial system, it also becomes part of
the internal dispositions of these legal actors.71 These internal dispositions
shaped by particular procedural structures of interpretation and meaning are
internalized through a number of socialization processes (e.g., law schools,
judiciary schools, prosecutor’s office and law firm training, interaction with
the courts).72 As a result of this socialization, a substantial number of actors
in the criminal justice system are predisposed to understand criminal
procedure and the various roles within it in a particular way, and these
dispositions become durable over time.73 Thus, as a consequence of their
internalization of an adversarial structure of interpretation and meaning,
most legal actors in common law countries will consider that judges are not
supposed to behave very actively, that prosecutors have to have broad
discretion to file and dismiss charges, and so on. A similar process would
occur with legal actors in inquisitorial jurisdictions regarding inquisitorial
structures of interpretation and meaning.
In the context of our analysis of ICTY criminal procedure and how it has
evolved over time, this conceptualization of the adversarial and inquisitorial
systems as procedural cultures, and the distinction between structures of
interpretation and meaning and internal dispositions within each of them are
important for the following reason. Given that lawyers coming from

70 For a more detailed description of the concept “structure of interpretation and meaning” and
its application to the adversarial and inquisitorial systems, see Langer, From Legal Transplants to
Legal Translations, supra note 30.
71 My source of inspiration for the development of this dimension of internal dispositions is
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus which can be defined as “a set of dispositions which
induce agents to act and react in certain ways. The dispositions generate practices, perceptions and
attitudes which are ‘regular’ without being consciously co-ordinated or governed by any ‘rule’.” John
B. Thompson, Editor’s Introduction to PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 1, 12 (Gino
Raymond & Matthew Adamson trans., John B. Thompson ed. 1991). Pierre Bourdieu describes his
notion of habitus in other works as well. PIERRE BOURDIEU, RAISONS PRATIQUES: SUR LA THÉORIE DE
L’ACTION 22-23 (1994); PIERRE BOURDIEU, Some Properties of Fields, in SOCIOLOGY IN QUESTION 72
(Richard Nice trans., 1993). I assert that the dimension of internal dispositions is only inspired by
Bourdieu’s concept, because I do not follow his theoretical framework in this article. Thus, my use of
it is idiosyncratic.
72 For a description of how lawyers, judges, prosecutors, and professors are trained and socialized
in civil law countries, see, for example, JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 101-10
(2d ed. 1985).
73 For a more detailed description of the concept “internal dispositions” and its application to the
adversarial and inquisitorial systems, see Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations,
supra note 30.
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adversarial and inquisitorial systems to participate in ICTY may have
different sets of internal dispositions about how to handle criminal cases,
they may tend to think and behave according to these preconceptions when
designing the rules of the tribunal, pleading about legal issues, managing the
pre-trial and trial phases, adjudicating criminal cases, and other matters. In
this sense, the conceptualization of adversarial and inquisitorial systems as
procedural cultures has not only a descriptive but also an explanatory value.74
In other words, it will help us to understand not only what kind of procedure
ICTY has, but also why and how this procedure has changed over time. The
competition between the adversarial and the inquisitorial procedural
cultures in ICTY has happened through the interactions of individual legal
actors coming from each of these traditions, and the relative power of groups
from each tradition may influence the outcome of the competition between
these two conceptions of criminal procedure.
This does not mean that the predominance of one system over the other
is only determined by the relative power of actors with inquisitorial or
adversarial internal dispositions, or by internal dispositions in general.
Many other factors also influenced the evolution of this competition, such as
time and resource constraints, practical problems and needs, external
political pressures on ICTY, institutional constraints, and the personal
agendas of people with decision-making power regarding the tribunal,
among others. But the internal dispositions and relative power of the
policymakers and legal actors of international jurisdictions have also
influenced these developments, so they also must be included in
international criminal procedure analyses.
In addition to being two different techniques to handle criminal cases
and two different procedural cultures, the adversarial and inquisitorial labels
can work, in some contexts, as legal identities.75 In other words, legal actors

74 On the distinction between the descriptive, explanatory and normative levels, see, e.g., William
B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371 (2001). A way to describe
the differences between these three levels is that at the descriptive level, we ask the question “what is
X?”; at the explanatory level, we ask the question “why is X this way?”; and at the normative level, we
ask the question “is it good or bad that X is this way?”
75 I believe that the adversarial and inquisitorial systems may work in some contexts as legal
identities because they do not necessarily have to operate as such. There is no question that the
adversarial and inquisitorial systems are two different procedural cultures or two different clusters of
procedural cultures. However, this does not mean that legal actors in all of these systems consider
the sharing of these cultural features as definitional of who they are as legal actors. This shows that
the concepts of culture and identity—which often merge—should be analytically distinguished. For
instance, social actors may share a number of features—i.e., being factory workers—without attaching
to them the importance of defining who they are. Conversely, identities may not be based on strong
cultural differences. Some people may say that this was the case in the former Yugoslavia before the
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may view the labels as defining who they are as legal actors—and who they
are not.76 In the same way in which many people think that gender, sexual
orientation, race, ethnicity, religion, class, or age are important features in
understanding and defining what kinds of persons they are,77 lawyers have
also thought that coming from an adversarial or inquisitorial system may also
be important in understanding and defining themselves as legal actors.78
This identity role of the traditional legal systems has been particularly
relevant in the context of ICTY, where interactions with “the other”—the
lawyer coming from a legal tradition different from one’s own—are a daily
experience. Thus, these identity roles are also important in order to explain
ICTY criminal procedure and its evolution over time.
Besides being two different techniques to handle criminal cases, two
different procedural cultures and two potential legal identities, the
adversarial and inquisitorial systems also differ at another level that can be
beginning of the 1990s. For instance, Croats and Serbs basically shared the same language, territory,
political system, and so forth, and still saw themselves as deeply distinct from each other.
76 This idea of using the adversarial and inquisitorial systems as legal identities is another new
idea explored in this article. For an analysis of common and civil law as identities, see GLENN, supra
note 31.
77 On the role of identities in U.S. legal discourse during the 70s and 80s, see DUNCAN KENNEDY, A
CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997).
78 For instance, in the United States, the word "adversarial" has been used in laudatory terms in
reference to U.S. criminal process, which had its earliest origins in England’s struggles for rights
against the authoritarian monarchy. These struggles continued in the Colonies and finally found
their way into the Bill of Rights. In this construction of the adversarial, the inquisitorial refers to the
contemporary criminal procedures of continental Europe that would still be considered
authoritarian—i.e., eliciting confessions in a coercive way. For an example of this construction of the
adversarial and the inquisitorial in the United States, see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442-43, 459-60. In
this construction of the adversarial, some American lawyers are saying that using compulsory
techniques to obtain confessions would be unacceptable for them because it goes against their
American adversarial conception of the criminal process, which is different from the one prevailing in
the civil law. (For another use of the terms in the United States that is not presented in a laudatory
way and is focused on the role of the judge in each of these systems, see, for example, McNeil v.
Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n.2 (1991).) In continental Europe, one of the most widespread uses of
the accusatorial and the inquisitorial for defining their criminal procedure practices has been the
following. The accusatorial is used to refer to the modern Anglo-American criminal procedures—and
the ones that prevailed in continental Europe from the fall of the Western Roman Empire until the
thirteenth century—that are usually considered inefficient in law enforcement terms; the inquisitorial
refers to the criminal procedures that prevailed in continental Europe from the thirteenth to the
nineteenth centuries, that are usually characterized as authoritarian.The modern continental
European criminal procedures would constitute a mixed system that combines the best of the two
systems. So, the way many European lawyers have constructed their criminal procedure identity is by
opposing it to both their old European inquisitorial past—by saying something like “we are
substantially different from our historical antecessors in the way we understand criminal procedure”,
and the current Anglo-American process—by saying some like “but also substantially different from
Anglo-Americans.” For an example of this use in early twentieth-century France, see RENE GARRAUD,
1 TRAITE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE D'INSTRUCTION CRIMINELLE ET DE PROCEDURE PENALE 10-22 (1907).
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powers.79

called the dimension of procedural
Each of these systems assigns
different quanta of procedural powers and responsibilities to the main actors
of criminal procedure—judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, etc. For
example, the inquisitorial decisionmaker, as an active investigator, has more
procedural power—e.g., to act sua sponte—than the adversarial judge or
jury.80 This also means that both the prosecution and the defense in the
inquisitorial system are comparatively less powerful than in the adversarial
one. An example of this is the power that the defense has in the adversarial
system to do its own pre-trial investigation—a power generally not present in
inquisitorial models.81 Varying procedural powers among individual actors
are also reflected at the institutional level in the power relations between the
prosecutor’s office, the judiciary, the defense bar, and other institutions.
In this sense, the competition between adversarial and inquisitorial
systems in ICTY can also be understood as a competition about which actors
and institutions will have more power and responsibilities within this
international jurisdiction.
If the adversarial system prevailed, both
prosecutors and defense attorneys would have more procedural powers and
responsibilities in handling international criminal cases vis-à-vis the judges.
If the inquisitorial system prevailed, it would be the other way around. As
with the three previous distinctions between the traditional systems as two
separate procedural techniques, cultures and legal identities, the dimension
of procedural power also has descriptive and normative value. From a
descriptive perspective, it is useful to show that the competition between
adversarial and inquisitorial systems is also about which professional group,
judges or prosecutors, will have the main role in handling international
criminal cases. From an explanatory perspective, this dimension of
procedural powers also may be useful to explain some of the changes that the
procedure of ICTY has undergone over time.

79 For a more detailed description of the dimension of procedural power and its application to the
adversarial and inquisitorial systems, see Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations,
supra note 30.
80 This is clear if we compare the active judges of the inquisitorial system with the jury of the
adversarial one. The inquisitorial judges are also more powerful than adversarial professional judges
because of their power to decide which evidence is produced at trial and the order in which it is
presented, as well as through their power to lead the interrogation of witnesses and expert witnesses.
However, this last statement must be qualified. The adversarial judges have inherent powers -- i.e.,
contempt powers -- that the inquisitorial ones lack. In addition, since there is less hierarchical
control over the decisions of the adversarial judges than the decisions of inquisitorial judges, the
former also have more power in this respect.
81 Regarding France, see, e.g., Valérie Dervieux, The French System, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURES 218, 250 (Mireille Delmas-Marty & J. R. Spencer eds., 2002).
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To sum up this section, then, the adversarial and inquisitorial systems
can be distinguished at four different levels. They can be understood as two
techniques to handle criminal cases; two procedural cultures—including here
both structures of interpretation and meaning, and internal dispositions of
the legal actors; two legal identities; and two different ways to distribute
powers and responsibilities between the main actors in criminal procedure.
In any given jurisdiction—national or international—these four different
levels work simultaneously in a given set of institutional practices.82 But in
the context of this article, it is important to distinguish them conceptually for
three different reasons.
First, these theoretical distinctions between adversarial and inquisitorial
systems provide us with theoretical tools to analyze and explain how the
criminal procedure of ICTY has evolved over time. Even if these four levels
cannot account for all the changes that ICTY criminal procedure has
undergone over time,83 they have played an important role in this evolution.
Second, the distinction between these four different conceptual levels at
which the adversarial and inquisitorial systems differ is also helpful to
identify what the competition between adversarial and inquisitorial systems
in international criminal justice is about. To some extent, that competition is
about which of the two systems can better achieve the goals of international
criminal procedure. But at the same time, it is a less rational competition
about which of the two procedural cultures and identities will prevail in the
international arena, and what institutions will have the main role in handling
international criminal cases. Finally, distinguishing between these four
levels also is important in order to analyze the rise of the managerial judging
system in ICTY. As will be shown later in Sections VII to IX, even if this
system has not been used as a legal identity by ICTY legal actors, it is—like
the adversarial and inquisitorial systems—a technique to prosecute and
adjudicate criminal cases, a procedural culture, and a particular way to
distribute powers and responsibilities between the main actors of the
criminal justice system.

82 As I explained supra note 82, the adversarial and inquisitorial are not necessarily used as legal
identities in every criminal procedure jurisdiction, even if they operate as such in many. But the three
other dimensions—the adversarial and the inquisitorial as procedural techniques, as procedure
cultures, and as different ways to distribute powers and responsibilities between the main actors of
the criminal justice system—are present in all of them.
83 Other factors such as time, practical constraints, and external political pressures also have
played an important role and will be considered in this article’s analysis of the evolution of ICTY
procedure.
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III. THE CREATION OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF ICTY AND ITS
FOUNDATIONAL TEXTS
The U.N. Security Council established ICTY for the “purpose of
prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia” after
199184 in an attempt to “put an end to such crimes and to take effective
measures to bring to justice the persons who are responsible for them.”85
Given that this was the first international tribunal established after the
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials —and according to some, the first truly
international criminal tribunal ever created86—designing its basic
organization and structure was a new and complex process of institutional
engineering.87
In the case of criminal procedure, this complexity arose partly from the
specific characteristics of ICTY in particular and of international criminal
jurisdictions in general in comparison to national legal systems.88 First, the
Tribunal has not had its own coercive apparatus in order to enforce its arrest
warrants, seize property of the accused, investigate and obtain evidence in
national territories, protect and guarantee the presence of witnesses, or fulfill
similar functions.89 For all these tasks, it has had to rely on the collaboration
of national states90 and the international community.91 Second, there has

84 ICTY has basically prosecuted and tried events that transpired between the periods 1992-95 in
Bosnia; 1991-95 in Croatia, and 1998-99 in Kosovo.
85 UN Security Council Resolution 827, S /RES/827 (1993).
86 See SAFFERLING, supra note 15, at 34.
87 For an analysis of the process that led to the creation of ICTY, see, e.g., GARY JONATHAN BASS,
STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS (2000).
88 For an analysis of other problems that ICTY and the International Tribunal for Rwanda had to
face that I will not analyze in the text, see Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the
Effective Operation and Functioning of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 18-32, U.N. Doc. A/54/634 of 22 November 1999
[hereinafter Expert Group].
89 See, e.g., CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6, at 442 (“The crucial problem
international criminal courts face is the lack of enforcement agencies directly available to those
courts”).
90 This problem did not exist in Nuremberg where the Allied Powers had total control over
German territory, but it has been particularly relevant given the resistance that many of the countries
which were part of the former Yugoslavia have shown toward the Tribunal. In addition, it is a
problem that not only the ICTY but also the International Criminal Court has to face. This is why the
relationship between the international criminal jurisdictions and national legal systems has had such
a central role in recent international criminal justice discussions. For analyses of this issue, see, e.g.,
Flavia Lattanzi, The International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions, in THE ROME STATUTE
OF THE ICC: A CHALLENGE TO IMPUNITY 177 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2001); GÖNTER
SLUITER, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL ADJUDICATION AND THE COLLECTION OF EVIDENCE: OBLIGATIONS OF
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Hague92

been a physical distance between the Tribunal located in The
and
the sites where the crimes occurred in the former Yugoslavia that has been
inconvenient both for investigative purposes and for conducting criminal
trials.93 In addition, every international criminal tribunal has to deal with
the question of translations between different languages, which not only
increases the costs of its operations, but also substantially lengthens its
proceedings.94 Furthermore, international criminal tribunals have to deal
with the hybridization of legal systems and the different understandings that
lawyers coming from very different legal traditions may have about them,
which may lengthen the proceedings and hamper their effectiveness.95
Finally, prosecuting and trying international crimes usually involve proving
STATES (2002); Ruth Wedgwood, National Courts and the Prosecution of War Crimes, in I
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 391 (Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald & Olivia Swaak-Goldman eds., 2000).
91 See, e.g., Sixth Annual Report of ICTY, August 25, 1999, Summary (“because the Tribunal lacks
effective enforcement powers to remedy such obstructionism, it continues to rely on the international
community to bring such States into compliance with their clear obligations under international
law.”) and para. 3-7.
92 Article 31 of the Statute of ICTY establishes that the “International Tribunal shall have its seat
at The Hague” (See Statute of the International Tribunal 32 I.L.M. 1192 [hereinafter Statute]). But
Rule 4 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of ICTY says that “(a) Chamber may exercise its
functions at a place other than the seat of the Tribunal, if so authorized by the President in the
interests of justice”. However, this power has not been exercised by any of the Chambers of ICTY.
The Statute of the International Criminal Court presents a similar regulation of this issue, by
establishing that the Court shall be established in The Hague but that a Chamber may sit elsewhere,
whenever it considers it desirable (see Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 3
(adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998), A/CN.4/L.490), [hereinafter Rome Statute]). The
regionalization of international criminal law enforcement could open new possibilities regarding this
issue. On this discussion, see generally William W. Burke-White, Regionalization of International
Criminal Law Enforcement: A Preliminary Exploration, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 729 (2003) .
93 The distance of ICTY from the places where the events occurred also may have had an impact
on the legitimacy of the Tribunal in the former Yugoslavia. See, e.g., Sixth Annual Report of ICTY,
August 25, 1999, para. 148 (“The Tribunal is viewed negatively by large segments of the population of
the former Yugoslavia…Throughout the region, the Tribunal is often viewed as remote and
disconnected from the population and there is little information available about it.”). For an analysis
of the problems that trials for mass atrocities face when not held in the place where the events
happened , see Jaime Malamud Goti, The Moral Dilemmas about Trying Pinochet in Spain, 32 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1 (2001).
94 See, e.g, CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6, at 443. The official languages
of ICTY are English and French (Article 33 of the Statute and Rule 3 (A)), but the trials are also
translated to other languages such as of Serbo-Croatian. The problem of translating documents and
proceedings has been an issue since Nuremberg. See, for instance, TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 125-6,
140-1, 165, 173, etc. In the case of the International Criminal Court, its official languages are Arabic,
Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish, though its working languages are only English and
French (see Article 50 of the Rome Statute).
95 See, e.g., CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6, at 442 (“[T]here exists a need
for international criminal courts to amalgamate different judges, each with a varied cultural and
legal background… Some come from common law countries, others from States with a civil law
tradition.”).
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complex factual issues such as the existence of a widespread or systematic
practice—as with crimes against humanity—or looking into the historical or
social context of the criminal conduct.96 This complexity not only lengthens
the proceedings but also presents all kinds of challenges to the investigation,
prosecution, defense, and adjudication of international criminal cases.
The drafters of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of ICTY had few
precedents to follow for their task. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Rules of
Procedure were too brief to provide a useful model for reference.97 In
comparison to international criminal law, international criminal procedure at
the time ICTY was created was—and still is today, though to a much lesser
extent98—an almost completely undeveloped field of law.99 To make things
even more difficult, both the drafters of the Statute of ICTY (hereinafter the
Statute) and the drafters of ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence had very
limited time in which to design these documents.
The U.N. Secretary-General assigned the task of drafting the Statute to
the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, which had only 60 days to issue
it.100 Contrary to what is widely stated by commentators,101 the drafted

96 See, e.g., Sixth Annual Report of ICTY, August 25, 1999, para. 13 (“The Tribunal’s cases involve
complex legal and factual issues, as well as the application of legal principles that have not previously
been interpreted or applied”); and CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6, at 442-43.
97 In Nuremberg, the Rules of Procedure of the International Military Tribunal for the major war
criminals only included eleven rules; in Tokyo, only nine (see Rules of Procedure of the International
Military
Tribunal
for
the
Far
East,
25
April
1946,
available
at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imtferul.htm.). However, as we will see below, despite the
brevity of their rules, the precedents of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials did influence the design of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of ICTY. For a brief analysis of the rules of evidence and
procedure applied in the trials of major war criminals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, see, e.g., Evan J.
Wallach, The Procedural and Evidentiary Rules of the Post-World War II War Crimes Trials: Did
They Provide an Outline for International Legal Procedure, 37 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF
TRANSNATIONAL LAW 851 (1999).
98 See, e.g., CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6, at 389 (“[I]t should be
emphasized that there do not yet exist international general rules on international criminal
proceedings. Each international court (ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC) has its own Rules of Procedure
and Evidence…Probably, with the gradual winding down of the judicial activity of ICTY and ICTR and
the contemporaneous consolidation of the ICC, the rules of procedure of this court may become
generally accepted by States and then turn into general international rules. This is, however, a
process that is likely to take a number of years.”).
99 See, e.g., Boas, Creating Law of Evidence for International Criminal Law, supra note 12, at
40 (“The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of ICTY are the first coherent body of principles governing
the prosecution of violations of international humanitarian law, or indeed international law, to be
construed”).
100 UN Security Council Resolution 808, S /RES/808 (1993) gave 60 days to the SecretaryGeneral to submit a report on “all aspects” for the effective and expeditious implementation of the
Tribunal, and the Secretary-General assigned the task of drafting the Statute to the OLA. For
analyses of this assignment to the OLA and its possible advantages and disadvantages in comparison
to other potential ways to creating the Tribunal and drafting its Statute, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
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Statute—which was approved without changes by the Security Council—did
not have a clear adversarial slant.102 Even if the Statute settled important
issues —such as what would be the main organs of the tribunal, who would
be in charge of the pretrial investigation, and how the trial court would be
composed—the decision of its drafters was to leave most criminal procedure
questions to be decided by the judges of ICTY, who would be in charge of
developing the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal (hereinafter
the Rules).103 The judges took only three months to draft and issue the
Rules,104 and the adversarial and inquisitorial systems were clearly the two
main reference models that framed their discussions—together with human
rights standards.105 This may be surprising, given the very special features of
an international criminal jurisdiction like ICTY. But it becomes less
surprising if we take into account that the judges applied their internal
dispositions about the criminal process to the international context, and if we
also keep in mind the binary way in which policymakers and scholars have
thought about international criminal procedure—a question that will be
analyzed later.106
THE LAW OF THE CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 219-226 (1996); Scott T. Johnson,
On the Road to Disaster: The Rights of the Accused and the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 10 INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 111, at 115 (1998).
101 An exception is Orie, supra note 6, at 1463, (stating that ICTY Statute was too rudimentary to
infer from it a certain procedural model).
102 See, e.g., BASSIOUNI, supra note 100, at 863; Johnson, supra note 100, at 142-5; Tochilovsky,
Legal Systems and Cultures, supra note 10, at 629. Among the “common law” features of the
Statute, commentators usually include the fact that it is a prosecutor, not a judge, who does the pretrial investigation (Article 16.1.) (see, for instance, BASSIOUNI, supra note 100, at 872). However, a
number of civil law countries also assign this task to the prosecutor (i.e., Germany) even if they
conceive of it in a very different way that I cannot develop here. The point that I want to make here is
that the Statute did not exclude either a common or a civil law conception of the pre-trial
investigation by putting it in charge of the prosecutor. The Statute also established that once the
indictment has been read to the defendant, he has to enter a plea (Article 20.3.).This might initially
look like a common law feature given that, as I will explain later, the idea of a guilty plea has
traditionally only existed in common law jurisdictions. However, it is unclear whether the Statute
introduced the common law concept of the guilty plea because it states that once the plea has been
entered, the Trial Chamber would set the date for trial. (According to the common law concept, if the
defendant pleads guilty, there should not be any trial. So, the Statute is ambivalent about this issue
too.) In addition, the Statute clearly established important civil law features, such as the exclusion of
the trial by jury (Article 12). Overall, though, it left most questions open and to be decided by the
judges as drafters of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
103 Statute, Article 15.
104 The Judges did not have a specific deadline to finish the Rules as did the members of the OLA
with the Statute, but they were under time-pressure to issue them in order to legitimize the role of the
Tribunal and because the rules would be necessary as soon as the first cases started to arrive at the
Tribunal.
105 First Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991, para. 71, A/49/342, S/1994/1007 (1994) [hereinafter, First Annual Report].
106 See infra Section IX.
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Unlike the Statute, the Rules had a clear adversarial inclination.107
There were two main reasons for the adoption of a predominantly adversarial
system. First of all, the most important input that the judges received to
perform their task came from U.S. sources.108 This probably reflected the
fact that the U.S. was the permanent member of the Security Council that
most strongly supported the creation and work of the Tribunal, because the
U.S. believed that the Tribunal could play an important role in dealing with
the Balkans scenario.109 The judges received proposals from several states
and organizations. However, “[T]he United States submitted by far the most
comprehensive set of proposed rules with commentary, numbering
approximately seventy-five pages. This proposal was particularly influential
because of its detailed coverage of procedural and evidentiary issues, the
explanation of the reasons for the proposal contained in the commentary and
the timeliness of the submission.”110 In addition, the American Bar
Association created a special committee, the “American Bar Association Task
Force on War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia”, which submitted a report

107 See, e.g., Orie, supra note 6, at 1464 (“The Rules of Procedure and Evidence that were adopted
by the judges…were largely inspired by the Anglo-American tradition. The rules introduce a typical
accusatorial type of trial”); Vladimir Tochilovsky, Rules of Procedure for the International Criminal
Court: Problems to Address in Light of the Experience of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 1999 NILR 343, at
345 (“ICTY borrowed principles of proceedings mostly from common-law jurisdictions. Drafters of
ICTY Rules opted for the common-law litigation model between two parties, where an indictment is a
form of a lawsuit”).
108 See BASSIOUNI, supra note 100, at 867; CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6,
at 384 (pointing out that in the first text of the Rules, the judges in essence adopted a system very
close to the one proposed by the U.S. Memorandum circulated among the judges by the U.S.
Department of Justice, which contained a proposal for draft Rules).
109 Certain permanent members of the Security Council, such as China and Russia, thought that
the Tribunal could be a potential impediment to political negotiations for achieving peace in the
region. But members of the U.S. government thought that the Tribunal could have an important
deterrent effect on the crimes that were being committed. (See BASSIOUNI, supra note 100, at 225;
Johnson, supra note 100, at 132-3.) According to other accounts, the position of the U.S. government
was less idealistic than the one just mentioned. Michael P. Scharf, who worked as Attorney-Adviser
for United Nation Affairs at the State Department from 1989 to 1993, says that the “United States’
motives were also less then pure. America’s chief Balkans negotiator at the time, Richard Holbrooke,
has acknowledged that the tribunal was widely perceived within the government as little more than a
public relations device and as a potentially useful policy tool. The thinking in Washington was that
even if only low-level perpetrators in the Balkans were tried, the tribunal’s existence and its
indictments would deflect criticism that major powers did not do enough to halt the bloodshed there”
(Michael P. Scharf, Indicted for War Crimes, Then What?, Washington Post, October 3, 1999, at B01,
quoted by Tochilovsky, Rules of Procedure for the International Criminal Court, supra note 10 , at
628-9). This shows that analyzing states as single entities—as international law analyses have
traditionally done—may be problematic. What probably happened in this context was that different
members of the U.S. government held different ideas on the potential role of the Tribunal. Thus, both
sets of ideas existed in the U.S.’s support of ICTY.
110 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, 1 AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 177 (1995).

2004]

THE RISE OF MANAGERIAL JUDGING IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

31

commenting on the U.S. proposal and suggesting changes and additions to
it.111 This probably made the U.S. proposal even more influential.112
The second factor in the adoption of a predominantly adversarial system
was that a majority of the judges seem to have been inclined in favor of a
predominantly adversarial system. According to the first President of ICTY,
this preference was “[b]ased on the limited precedent of the Nuremberg and
Tokyo Trials, and in order for us, as judges, to remain as impartial as
possible.”113 But within this context, it was not a secondary factor that a
slight majority of the judges who drafted the Rules came from common law
countries.114
This does not mean, though, that the judges simply transplanted or
“copy-and-pasted” the U.S. adversarial system to the international arena.115
Rather, the judges had to both decide which specific rules and institutions
would be part of ICTY criminal procedure, and adapt and translate an
adversarial system to the international context.116 For instance, as the
Statute had already excluded the possibility of having trial by jury in the
Tribunal, the judges decided to exclude most of the institutions they

See BASSIOUNI, supra note 100, at 864.
See BASSIOUNI, supra note 100, at 863 (mentioning that the American Judge Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald brought with her the ABA report).
113 Antonio Cassese, Statement by the President Made at a Briefing to Members of Diplomatic
Missions, IT/29, 11 February 1994, in MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 9, at 650. See also CASSESE,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6, at 384 (pointing out that one of the reasons for the
adoption of the largely adversarial system at ICTY and the ICTR was the intellectual and
psychological appeal of the Nuremberg and Tokyo model; and adding that it was perhaps felt that the
adversarial system better safeguarded the rights of the accused). In both the Nuremberg and Tokyo
trials, it is believed that the adversarial system prevailed over the inquisitorial. See CASSESE,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6, at 376-84.
114 See BASSIOUNI, supra note 100, at 863; CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6,
at 384. In addition, the first President of the Tribunal, Antonio Cassese, came from Italy, which is
traditionally considered a civil law country but that adopted a system in 1988 that Cassese himself
has considered adversarial. See his INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 366 (2003). For analyses of the
difficulties Italian criminal procedure has faced in trying to move in the direction of the adversarial
system, see Grande, supra note 47; Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations, supra note
30; William T. Pizzi & Mariangela Montagna, The Battle to Establish an Adversarial System in Italy,
25 MICHIGAN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 429 (2004).
115 On the problems that the idea of the legal transplant presents to the circulation of legal ideas
and institutions between legal systems, see Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations,
supra note 30.
116 ICTY adopted special characteristics in this respect because not only were individual legal
institutions and ideas translated to this context, but also the whole institutional setting was created
from scratch.
111
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considered closely associated with it, such as common law rules of evidence117
and the prohibition of appeal of an acquittal by the prosecution.118
The enactment of predominantly adversarial rules helped to shape the
criminal procedural practice of ICTY in the same direction. Even if, as will be
suggested later in this article, a number of judges, prosecutors and defense
attorneys with a predominantly inquisitorial set of internal dispositions
consciously or unconsciously resisted certain institutions and practices
characteristic of the adversarial system,119 there was an agreement that the
system set up by the Rules was predominantly adversarial.120 Legal actors
who came from inquisitorial backgrounds generally accepted that many of
their internal dispositions regarding the handling of criminal cases did not
apply in this international context.121 This agreement had the effect of
reinforcing the predominance of the adversarial system in the first years of
the tribunal’s work.
Furthermore, since there is a certain interdependence between a
number of features of each of these systems, the predominance of the
adversarial system initially prevented, or at least weakened, the development
of inquisitorial practices within it.122 For instance, a judge can only behave in
an inquisitorially active way in the interrogation of witnesses at trial if she
has information about the case beforehand. But if the judge does not
participate in the pre-trial investigation or have access to the case through a
written dossier that contains this investigation—as the judges did not in the
initial years of the tribunal—she cannot be very active in the interrogation of
witnesses even if she wants to, because she does not have enough

117 This idea had also been followed in Nuremberg. See, e.g., CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW, supra note 6, at 382, who says that in Nuremberg “with regard to evidentiary requirements, the
USA and the UK easily accepted the idea that rules of evidence should be simplified, the more so
because there was no jury and the common law rules of evidence constituted, as Jackson put it, ‘a
complex and artificial science to the minds of Continental lawyers’”.
118 See First Annual Report, supra note 105, para. 72.
119 See infra Sections 4 and 5.
120 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Case 96-21, Decision on the Motion on Presentation of
Evidence by the Acussed, Esad Landzo, May 1, 1997, para. 15 (“the Judges adopted a largely
adversarial, instead of the inquisitorial, approach in the Rules”).
121 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kupreškic et al., Case IT-95-15, Transcript, August 27, 1998 (Judge
Cassese: “As for the point of, 'Our witnesses, their witnesses,' I'm afraid this is the procedure. And this
is, of course, as you know, Mr. Radovic, better than me, it is the adversarial system, which is totally
different from the inquisitorial system with which you are familiar in your country and also other
European persons from Continental Europe are also familiar with namely the inquisitorial system
where you have a totally different approach, but we have to stick to our rules”).
122 On the idea of the interconnectedness of various procedural systems’ elements, see Stephen
Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 631, at 676-77
(1994) (applying this idea to U.S. civil procedure debates).
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questions.123

information to ask meaningful
In this way, the establishment of
a predominantly adversarial model in the Rules also reinforced many of the
adversarial features of ICTY criminal proceedings.124
But in what sense did the adversarial system predominate over the
inquisitorial in the first years of ICTY criminal procedure? To answer this
question, it is necessary first to define what the main features of the
adversarial and the inquisitorial systems are. As this article defines these
terms, it will show how the main features of the initial rules and practices of
ICTY corresponded to one system or the other. It will also show how legal
actors with inquisitorial internal dispositions challenged a predominantly
adversarial structure of interpretation and meaning, which also helped to
shape criminal procedure during the initial years of ICTY.

IV. THE MODEL OF THE DISPUTE VERSUS THE MODEL OF THE OFFICIAL
INVESTIGATION
Defining the adversarial and inquisitorial systems is not an easy task.
One of the difficulties is that the differences between criminal procedure in
common law and civil law are so numerous that it is easy to get lost in the
details and to lose sight of the basic differences between them. The most
promising way to capture these basic distinctive features is to describe the
adversarial and inquisitorial systems as being organized mainly according to
two opposing pairs of sub-systems or models.125 This section describes and
explores the first of these opposing pairs in analyzing ICTY procedure during
its early years. Section V proceeds in the same way regarding the second
opposing pair.
The first of these pairs is the opposition between the model of the
dispute and the model of the official investigation. The basic difference here

123 This explains why Italy has eliminated the access of the pre-trial written-dossier to the trial
court by creating a special dossier for the trial. See C.P.P. Italy, art. 431.
124 On this idea of interconnectedness between elements of the adversarial and inquisitorial
systems at the national level, see Mirjan Damaska, Aspectos globales de la reforma del proceso
penal, in REFORMAS A LA JUSTICIA PENAL EN LAS AMERICAS (Fundación para el Debido Proceso Legal
ed., 1999).
125 Another difficulty in defining the adversarial and the inquisitorial systems is that the criminal
procedures included in common and civil law are so numerous that it is difficult to find features that
are present in every jurisdiction or that are present in a similar way in all of them, even if many of
these features are very characteristic of most common law and civil law systems. Therefore, the
description I will offer in this and the next section should be taken as Weberian ideal-types that may
need adjustments in relation to particular jurisdictions.
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is that criminal procedure rules and practices of common law jurisdictions
are basically conceived as a dispute between two active parties who carry on
the proceedings before a passive decisionmaker, while the criminal
procedure practices of civil law jurisdictions are conceived as an official
investigation done by one or more public officials in order to determine the
truth.126
These two different organizing principles or models explain many
features of criminal procedure in each of these traditions. First of all, these
models provide an account of the predominant conceptions of the
decisionmaker (judge and/or jury), the prosecutor and the defense, as well as
the role of the victim, in common and civil law countries. In common law
jurisdictions, the decisionmaker is usually understood as a passive umpire
who decides upon the controversies that the parties present to him.127 A tooactive decisionmaker is viewed with suspicion within this conception of the
criminal adjudication process, because his activism may indicate a bias
toward one side or the other.128 By contrast, the prosecutor is seen as an
active party who has to investigative and defend his own case, has something
at stake in winning it (usually, obtaining a conviction), and has formal
powers relatively equal to those of the defense.129
The defendant and his attorney are usually understood to be procedural
equals of the prosecutor. They, too, have to develop their own case, have an
interest in the decision of the controversy, and have most of the same

126 The ideas of the dispute and the investigation have been used for comparative law purposes for
a long time. See, for instance, HÉLIE, 5 TRAITÉ DE L’INSTRUCTION CRIMINELLE OU THÉORIE DU CODE
D’INSTRUCTION CRIMINELLE, supra note 57, at 53.
127 For a classical description of the role of the judge and the jury in the adversary system, see Lon
L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 35, at 36 (Harold J. Berman ed., 1972).
I will take my examples to illustrate both the features of the adversarial system and the model of the
dispute from the U.S. system because it is the common law system with which I am most familiar.
128 See, e.g., People v. Davis, 549 N.W.2d 1, at 50-51 (Mich.App., 1996) (“The principal limitation
on a court's discretion over matters of trial conduct is that its actions not pierce the veil of judicial
impartiality… The trial court may question witnesses in order to clarify testimony or elicit additional
relevant information. However, the trial court must exercise caution and restraint to ensure that its
questions are not intimidating, argumentative, prejudicial, unfair, or partial. The test is whether the
“judge's questions and comments 'may well have unjustifiably aroused suspicion in the mind of the
jury' as to a witness' credibility, ... and whether partiality 'quite possibly could have influenced the
jury to the detriment of defendant's case.' ").
129 In the United States, it is usually said that the role of the prosecutor is not only to look for a
conviction, but also for justice. Nevertheless, in comparative terms, the U.S. prosecutors usually act
as parties with an interest at stake in the case. For instance, they usually consider that they win a case
when the defendant is convicted and lose a case when the defendant is acquitted or the case is
dismissed with prejudice. See William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the
United States: The Limiss of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1325, 1349 (1993).
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powers.130

procedural
Finally, the victim plays a very limited role in the
binary logic of this kind of proceeding, which pits prosecution against
defense in a contest.131 Contemporary common law systems conduct only
public prosecutions and allow no room for private prosecutions. Therefore,
the role of the victim generally is limited to providing information about the
case and giving testimony in the formal proceedings.132
The model of the official investigation explains the predominant
conception of the judge, the prosecutor, and the defendant in civil law
jurisdictions, as well as the roles that the victim plays in some of them.
There, the judge is predominantly conceived as a public official whose role is
to investigative the truth.133 Therefore, he has to be active and able to decide
lines of investigation and produce evidence sua sponte, even if the parties
have not requested it.134 In addition, he also decides in which order the
evidence will be produced. The prosecutor is not conceived as a party but
rather as another public official whose role also is to investigate the truth.135
This is why the prosecutor, like the judge, has a duty to gather both
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.136 There is a sort of division of labor
between prosecutor and judge, in which the former investigates the facts
and/or requests the application of the law while the latter adjudicates—
without quitting her investigative role. But otherwise, the roles of both
public officials are essentially the same.137
Regarding the defendant, even if he is a citizen with rights in
contemporary inquisitorial systems, he is also a target of investigation who

130 On the predominant conception of the role of the advocate in the U.S., see, for instance, the
classical article by Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1031, at 1035-9 (1975).
131 See DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE, supra note 43, at 201 (“[I]n Anglo-American criminal
procedure the victim has few ancillary rights because important stages of common-law prosecution
are structured as a contest of two sides, so that introduction of a third actor into bi-polar litigation
can adversely affect the incentives required to sustain it”).
132 On the limited role of victims in U.S. criminal procedure, see, generally, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
1 (1999) (Symposium Victims and the Criminal Law: American and German Perspectives).
133 For instance, regarding the determination of truth being the goal of criminal procedure in
France, see MICHELE-LAURE RASSAT, TRAITE DE PROCEDURE PENALE 297 (2001). On the more
absolute conception of truth more predominant in the inquisitorial system as opposed to the
accusatorial one, see Antoine Garapon, French Legal Culture and the Shock of 'Globalization.' 4 SOC.
& LEGAL STUD. 493, 496-97 (1995).
134 See, for instance, § 155, II and § 244, II STPO (German Criminal Procedure Code). For an
analysis of these provisions, see CLAUS ROXIN, STRAFVERFAHRENSRECHT 94-5 (1998).
135 See, for instance, Thomas Weigend, Prosecution: Comparative Aspects, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRIME & JUSTICE 1233-4 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002).
136 Id. at 1234.
137 Id. at 1233-4.
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has a personal stake in how the case is decided, unlike the judge and
prosecutor.138 This is why, as a rule, the defense does not gather its own
evidence but instead asks the investigating prosecutor or judge to do it. The
latter are supposed to have an objectivity and impartiality that the former
lacks, and evidence gathered in a partial way is not supposed to enter into an
impartial investigation.139 Finally, even if the victim is not a necessary actor
in this kind of proceeding, he fits much more easily within it.140 Since the
criminal procedure is mainly an investigation made by public officials to
determine the truth, there is no binary logic at work here.141 Therefore, the
victim can be accepted as a participant who also has something at stake in the
case, who is not impartial, but who can have, as the defendant, a voice and
procedural rights within criminal proceedings.142
Besides explaining how the main actors of criminal procedure are
predominantly understood in common and civil law jurisdictions, the dispute
model and the official investigation model also explain many of the particular
institutions or features of each of these procedures. For instance, the broad
prosecutorial discretion in the charging decision that exists in common law

138 Many commentators have said that while in the adversarial system the defendant is a subject
of rights, in the inquisitorial system he is an object of investigation. This was probably true for a long
time, but after World War II--and even earlier in some jurisdictions--most inquisitorial countries
began considering the defendant as a subject of rights, both at the rule level-- constitutions, human
rights treaties, criminal procedure codes--and at the law in action level. Thus, in most civil law
jurisdictions today, the defendant is presumed innocent, has a right against compelled selfincrimination, a right to assistance of counsel, etc. See, e.g., Gordon Van Kessel, European
Perspectives on the Accused as a Source of Testimonial Evidence, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 799 (1998).
This does not mean, of course, that all the rights enunciated in rules are respected in practice. The
point that I am trying to make is that the concept of rights seems to have lost part of its old heuristic
value in establishing clear distinctions between adversarial and inquisitorial systems.
139 For a summary of the judicial reactions that the introduction of investigating powers by the
defense generated in a jurisdiction like Italy where most legal actors had a predominant inquisitorial
set of internal dispositions, see IL CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE 2067-9 (Piermaria Corso ed., 11th ed
2001). On the need to distinguish between the investigation done by the prosecution and the defense
given the different conceptions of both actors in Italy, see Paolo Ferrua, La Giustizia Negoziata Nella
Crisis Della Funzione Cognitiva Del Processo Penale, in his III STUDI SUL PROCESSO PENALE 132, at
160 (1997).
140 Civil law countries regulate the role of the victim in different ways, but there are two main
ways in which they let the victim be a party in criminal proceedings. The first is as a civil actor in the
criminal process. This is the system that France has adopted. The second way to regulate victim
participation is by letting the victim be a sort of private prosecutor in the criminal process. For
instance, Germany has adopted such a system.
141 See DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE, supra note 43, at 201 (“It is precisely because continental
criminal procedure is not a bi-polar contest that the voice of the victim can easily be accommodated.
His action does not obstruct the smooth progression of criminal prosecution”).
142 On the role of the victim as a civil actor in the criminal procedure of France and Italy,
respectively, see, for instance, MICHÈLE LAURE RASSAT, TRAITÉ DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE 247-293
(2001); AND GILBERTO LOZZI, LEZIONI DI PROCEDURA PENALE 114-9 (4th ed. 2001).
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jurisdictions makes sense within this procedure because, if the procedure is a
dispute between two parties, these parties should be able to decide when this
dispute is over, and the judges, as umpires, should have little control over
that decision.143 In the same way, if the defendant accepts the prosecution’s
claim, the dispute is also finished. This explains the institution of the guilty
plea, so characteristic of common law countries. If the defendant admits the
charges and pleads guilty, the phase of determination of guilt or innocence
ends, and the case moves to the sentencing phase.144 Stipulations and plea
bargaining145 can also be explained through this model, because if the
criminal procedure is a dispute between two parties, it is only natural that the
parties may negotiate about their dispute and reach partial or full agreements
about it.146
The dispute model also explains why the criminal procedure in common
law countries is structured as a contest between two competing cases, the
prosecution case and the defense case. This applies both to the pre-trial and
trial phases. During the pre-trial phase, each of the parties can do its own
factual and legal investigation. Within this context, police investigators are
conceived as an aid to the prosecution, and the defense has to hire its own
investigators if it wants to gather information and evidence.147 During trial,
the prosecution and defense cases vie for credibility. Witnesses and expert
witnesses are not witnesses of the court, but rather of the prosecution or the

143 For analyses of the broad discretion of U.S. prosecutors, see, for example, Norman Abrams,
Prosecution: Prosecutorial Discretion, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1272 (Sandorf H.
Kadish ed., 1983); Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative
Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246 (1980); Peter Krug, Prosecutorial
Discretion and its Limits, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 643 (2002); Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor's
Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 532 (1970); Robert L. Misner, Recasting
Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717 (1996); James Vorenberg, Decent
Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1981). For classical analyses of how to
address the problem of discretion in the criminal justice system, regarding not only prosecutorial
practices but also the practices of other legal actors, see KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969); Arthur Rosett, Discretion, Severity and Legality in
Criminal Justice, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 12 (1972).
144 See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c) (4).
145 On the factors that influence plea agreements in the U.S., see, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea
Bargaining outside the Shadow of the Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004).
146 See, e.g., Brady, 397 U.S. 742 (approving, for the first time, the constitutionality of plea
bargaining). For historical analyses of how the practice of plea bargaining developed in U.S.
jurisdictions, see Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 13 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 211
(1979); George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857 (2000); Lawrence M.
Friedman, Plea Bargaining in Historical Perspective, 13 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 247 (1979); John H.
Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 261 (1979).
147 On the duty of the defense attorney in the United States to make reasonable investigations, or
to make reasonable decisions that particular investigations are unnecessary, see Wiggins v. Smith,
123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984).
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defense,148

and questioning of witnesses proceeds according to a contest
structure through direct examination, cross-examination, re-direct, and
rejoinder.149

The official investigation model, in turn, explains many features of civil
law criminal procedures. For instance, if the role of the prosecutor is to
determine the real truth, he can only dismiss the case when there is not
enough evidence that the defendant committed the offense. Hence,
prosecutorial discretion is much more limited in systems where this model
prevails.150 The concept of the guilty plea traditionally has been unknown in
these systems.151 While the admission of guilt may be very useful to the judge
in seeking the truth, the judge still has the final word on the determination of
guilt and can thus find that the defendant’s confession alone does not
constitute proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If an admission of guilt
happens during the pre-trial phase, the case still must go to trial before the
judge can make a final determination.152
Stipulations and plea bargaining also long have been alien to this
model.153 First, as we just saw, the very concept of the guilty plea does not

148 On the coaching that lawyers give their witnesses in the United States, see, for example,
WILLIAM T. PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH 21-22 (1999). But see Fed. R. Evid. 614(a) (establishing that
the court may, on its own motion, call a witness); Fed. R. Evid. 706(a) (stating that the court may also
appoint expert witnesses of its own selection). These powers, however, are seldom used in criminal
trials. See, e.g., United States v. Ostrer, 422 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (stating that although the
court has discretionary power to call a court witness, this power is rarely invoked). For an analysis of
the obstacles that judges would face in becoming more active players at trial, see Marvin E. Frankel,
The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1041-45 (1975).
149 See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 611. Federal Rule of Evidence 614(b) establishes that "the court may
interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party." But this power is also infrequently used
in criminal trials. See Bradley, United States, supra note 67, at 421.
150 For instance, Argentina (Penal Code, art. 59) and Italy (Constitution, art. 112) establish a rule
of compulsory prosecution. Germany establishes compulsory prosecution as the general rule, though
it also includes exceptions to it through its opportunity principle (§ 152-4a). In France, the
prosecutor has discretion about whether to bring charges initially. Code de procédure pénale [C. PR.
PEN.] [Criminal procedure code] art. 40 (Fr.). But if the French prosecutor decides to bring charges,
he/she cannot dismiss the charges without the acquiescence of the court. See RASSAT, supra note 133,
at 452-53). (I will not analyze here the powers of the victim regarding this issue). As there is no
system that can possibly prosecute all criminal offenses, the rule of compulsory prosecution or limited
prosecutorial discretion has been described as a myth. For a classical debate on this issue, see
Abraham S. Goldstein and Martin Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three “Inquisitorial”
Systems: France, Italy and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240 (1977); John H. Langbein and Lloyd L.
Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: “Myth” and Reality, 87 YALE L.J. (1978).
151 See, e.g., Myron Moskovitz, PERSPECTIVE: The O.J. Inquisition: A United States Encounter
with Continental Criminal Justice, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1121, 1153 (1995).
152 See, e.g., JOHN H. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY 73-74 (1977).
153 For a classical analysis, see, for instance, John H. Langbein, Land without Plea Bargaining:
How the Germans Do It, 78 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 204 (1979). However, in the last decades,
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here.154

exist
An admission of guilt by the defendant may help the official
investigator to determine the truth, but it does not immediately end the guiltdetermination phase as in the dispute model. In addition, in the official
investigation model there are not two parties who can negotiate and bargain
toward a compromise about their respective claims as in the adversarial
system. The prosecutor is not a party as in the adversarial system, but rather
another official who, like the judge, must determine what has happened.155
Thus the “real” truth has to be determined by the prosecutor and cannot be
negotiated or compromised.156 And the judge has the last word. In addition,
inquisitorial officials traditionally perceived the very act of getting into
negotiations with the defendant to be improper conduct. In negotiations and
bargains, the parties have to recognize each other as equals, at least at a
certain level. But in the official investigation model, the judge, prosecutor,
and defense are not equals, because the latter has an interest at stake in the
process that the former do not have.
The official investigation model also explains other features of criminal
procedure in civil law countries. First, in these systems, there is only one
case, which can be characterized as the case of the court, not two competing
cases.157 This makes sense within this model because the procedure is
conceived as one official investigation to determine the truth.158 During the
pre-trial phase, the judge or the prosecutor is in charge.159 If the defendant
wants certain evidence to be produced, he has to request this of the public
official in charge.160 In addition, the trial also is structured according to the
idea of a unitary investigation. There are not separate cases made by the
prosecution and the defense; the presiding judge decides what evidence will
Germany and other civil law countries have tried to import institutions similar to plea bargaining.
For an analysis of these reforms in Argentina, France, Germany and Italy, see Langer, From Legal
Transplants to Legal Translations, supra note 30.
154 See LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; GERMANY, supra note 152, at 73-74;
Moskovitz, supra note 151, at 1153.
155 See Weigend, Prosecution: Comparative Aspects, supra note 135, at 1233-34.
156 On the more absolute conception of truth more predominant in the inquisitorial system as
opposed to the accusatorial one, see Antoine Garapon, French Legal Culture and the Shock of
'Globalization.' 4 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 493, 496-97 (1995).
157 Regarding France, see, for example, Dervieux, supra note 81, at 250.
158 Regarding the existence of only one pre-trial investigation in France, see id.
159 Traditionally, a judge has been in charge of the pre-trial investigation in civil law countries.
This is still the case in Argentina, France for serious cases, and Spain. But in other civil law countries,
the prosecutor is now in charge of the pre-trial investigation. Germany moved in this direction in
1974. But even in this case, since the prosecutor is conceived of as an impartial official, she has the
duty to look for both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. A jurisdiction that has tried to depart
from the civil law tradition in this respect is Italy where, since 1989, the prosecutor is in charge of the
pre-trial investigation, and the defense can run its own investigation.
160 For instance, this is the case in France. See, e.g., Dervieux, supra note 81, at 250.
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order,161

be produced and in what
and any witnesses and expert witnesses are
the court’s, not the parties’.162 Furthermore, since the court has the duty to
investigate the truth, its members usually will start their own interrogation.
Only after they finish can the parties ask additional questions.163
If we analyze the conception of the judge, the prosecutor, the defense
and the victim in the early years of ICTY, we find that the dispute model
prevailed over the official investigation model in ICTY’s procedural structure
of interpretation and meaning, despite conscious or unconscious resistance
that legal actors with a different set of internal dispositions presented against
some of its features. First, the judges were basically conceived and generally
behaved as passive umpires. The Rules gave them some inquisitorial formal
powers to issue motu propio orders, subpoenas and warrants,164 to change
the order in which the evidence was presented at trial,165 and to ask the
parties to produce additional evidence or to summon witnesses motu
propio.166 Nevertheless, the Rules generally made the parties the most active
actors in the criminal proceedings, in charge of developing their own pretrial investigations and cases at trial.
Even if the judges had few inquisitorial powers in the law-in-thebooks,167 the law-in-action was even more tilted toward a conception of
judges as umpires. This happened naturally when the judges came from

161 See. e.g., Código Procesal Penal de la Nación [COD. PROC. PEN.] [Criminal Procedure Code] art.
356 (Arg.). Regarding Germany, see §§ 155 Nr. 2, 244 Nr. 2 StPO (F.R.G.). See also ROXIN, supra note
68, § 15, at 95.
162 France is an exception because, during trial, the witnesses belong to the parties. See, e.g.,
RASSAT, supra note 133, at 405-06. However, the witnesses cannot be coached, and it is still the
presiding judge who questions witnesses acting sua sponte or on the request of the parties. See C. PR.
PEN. arts. 312, 332, 454, 536 (Fr.). Since January 1, 2001, questions can also be put to the witnesses
directly by the parties. See Dervieux, supra note 81, at 258- 59.
163 Regarding Argentina, see COD. PROC. PEN. art. 389 (Arg.). Regarding Germany, see §§ 238 Nr.
1, 240 STPO (F.R.G.). Section II39 of StPO states that interrogatories at trial shall be developed
through direct and cross-examination if the prosecution and the defense request it. However, this is
rarely applied. See ROXIN, supra note 68, § 42, at 343.
164 International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32 (1994), Rule 54. In the analysis of the original
features of ICTY in this and the next section, I will use the original Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
unless I otherwise indicated it. I use the version of the Rules published in 5 CRIM. L. F. 651 (1994)
that contains both the original version of the Rules and the fourth version of them (after their third
set of amendments), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 3 (1995). In the rest of the article, I am using the most
recent version of the Rules of April 6, 2004.
165 Rule 85.
166 Rule 98.
167 This is, of course, a reference to Roscoe Pound’s famous distinction between the law-in-thebooks and the law-in-action.
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common law jurisdictions, because the internal dispositions of these judges
were generally closer to a conception of their role based on dispute model.168
But besides these ingrained tendencies of common law judges, it seems that
even the majority of the civil law judges basically behaved as umpires or
passive decisionmakers during the initial years of the Tribunal. The Expert
Group that reviewed the operation and functioning of ICTY in 1999 said in its
report: “From the beginning, the judges have been scrupulous in their
respect for the distribution of responsibilities implicit in the common law
adversarial system and have tended to refrain from intervening in the
manner of presentation elected by the parties.”169
The reasons for this refrain seem to have been the two already
mentioned in the previous section. First, because the judges were convinced
that the procedure enacted by the Rules was predominantly adversarial, they
generally tried to behave according to that system—even those coming from
civil law jurisdictions.170 Second, even if some judges may have wanted to be
more active, they could not do so because, given the adversarial structure of
the procedure, they did not have enough knowledge about the case before
trial, since they did not participate in the pre-trial investigation and had no
written dossier containing it.171
Nevertheless, a number of civil law judges resisted what they saw as an
overly passive role in the management of the trial and the interrogation of
witnesses, a resistance that can be explained both in terms of their
inquisitorial set of internal dispositions and their discomfort with the limited
procedural powers they had in a predominantly adversarial system. This
resistance is exemplified in a decision of ICTY’s Trial Chamber in
Dokmanovic where the Chamber requested that the prosecution submit
written witness statements prior to the commencement of the trial. The
Chamber justified its decision by saying that perusal “of such documents by

168 See, for instance, Tadic Trial Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T, para. 238 & 241 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for
Former
Yugoslavia
Trial
Chamber
II
May
7,
1997),
available
at
http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/ judgement/index.htm, where the Trial Chamber composed by
three common law judges said that the prosecution had failed to elicit clear and definitive evidence in
the interrogation of witnesses on the death of four prisoners. A group of judges with an inquisitorial
set of internal dispositions would not have understood the success or failure in the interrogation of
witnesses as the responsibility of the prosecution, but rather as theirs. As with a few other examples
that I use in this section, I originally knew about this one through Tochilovsky, Rules of Procedure,
supra note 12.
169 Expert Group, supra note 88, at 30. This was not a rhetorical statement but rather part of the
diagnosis that the Expert Group made about the Tribunal. It was precisely because the judges were
generally behaving as passive umpires that the Expert Group proposed many of the reforms we will
analyze later.
170 See supra notes 120-21, and accompanying text.
171 See supra notes 122-24, and accompanying text.
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the Trial Chamber is primarily for the purpose of promoting better
comprehension of the issues and more effective management at trial.”172 In
other words, the judges requested this information to help them be more
active investigators at trial.
The prosecutor also was conceived and behaved according to the dispute
model. She was not conceived as an impartial official whose role is to
investigate the truth as a (relative) equal of the judge, but rather as a party
who must defend her own case against that of the other party.173 The Rules
played an important role in shaping the system this way. For instance, they
did not establish that the prosecutor must search equally for inculpatory and
exculpatory evidence during the pre-trial phase.174 More generally, the Rules
conceived the criminal procedure as a competition between the cases of the
prosecution and the defense.175 In a criminal procedure structured this way,
there are few incentives for impartial investigations that seek all kinds of
evidence impartially. Rather, the goal is to make one’s own case as strong as
possible and to weaken the case of the other party. This created a procedural
setting where the members of the Office of the Prosecutor, or OP, saw
themselves as (relative) procedural equals to the defense team and as
different from the judges.176

172 Dokmanovic Order of 28 November 1997, IT-95-13a-PT (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Former
Yugoslavia Trial Chamber II), quoted by Tochilovsky, Legal Systems, supra note 12, at 634. As we
will see later, the door open by this decision had important consequences in the way criminal
procedure was later conceived in ICTY.
173 As it happens in other predominantly adversarial jurisdictions, In Kupreškia Decision on
Communication between the Parties and Their Witnesses, Case IT-95-16-T, September 21, 1998 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber II), the Trial Chamber said that “the Prosecutor of
the Tribunal is not, or not only, a Party to adversarial proceedings but is an organ of the Tribunal and
an organ of international criminal justice whose object is not simply to secure a conviction but to
present the case for the Prosecution, which includes not only inculpatory, but also exculpatory
evidence, in order to assist the Chamber to discover the truth in a judicial setting.” From this
statement, one would think that the conception of the prosecutor of ICTY is closer to the model of the
official investigation than to the model of the dispute. But my claim is that in the law in action of the
Tribunal, the conception of the prosecutor has, in fact, been closer to the latter. A similar process
probably happened in the ICTR. For an analysis of the conception of the prosecutor in the ICTR, see
Larissa J. van den Herik, Some insights into the strategy of the ICTR Prosecutor (on file with the
author).
174 Perhaps showing a different conception of the prosecutor, the Rome Statute establishes the
duty of the prosecution to investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally (Article
54.1.(a)).
175 See, for instance, Rules 39, 66, 67 and 68.
176 This statement has to be qualified in the following way.
Prosecutors and Judges are
permanent members of the Tribunal, as opposed to defense attorneys who usually take one case or a
limited number of cases. In addition, there is not an office of the public defender in ICTY. This may
have produced closer relationships between judges and prosecutors than the ones that usually exist in
adversarial jurisdictions. For an analysis of this question including the proposal to create an
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Similarly, since ICTY criminal procedure was structured as a
competition between the cases of the prosecution and the defense, the latter
was seen as a procedural equal to the former. The defense not only has
similar procedural powers to the prosecution for developing its own case,
calling its own witnesses, interrogating its witnesses and the witnesses of the
prosecution, and such, but it can also develop its own investigations, which
are considered of (approximately) equal value to the prosecutor’s.177
However, as with the predominantly adversarial conception of the judge,
legal actors with an inquisitorial set of internal dispositions also showed a
resistance toward this conception of the defense. For instance, the
sometimes aggressive style of defense attorneys in some adversarial systems
fits well with a criminal procedure conceived as a dispute between two
parties before a passive umpire. But civil law judges who are used to
handling their own investigations may find this aggressive style a little
disruptive for developing their work. The following exchange provides an
illustration of this phenomenon:
There was another objection by the defense, one in a long
series raised by Los Angeles lawyer Russell
Hayman…Judge Claude Jorda sighed loudly and peered
over his wire-rimmed glasses at Mr. Hayman, who calmly
complained about the casual way evidence was being
introduced by the prosecution, not the way it was done in
California…Judge Jorda, a Frenchman, had had enough.
“I think what separates us is conceptual problem,” he said.
“We should not constantly bring about a clash of different
legal systems. It was never said in the rules of the
tribunal…that we will apply the procedures that Mr.
Hayman is used to using in Los Angeles”…Hayman insists
he is not trying to aggravate the court, just trying to define
the legal requirements.178
Since ICTY criminal procedure was structured as a binary clash between
the cases of the prosecution and defense, there was not room for the victim’s
participation as a formal actor.179 His role was basically limited to providing
independent defense unit, see Note, Fair Trials and the Role of International Criminal Defense, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1982 (2001).
177 See, for instance, Rules 45, 67, 85, etc.
178 Kitty Felde, International, A Letter from The Hague, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 3,
1997. Something similar to the aggressive style of U.S. prosecutors and their use of objections may
have happened in ICTR. (Interview with Ambassador Pierre Prosper, Former Legal Officer of the
Office of the Prosecutor in ICTR, in Cambridge, Ma, USA (11/29/01)).
179 See Rules 34, 69, 75 and 106.
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information and testimony during the pre-trial and trial phases.180
Regarding the other features of common and civil law that the dispute and
official investigation models explain, we find that most other features of ICTY
criminal procedure in its formative years also corresponded to the dispute
model of the adversarial system.
First, the prosecutor had broad discretion to initiate investigations and
bring charges.181 The Statute and the Rules are silent on whether the judges
can review the decision of the prosecutor about these issues. But from the
very beginning, the understanding of the judges was that it remained
“entirely a matter of the Prosecutor to determine against whom to
proceed.”182 Accordingly, in ICTY’s initial years of operation, the practice
was to allow the prosecutor broad prosecutorial discretion that the judges did
not control.183 In addition, the Rules introduced the concept of the guilty

180 This limited role for the victim has been later confirmed in the Tribunal. At their plenaries
held from August 1, 2000, to July 31, 2001, the judges discussed the right of the victims to participate
in the proceedings and to request compensation. The judges did not decide to let victims participate
in the proceedings, and only recommended to the Security Council and the Secretary-General of the
United Nations that the relevant United Nations bodies explore in detail possible methods of
compensation for the victims of crimes in the former Yugoslavia. See Eight Annual Report ICTY,
August 13, 2001, para. 49. The Tribunal has also created a Victims and Witnesses Section to protect
and support all witnesses that appear before the Tribunal.
181 This issue has been particularly sensitive because international criminal justice has been
accused of being a political tool of either the victors of war (in the case of Nuremberg and Tokyo) or
the main Western powers (in the case of ICTY and the ICTR). In the case of prosecutorial discretion,
the question is the tu quoque argument, which is whether officers of the victorious or Western
countries have also committed criminal acts that are no less criminal than those of the accused. For
an analysis of this question in Nuremberg, see Quincy Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41
AM. J. INT’L L. 38, at 46-7 (1947); JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 161-4 (1986). In the case of ICTY,
similar criticisms have been developed regarding the decision of the Prosecutor to not initiate an
investigation in relation to the NATO bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, The Hague, 8 June 2000, Final
Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign
Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in 21 HUMAN RIGHTS JOURNAL 255 (2000). For an
analysis of the criticisms against this decision and, more broadly, of the relationships between
international criminal justice and politics, see Frédéric Mégret, Three Dangers for the International
Criminal Court: A Critical Look at a Consensual Project, in XII FINNISH YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 207 (2001). The question of prosecutorial discretion has also been at the center
of the debate about the resistance of the United States toward the International Criminal Court
because the Prosecutor of the ICC has been seen as a potential danger to U.S. sovereignty. The
question is regulated in Article 15 of the Rome Statute that expressly establishes that the Pre-Trial
Chamber controls the decision of the prosecutor to initiate an investigation (Article 15.4.). It is hard
to know in advance, though, what the law in action of the ICC will be in relation to this issue.
182 First Annual Report, supra note 105, para. 74.
183 This initial practice has been lately confirmed. The Prosecutor asked the former President of
the Tribunal, Gabrielle Kirk McDonald to revise the Prosecutor’s decision on the initiation of an
investigation for crimes committed in Kosovo. Judge McDonald said that the President does not
exercise any control in this regard. See Letter of ICTY President Kirk McDonald to Prosecutor Justice
Arbour, 16 March 1999, available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p386-e.htm. This broad
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plea by establishing that if the accused entered a plea of not guilty, the case
had to be sent to trial, while if he entered a guilty plea, the case had to be sent
to the pre-sentencing hearing.184 Not surprisingly, since the concept of the
guilty plea traditionally has not existed in civil law countries, legal actors with
predominantly inquisitorial internal dispositions understood this institution
differently than did those from common law jurisdictions.185
The Erdemovic case presents two examples of this phenomenon.186
Drazen Erdemovic was indicted for a crime against humanity or,
alternatively, a violation of the laws and customs of war for his participation
in the shooting and killing of hundreds of unarmed Bosnian Muslim men. In
his initial appearance before the Trial Chamber, Erdemovic pleaded guilty to
a crime against humanity. But at the same time, he gave an explanation for
his conduct that could be understood as a defense on the grounds of
duress.187
According to the common law conception of the guilty plea, if the Trial
Chamber considered duress only as a mitigating factor at sentencing, it could
take the guilty plea and send the case directly to the sentencing phase. But if
it considered that the duress claim could be a full defense depending on the
factual circumstances, the case would be sent to trial so that evidence could
be presented regarding factual issues, which the parties could then discuss.
However, the Trial Chamber, composed of three civil law judges, did neither:
it considered that duress could be a complete defense given certain factual
circumstances, but since it considered that “proof of the specific
prosecutorial discretion in the charging decision was also confirmed in the Elibici Judgment, Case IT96-21-A, para. 596-619 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Trial Appeals Chamber 20 February
2001).
184 Rule 62. The Rome Statute does not mention the expression “guilty plea” as a result of the
negotiators’ resistancewith an inquisitorial set of internal dispositions toward the institution. Its
Article 65 introduces proceedings “on admission of guilt” a compromise between common and civil
law negotiators. For a description of these resistances as well as an analysis of the “admission of
guilt” in comparison to the common law guilty plea, see Fabricio Guariglia, Article 65. Proceedings
on an admission of guilt, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 823 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999).
185 This shows that my category of internal dispositions includes not only a disposition to act or
react in certain ways, but also to understand procedural issues in certain ways.
186 Erdemovic Case No. IT-96-22-T.
187 Erdemovic said: “Your Honour, I had to do this. If I had refused, I would have been killed
together with the victims. When I refused, they told me: ‘If you’re sorry for them, stand up, line up
with them and we will kill you too.’ I am not sorry for myself but for my family, my wife and son who
then had nine months, and I could not refuse because then they would have killed me.” See
Erdemovic Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-96-22-T, para. 10 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Former
Yugoslavia Trial Chamber I 29 November 1996). This explanation could also have been read as a
defense of obedience to superior orders but, because the Statute of ICTY expressly established in
Article 7(4) that this could not relieve the accused of criminal responsibility, this did not generate any
of the questions that could be raised by the potential defense of duress .
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circumstances which would fully exonerate the accused of his responsibility
has not been provided”,188 it took the plea and sent the case directly to the
sentencing phase. Erdemovic’s defense attorney —who, like the trial judges,
came from a civil law country— also interpreted the guilty plea differently
from how it would be interpreted in a common law jurisdiction. He simply
saw it as a confession that did not end the phase of determining guilt or
innocence. Thus, he still was pleading for the acquittal of his client at the
sentencing hearing.189
These two examples show that the internal dispositions of legal actors
include not only a disposition to act and react in certain ways to procedural
issues, but also to understand them in certain ways.
Neither the
understanding of the members of the Trial Chamber nor that of Erdemovic’s
defense attorney was necessarily wrong. They were simply different from a
common law understanding of the guilty plea. And they were different
because these actors were used to understanding criminal procedure issues
differently than actors accustomed to an adversarial system.190
Furthermore, if they had obtained enough support from other legal
actors, any one of these readings could have inserted itself into the practices
of ICTY. However, the Court of Appeals, with common law judges forming a
majority, found the Trial Chamber’s interpretation and application of the
guilty plea in error. The appellate judges also pointed out Erdemovic’s
attorney’s misunderstanding and vacated the conviction and sentence based
on a finding that the guilty plea was made without informed consent.191 In
this way, the dispute model also prevailed regarding this issue.
Plea bargaining offers another interesting example of this struggle
between the dispute and official investigation models. There are few
institutions that are more firmly resisted by legal actors with inquisitorial
internal dispositions.192 In the case of ICTY, even though plea bargaining

Id. at para. 20.
Erdemovic Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, Case No. IT-96-22T, para. 16 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber 7 October 1997).
190 A Senior Trial Attorney of the OP —now in charge of the Milosevic case— has expressly
recognized this phenomenon in the context of ICTY: “…it cannot be stressed enough how difficult or
impossible it is for even comparatively young lawyers, with open minds, to let go their cultural legal
past and grapple with the conception of others…Practitioners from each of the two main different
systems cannot —cannot— understand the concepts of the other” (Geoffrey Nice, Trials of
Imperfection, 14 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 383, at 390 (2001).
191 Erdemovic Judgment, Case N0. IT-96-22-T (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Appeals
Chamber 7 October 1997).
192 In the negotiations of the Rome Statute, the resistance of civil law actors to the guilty plea was
partially based on the fear that the inclusion of this institution “would automatically lead to the
practice of plea bargaining being imported into the context of the ICC” (Guariglia, Article 65.
188
189
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had been explicitly included in the U.S. proposal that so strongly influenced
the Rules of the Tribunal, the judges did not accept it.193 However, in March
1998, again in the Erdemovic case, the prosecution and defense made the
first plea agreement and presented it to the Trial Chamber, which did not
question the practice.194 Since then, other cases have been disposed of
through this mechanism.195 The judges’ acceptance of this institution from
the dispute model seems not to have been determined primarily by the
relative power of actors with adversarial or inquisitorial internal dispositions,
but rather by the slowness of the proceedings and the heavy caseload that the
tribunal by then was facing. And, as will be shown later, once the managerial
judging system replaced the adversarial one as the predominant system of
the Tribunal, plea bargains multiplied even more.196
Finally, the dispute model also triumphed over the official investigation
model regarding the general structure of ICTY criminal procedure. The
Rules structured it as a contest between the cases of the prosecution and
defense,197 classified the evidence as belonging to one party or the other,198
Proceedings on an admission of guilt, supra note 184, at 824). In fact, paragraph 5 of Article 65 was
expressly included to ensure that plea bargains would not be practiced in the ICC. However,
paradoxically, “the language in paragraph 5 presupposes exactly what it intends to avoid: the
existence of discussions between the Prosecutor and the defence regarding modification of the
charges, the admission of guilt or the penalty to be imposed” (id. at 831). Whether or not the ICC will
present plea bargains is, therefore, an open question that its own practices and actors will determine.
193 See First Annual Report, supra note 105, where after describing how the adversarial and the
inquisitorial systems framed the discussions of the judges, the first President of the Tribunal, Antonio
Cassese, said “there are three important deviations from some adversarial systems….the granting of
immunity and the practice of plea-bargaining find no place in the rules” (para. 72 and 74).
194 See Erdemovic Sentencing Judgment, Case N0. IT-96-22-T, para. 18 and 19 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber 5 March 1998).
195 See, for instance, Jelisic Case IT-95-10; and Sikirika Case IT-95-8-S.
196 See infra notes 423-24, and accompanying text. For an analysis on the use of plea bargaining
in international criminal justice, see Nancy Amoury Combs, Copping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea
Bargaining of International Crimes, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2002).
197 Rules 66, 67, 84, 85, 86.
198 Rules 84 and 85. The conception of the witnesses as being either prosecution or defense
witnesses was resisted by legal actors with a predominantly inquisitorial set of internal dispositions.
Both Trial Chambers, presided by civil law judges, established that once the witnesses have made the
solemn declaration to tell the truth before the Trial Chamber, they become “witnesses of truth” or
“witnesses of justice” and the prosecution and the defense have to discontinue meeting with them.
See Kupreškia Case, supra note 173; and Jelisia Decision on Communication between Parties and
Witnesses, Case No. IT-95-10-T (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber I 11
December 1998). This doctrine was later followed in Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez,
Case IT-95-14/2, “Lasva Valley”, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion on Trial Procedure, March 19,
1999. Defense attorneys from the civil law also resisted the conception of witnesses as belonging to
one of the parties. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kupreškia et al., Case IT-95-15, Transcript, August 27,
1998.
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and established examination-in-chief, cross-examination, re-direct, and
rejoinder as the way to interrogate witnesses.199

V.

THE COORDINATE MODEL VERSUS THE HIERARCHICAL MODEL

The second broad distinction between common and civil law criminal
procedures relates to the institution of trial by jury characteristic of the
former, as opposed to the latter’s system of trial by professional judges who
are part of a hierarchical bureaucracy. Mirjan Damaška has tried to capture
these differences by proposing what he calls the coordinate and hierarchical
models.200 According to Professor Damaška, in the coordinate model
authority is exercised by lay decisionmakers who are in a relatively horizontal
relationship of power among themselves and who apply community
standards to their decisions. In the hierarchical model, authority is exercised
by legal professional decisionmakers whose relationships are hierarchically
ordered and who apply technical rules to their decisions. In the coordinate
model there is a bifurcated court which integrates a lay organ (the jury) and a
professional one (the judge), while in the hierarchical model the court is
unitary.201
These two models or organizing principles—the coordinate
corresponding to the adversarial, the hierarchical to the inquisitorial
system—also explain many features of the criminal procedure of the common
and civil law traditions. In the coordinate model, there are detailed rules of
evidence that filter the elements of proof that are allowed at trial and that
guide the evaluation of the evidence which is finally introduced.202 Because
the final decisionmakers are lay people,203 the underlying assumption is that

199 Rule 85(B). For an application of this Rule according to the common law conception of
witness interrogation, see Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case IT-96-21-T, Decision on the Motion on
Presentation of Evidence by the Accused, May 1, 1997 (where the Trial Chamber did not allow the
defense to cross-examine a prosecution witness for a second time following the prosecution’s re-direct
arguing that the rule was common law in origin and did not allow a second cross-examination).
200 See DAMAŠKA, FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY, supra note 43, at 16-71.
201 As developed by Prof. Damaška, the coordinate and the hierarchical models do not includethe
opposition between a bifucarted and a unitary court as one of their defining features. However, this
author has recently used this opposition to explain the differences in the law of evidence that
common and civil law jurisdictions have traditionally presented. See his EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT
(1997). The definition of the coordinate and the hierarchical models that I will use in this article also
differs from Prof. Damaška’s in that I will not include in these categories the opposition between the
application of community standards and technical rules.
202 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID.
203 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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they may not give proper weight to evidence that is prejudicial or not totally
reliable.204 The bifurcated structure of the court allows the professional
judge to hinder jurors’ access to such evidence. In addition, since the lay
participants can only participate in the administration of justice for a limited
time period, and since it is not practical that they read long pieces of written
evidence together, there is a preference for oral evidence and for the
production of evidence at trial.205
Furthermore, given their number, the lay decisionmakers could hardly
give a group justification of how they reach their decision.206 And since the
decision of the lay decisionmakers enjoys an additional legitimacy given its
supposedly popular source, the hierarchical control over this decision and,
more specifically, the superior control through appeals, are relatively limited.
This explains, for instance, why the prosecutor cannot appeal acquittals in
most common law jurisdictions.207 Finally, since the lay decisionmakers do
not know about the defendant’s personal background before trial, and given
the court’s bifurcated structure, it is possible to distinguish clearly the phase
of determination of guilt from the sentencing phase, the former being the
responsibility of the jury and the latter that of the professional judge.208
In the hierarchical model, there are not detailed rules of evidence209
and, as a general rule, all relevant evidence can be admitted at trial.210 The
assumption is that since the decisionmakers are professional judges,211 they

204 DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT, supra note 201, at 28-46, though questioning whether this
traditional justification provides a good analytical rationale for the development of the detailed rules
of evidence of common law.
205 DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT, supra note 201, at 57-8, 61-2.
206 This explains the absence of a mandatory justification of the verdict in the U.S. See, e.g., FED.
R. CRIM. P. 31.
207 In the United States, the Supreme Court decision that settled this issue was Kepner v. United
States, 195 U.S. 100, 24 S.Ct. 797, 49 L.Ed. 114 (1904). Canada is an exception among common law
jurisdictions given that the prosecutor can appeal against acquittals.
208 For instance, in the U.S., see FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rules 31 and 32
(2001).
209 Regarding France on this point, see, e.g., ROGER MERLE & ANDRE VITU, II TRAITE DE DROIT
CRIMINEL 193-94 (5th ed. 2001).
210 See, for instance, Argentine Criminal Procedure Code, Article 356.
211 Some civil law countries hold mixed courts in which lay and professional judges sit, deliberate
and decide together the most serious criminal cases. For instance, the province of Cordoba in
Argentina, France, Germany, and Italy have this kind of courts. But in these mixed courts, the
professional judges are still the most influential decision-makers given their legal knowledge and
experience because professional and lay judges deliberate together. For an analysis of mixed courts,
see John H. Langbein, Mixed Court and Jury Court: Could the Continental Alternative Fill the
American Need?, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 195 (1981). A substantial number of the inquisitorial
systems in continental Europe tried to import the jury during the nineteenth century. The precursor
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can prevent themselves from being biased by prejudicial evidence and can
correctly evaluate whether the evidence is reliable and what its proper weight
should be.212 The unitary court also renders detailed rules of evidence
practically meaningless, because the same judges who decide about the
admission of evidence participate in the verdict. Therefore, the rejection of
evidence would not prevent their knowledge about it.213
In addition, since professional judges are part of a permanent
bureaucracy that is composed of many stages and echelons of authority, a
written dossier works as a tool that interconnects them.214 This written
dossier documents all procedural activity and the evidence that has been
produced so far.215 Through this dossier, the participants of the procedure —
including trial judges— can know, at every stage, what the case is about and
what evidence has been produced to confirm or disprove the charges against
the defendant.216 Moreover, because they are part of a hierarchical
apparatus, trial judges have to give a written justification of their decisions217
that the appellate judges can review more broadly than the verdict within the
was France, who set up the jury twice, in 1791 and 1808. Other countries, like Germany, followed its
example. Nevertheless, today most inquisitorial systems have replaced the jury with mixed courts or
do not have any kind of lay participation in the criminal justice system. (Two exceptions are Russia
and Spain, who introduced the jury into their respective systems in 1993/2002 and 1995.) For
accounts of the introduction of the jury by France and Germany during the nineteenth century, see
the articles included in THE TRIAL BY JURY IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY 1700-1900 (Antonio Pado
Schioppa ed., 1987). For an explanation of why France and Germany finally rejected this institution
and adopted mixed courts, see Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, in
SELECTED WRITINGS 294, 310 (1978). For an analysis of the turn against the jury court on the part of
liberal and conservative legal actors alike after about 1900, see Benjamin C. Hett, Death in
Tiergarten and Other Stories: Murder and Criminal Justice in Berlin, 1891-1933, 343-45 (2001)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with the author). For an analysis of the
history of the jury in Germany and its link to contemporary debates on political philosophy, see
Markus Dirk Dubber, The German Jury and the Metaphysical Volk: From Romantic Idealism to
Nazi Ideology, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 227 (1995).
212 On the regulation of second-hand evidence in civil law countries with special reference to
Germany, see Mirjan Damaška, On Hearsay and its Analogues, 76 MINN. L. REV. 425 (1992).
213 id at 427-28.
214 Damaška, FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY, supra note 43, at 50.
215 Regarding Germany, see StPO § 168, 168a, and 168b.
216 Contemporary civil law countries rely on oral production of evidence at trial much more than
in the past. For instance, the civil law principle of immediacy establishes that the decision-makers,
the prosecution, and the defense must be present during the production of evidence, which the
decision-makers will evaluate in order to issue their verdict and sentence. See, e.g., MAIER, supra note
52, § 8(D)(3)(c), at 877-78. However, the elements of proof collected in the written dossier continue
to have an influence on trial judges--who in most jurisdictions do not participate in pre-trial
proceedings and only have knowledge of those elements of proof because of the written records. For
an analysis of this issue in Germany, see Mirjan Damaska, Of Hearsay and Its Analogues, 76 MINN.
L. REV. 425, 449-52 (1992).
217 On the duty of judges to give written justifications of their decisions in Italy, see, e.g., COST.
art. 111.6 (which was in place even before the reform of November 1999).
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model.218

coordinate
Finally, given the unitary trial court, the written
dossier, and trial judges’ resulting knowledge of the case and the defendant
before the trial, both guilt and sentencing issues are tried jointly.219
The criminal procedure of ICTY in its initial years presented a relatively
equal number of features of the hierarchical and coordinate models, with a
slight predominance of the former. First, the Statute established that the
Trial Chamber would be composed of professional judges—thus it excluded
trial by jury from ICTY.220 In addition, the Rules established a unitary court
which decides whether to admit evidence, directs the trial, and issues a
verdict at the end of it.221 Second, as drafters of the Rules, the judges decided
not to include technical rules of evidence from common law jurisdictions.222
All relevant evidence could be admitted, unless its probative value would be
substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial223 or it was
obtained by means contrary to internationally protected human rights.224
Third, the trial judges had to give a reasoned opinion in writing to justify
their judgment.225 Finally, the prosecution could appeal the acquittal of the
defendant.226
Nevertheless, the initial ICTY criminal procedure also had a number of
features of the coordinate model. First, even if there were no technical rules
of evidence, the Rules established a clear preference for oral evidence.227

See, e.g., LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY, supra note 152, at 84-85.
See, for instance, Argentine Criminal Procedure Code, Articles 396 and 398.
220 Statute, Article 12(a).
221 See Rule 89.
222 See First Annual Report, supra note 105, para. 72. The justification was precisely the one that
is usually found in inquisitorial jurisdictions: there would not be trial-by-jury at the tribunal but by
professional judges. See supra note 117. On the admissibility of hearsay evidence in the tribunal, see,
e.g., Prosecutor v. Aleksovsky, Case IT-95-14/1-AR73, Decision on Prosecutor’s Appeal on
Admissibility of Evidence, February 16, 1999, para. 15 (where the Chamber stated that decisions in
the Tadic and Blaskic cases unquestionably established the broad discretionary power of Trial
Chambers to admit relevant evidence under Rule 89 (C) because “the fact that the evidence is hearsay
does not necessarily deprive it of probative value”).
223 Rules 89(C) and (D).
224 Rule 95. Regarding cases of sex assault, the Rules expressly established that no corroboration
of the victim’s testimony shall be required. See Rule 96(i).
225 Rule 88(C).
226 Statute, Article 25; Rule 99(B).
227 See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, To Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence: the Use of
Affidavit Testimony in Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings, 42 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL
LAW JOURNAL 535, at 540 (2001) (“On the whole then, ICTY proceedings were originally envisioned
as reliant mainly on live witness testimony, and indeed several attempts by the prosecutor to
introduce written statements of witnesses, or to broaden the strict requirements of corroborative
218
219
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Rule 90(A) said that in principle, the witnesses had to be heard directly by
the Trial Chamber.228 Furthermore, neither the Rules nor the initial
practices of the tribunal established that there would be a written dossier that
would contain records of the pre-trial investigation or some of the evidence
that would be presented at trial. Finally, the Rules established that the
question of sentencing could be decided in a different procedure after the
Trial Chamber found the accused guilty of a crime.229
Regarding the opposition between the hierarchical and coordinate
models the procedural structure of interpretation and meaning of ICTY was
initially a hybrid between the adversarial and the inquisitorial systems. This
hybrid was probably determined not by the relative power of actors with
adversarial and inquisitorial internal dispositions, but rather by the
conviction, held by even common law policymakers and judges, that it was
not possible or convenient to apply some of the features of the coordinate
model in an international criminal context. For instance, the drafters of the
Statute thought that a trial by jury was impracticable in an international
criminal jurisdiction. And, as drafters of the Rules, the judges probably
thought that common law rules of evidence were not only unnecessary, but
also unfavorable to the achievement of the tribunal’s goals, because they
would present additional obstacles to the prosecution in proving its cases.

VI. RISE AND FALL OF THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM IN ICTY
The analysis in the last two sections shows that the adversarial system
prevailed in the early years of ICTY not only in its Rules, but also in its legal
practices and procedural culture. The dispute model clearly prevailed over
affidavits pursuant to Rule 94 were repelled, if not by the Trial Chamber, then by the Appeals
Chamber.”).
228 The complete text of the original Rule 90(A) was: “Witnesses shall, in principle, be heard
directly by the Chambers. In cases, however, where it is not possible to secure the presence of a
witness, a Chamber may order that the witness be heard by means of a deposition as provided for in
Rule 71.” This last rule was also quite strict in providing exceptions to the principle that witnesses
should be heard directly by the Trial Chambers. Rule 71(A) said: “At the request of either party, a
Trial Chamber may, in exceptional circumstances and in the interests of justice, order that a
deposition be taken for use at trial…” In the case of the ICC, this question is regulated in Article 69(2)
of the Rome Statute, which establishes that, as a general rule, the testimony of a witness at trial shall
be given in person. However, because Article 69(2) also establishes exceptions to this rule, it is
unclear how this issue will actually be regulated and practiced in this jurisdiction.
229 Rule 100. Applying the rationale of this rule, “Trial Chamber II consistently refused to hear
any motion on the form of the indictment that came down to the allegation that one and the same act
resulted in charges of different crimes, since it considered this to be relevant only for sentencing once
the defendant had been found guilty. Therefore the sentencing stage was the proper time to hear
these complaints” (see Orie, supra note 6, at 1473, mentioning Tadia, Delalia et al, and Delia and
Lablo as cases where the Trial Chamber applied this rationale).
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the official investigation model, and even if there were several elements from
the hierarchical model, there were almost as many from the coordinate one.
This predominance of the adversarial system had an impact on how the
Tribunal worked, including how it organized and administered its human
and material resources. It also affected how the Tribunal distinguished
between guilt and innocence, how it was perceived by the population in the
territories of the former Yugoslavia, and how rapidly it prosecuted and tried
its cases, among other factors.230
The last of these factors—the speed of the proceedings—started to raise
important concerns for ICTY judges and members of ICTY’s Office of the
Prosecutor (hereinafter OP),231 who wondered whether the predominantly
adversarial system of the tribunal was adequately dealing with this
question.232 By July 1998, more than five years after the creation of the
tribunal by the Security Council, only two judgments had been issued.233 The
rapid growth in the caseload of the Tribunal also fed these concerns. The
number of accused persons under its custody more than tripled within two

230 Another issue that should be analyzed in terms of the adversarial and the inquisitorial systems
is deciphering which system might better determine the historical events that lead to mass atrocities
and the responsibility that different social and political actors had in them. This question is crucial
given that one of the proclaimed goals of international criminal justice is to contribute to national
reconciliation in the territories where the atrocities happened. To what extent international tribunals
can achieve this and its other goals is a question that is beyond the scope of this article. For skeptical
analyses on the potentially of ICTY to achieve its goals, see, e.g., Anthony D’Amato, Peace vs.
Accountability in Bosnia, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 5000 (1994); and David P. Forsythe, Politics and the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.F. 401 (1994). For a defense
of the potentiality of international criminal jurisdictions to deter future atrocities, see Payam
Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM.
J. INT’L L. 7 (2001).
231 See, e.g., Sixth Annual Report of ICTY, August 25, 1999, para. 13 (“The Tribunal’s Judges are
concerned about the length of time many of the trials and other proceedings are taking to complete”);
Seventh Annual Report ICTY, July 26, 2000, para. 4 and 7 (pointing out that one of the two major
problems that the Tribunal had to overcome was trying all the accused within a reasonable timeframe).
232 As the first President of the Tribunal, Antonio Cassese, said: “it became clear fairly soon that,
to expedite proceeding which, being grounded on the adversarial model, were rather lengthy, it was
necessary to depart from the system whereby the court acts as a referee and has no knowledge of the
case before commencement of trial”. See CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6, at
385.
233 The cases were Erdemovic Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-96-22-Tbis (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber II, 5 March 1998), which had been disposed of through a guilty
plea and a plea bargaining; and Tadic Opinion and Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for Former Yugoslavia Appeals Trial Chamber II 7 May 1997), whose appeal was still pending. Of
course, the tasks of the Tribunal have not only been limited to these two cases but also to others
where investigations have been done, indictments issued, and trials were held.
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years, growing from eight individuals in June 1996 to twenty nine in June
1998.234
Not only the judges, but also the media and several members of the
international community showed concern about these issues.235 At the very
end of 1998, the General Assembly of the U.N. requested that the SecretaryGeneral conduct a review of the functioning of ICTY and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [hereinafter ICTR], which was facing similar
problems, “…with the objective of ensuring the efficient use of the resources
of Tribunals …”236 The Secretary-General appointed an Expert Group to
conduct this review.237
In a report issued in November 1999,238 the Expert Group put the
question very candidly:
Major concerns have been voiced not only by United
Nations officials, Member States and others, but also by all
the organs of the Tribunals with regard to the slowness of
the pace of proceedings…[T]he question is why, after
almost seven years and expenditures totaling $400
million, only 15 ICTY and ICTR trials have been
completed…239

234 See Mundis, supra note 12, at 371. The caseload of the Tribunal continued to increase in the
following years. See, e.g., Seventh Annual Report ICTY, July 26, 2000, para. 2 (pointing out that from
August 1, 1999, to July 31, 2000, thirteen indicted persons were arrested in a single year, bringing to
37 the total number of those detained).
235 See, e.g., Charles M. Madigan & Colin McMahon, A Slow, Painful Quest for Justice, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, Section News, September 7, 1999; Carol J. Williams, Crisis in Yugoslavia; Wheels of Justice
Turn Slowly at Tribunal, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Part A, page 20, May 28, 1999; Elizabeth Neuffer, A
worldwide tribunal on crime eyed; Talks aim for permanent court, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Section
National/Foreign, page A1, June 15, 1998; Elizabeth Neuffer, War criminal tribunal faces trial of its
own; UN panel facing fiscal pressures, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Section National/Foreign, page A2, May
9, 1997; Tracy Wilkinson, Problems Outweigh progress of U.N. Tribunal; War Crimes: Lack of
International Cooperation, Slow Pace of Arrests Bring Panel to Turning Point, LOS ANGELES TIMES,
Part A, page 12, May 4, 1997.
236 See Expert Group, supra note 88, at 8. See also Seventh Annual Report ICTY, July 26, 2000,
para 330 (“The aim of report was to find pragmatic and flexible solutions which would enable the
judges to deal effectively with the considerable increase in their workload over the past few years and
with the expectations of the acussed, the victims and the international community.”).
237 The Group was composed of Jerome Ackerman (Chairman, United States), Pedro David
(Argentina), Hasson Jallow (Gambia), Jayachandra Reddy (India) and Patricio Rueda Spain.
238 The report of the Expert Group—which included criticisms to the adversarial system of ICTY—
was very influential on the Tribunal. See, e.g., Seventh Annual Report ICTY, July 26, 2000, Summary
(“Nearly all the recommendations contained in the Expert Group report were applied or about to be
implemented”) and para. 325-28.
239 Id. at 17-8. For a complete assessment of the work of ICTY as of 31 August 1999, see id. at 16.
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Many judges and members of the OP—even many of those from
common law jurisdictions—and the members of the Expert Group thought
that one of the main causes of these problems was the adversarial system of
ICTY, or at least some of its features.240 These problems seemed to have
arisen from the difficulties that the adversarial system had in dealing with
complex criminal cases within the international context. The complexity of
these cases should not be underestimated.241 This complexity arises, first,
from the definitions of international crimes themselves, which require
certain elements that are particularly hard to prove or disprove. 242 As the
second President of the Tribunal put it:
…[E]stablishing—or defending against claims—that the
conflict was widespread or systematic (as required for
crimes against humanity), that there was intent to destroy
in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial, or religious
group (as required for genocide), or that the conflict was
international and the victims were a protected group (as
required for grave breaches) necessarily requires
considerable evidence.243
As a consequence of some of these substantive requirements, the
prosecutor usually has to prove not only one or two factual incidents—as
usually happens in national jurisdictions—but rather a multiplicity of
incidents that may have occurred in a broad geographic area and over a

240 See CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6, at 385 (“it became clear fairly soon
that, to expedite proceeding which, being grounded on the adversarial model, were rather lengthy, it
was necessary to depart from the system whereby the court acts as a referee and has no knowledge of
the case before commencement of trial”). For an analysis of other factors that may have produced a
delay in ICTY proceedings, see Expert Group, supra note 105 at 18-32. For a description of the
Expert Report and the answer of the Tribunal toward it, see Daryl A. Mundis, Improving the
Operation and Functioning of the International Criminal Tribunals, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 759 (2000).
241 See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, To Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence: the Use of
Affidavit Testimony in Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings, 42 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL
LAW JOURNAL 535, at 536-37 (2001) (“A trial at ICTY is usually more akin to documenting an episode
or even an era of national or ethnic conflict rather than proving a single discrete incident.”).
242 See, e.g., Sixth Annual Report of ICTY, August 25, 1999, para. 13 (“The Tribunal’s cases
involve complex legal and factual issues, as well as the application of legal principles that have not
previously been interpreted or applied”); and CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6,
at 442-43.
243 Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Trial Procedures and Practices, in I SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL
ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 547, at. 616 (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia SwaakGoldman eds., 2000).
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time.244

relatively long span of
In addition, international crimes are usually
committed by individuals who are part of organizations, which creates
additional evidentiary problems, such as proving command responsibility.245
Gideon Boas provides a good description of these difficulties regarding
KordiG, a large-scale command responsibility case before ICTY:
The prosecution needed to prove not only the position of
Dario Kordia and Mario derkez in the military and/or
political chain of command, but also the alleged atrocities
for which they were said to be responsible…[which
included the] attacks and atrocities allegedly committed in
the entire Lasva Valley…In addition, the prosecution stated
that it would establish the command structure of the HVO
[Bosnian Croat Army], the role of the co-accused in that
command structure (both political and military), the
authority of the HVO over the region in which the
atrocities were committed, and the conditions and
structure of the HVO detention facilities, as well as their
existence. Furthermore, the prosecution asserted that it
would establish, for the purposes of article 2 of the Statute,
that the armed conflict in the region of central Bosnia at
the time of the offences was international in nature.246
Any procedural system would have problems in dealing with so many
complicated investigative and evidentiary issues at the same time.247 In the
case of ICTY, the adversary system was having two main problems in
addressing these issues. The first problem was in the structure of the
adversarial process itself, organized according to the dispute model. Because
it is structured as a dispute between two parties before a passive
decisionmaker, the adversarial system establishes a very clear distinction
between the roles of prosecuting—the responsibility of the prosecutor—and
adjudicating—the responsibility of the judge. Since the prosecutor has the

244 See, e.g., Wald, supra note 227, at 536-37 (“A trial at ICTY is usually more akin to
documenting an episode or even an era of national or ethnic conflict rather than proving a single
discrete incident”).
245 For a critical analysis of the doctrine of command responsibility in international criminal law,
see Mirjan Damaška, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 455 (2001).
246 Boas, Creating Law of Evidence for International Criminal Law, supra note 12, at 60.
247 In fact, the Expert Group thought that the complexity of legal issues was a problem in itself,
independent of the problems that the procedure of the Tribunal had in dealing with this complexity.
See Expert Report, supra note 88, para. 61 (“Once started, trial proceedings are lengthened by a host
of additional problems. The most important of these thus far has arisen out of the legal complexity
involved in establishing guilt of one or more of the crimes proscribed by the Statute.”).
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burden of proof, she must gauge in advance how much evidence will be
enough to persuade the decisionmaker about each element of the alleged
crimes.248
However, this evaluation is necessarily speculative. This uncertainty
may lead a prosecutor to obtain and present more evidence than what the
prosecutor, or even the judges, might consider necessary to support a
conviction—especially in long investigations and trials where an acquittal
might be especially painful after so many resources had been spent on them.
In the context of ICTY, this adversarial system of incentives, and the special
evidentiary difficulties presented by international criminal cases, led the
members of the OP to undertake especially lengthy investigations, produce
an excess of evidence at trial, and spend a great deal of time in the
interrogation of witnesses and experts.249
Furthermore, a criminal procedure structured as a dispute between two
parties usually generates a sort of “poker game” between them. Both the

248 In both contemporary civil and common law countries, the judges or jurors have to reach
certainty in order to convict a defendant. This duty is framed in common law countries as the burden
on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt and the duty of the
decision-maker to be certain beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense
when he/she issues a conviction. In civil law countries, a similar principle is expressed through the
principle “in dubio pro reo,” which establishes that judges cannot convict the defendant unless they
have certainty about his guilt. These principles are usually derived from the presumption of
innocence that applies in both contemporary civil and common law countries. In the context of ICTY,
the presumption of innocence is established in Article 21.3 of its Statute, but the principle that the
prosecution has the burden of proof is not expressly established in either the Statute or the Rules.
However, it has been the understanding in ICTY practices that the prosecution has such a burden.
For instance, Rule 98 bis establishes that after the prosecution has presented its case at trial, the Trial
Chamber can acquit the defendant—after a defense motion for judgment of acquittal or motu
propio—if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. This demonstrates that the prosecution
has such a burden. For critical analyses of these issues, see CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW,
supra note 6, at 390-93; SALVATORE ZAPPALÀ, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 10, at 91-97.
249 See Expert Report, supra note 88, para. 65 (“From the standpoint of the prosecution, its
position has been that, in order to carry out its mandate faithfully, it has no choice but to indict for as
many crimes as appear to have been committed or to combine alleged individual offences into broad
categories such as genocide and crimes against humanity, and to introduce as much evidence and as
many witnesses as appear necessary to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Were a Trial
Chamber erroneously to exclude evidence and later wrongly to acquit an accused on the ground of
insufficient evidence, this might lead to a retrial ordered by the Appeals Chamber with the associated
emotional burdens on witnesses of having to repeat their testimony and the corresponding drain on
prosecutorial resources. Some inkling of the dimensions of what the nature of the prosecution
burden of proof and the defence response produces may be gleaned from the fact that in ICTY
proceedings during 1997 and 1998, 699 witnesses testified and their testimony covered almost
90,000 pages of transcript. In the absence of authoritative guide from the Appeals Chamber enabling
the prosecution to reduce the size of its case, without fearing that it will be found to have failed to
sustain its burden of proof, it is very difficult to fault the prosecution’s position. And this, of course,
has a significant bearing on the optimum use of prosecution counsel and support staff.”).
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prosecution and the defense try to show as few “cards” (evidence, strategies,
and such) as possible to the other party in order to be able to surprise it later
(and not be surprised). Within this context, the uncertainty of the
prosecution about the defense’s strategies and evidence may also lead it to
make longer investigations and case presentations at trial, especially in
complex criminal cases like most of those heard by ICTY. In addition, since
the prosecution has to obtain an indictment and prove the case at trial
beyond a reasonable doubt, the usual strategy of the defense is to get as much
information as possible about the prosecution case during the pre-trial
phase, to withhold as much information as possible about its own case, to
stipulate as little as possible about facts that the prosecution has to prove, to
vigorously cross-examine the prosecution witnesses during trial, and so
on.250
At the national level, where most cases involve a limited universe of facts
and evidence, these issues seldom generate substantial problems in terms of
the length of the proceedings. But in international criminal cases, where the
number of facts to be established and the amount of potential evidence to be
presented can be huge, these legitimate defense tactics may substantially
lengthen the proceedings. For instance, few stipulations, and lengthy crossexaminations, can substantially lengthen an already long trial.251 Of course,
the adversarial system also faces these challenges in complex cases at the
national level. But there the adversarial system offers tools such as plea
bargaining, immunities, and others that will be analyzed in detail in Section
X which fit well within this conception of the criminal process, as we already
have seen. However, such tools were used sparingly if at all in the early years
of ICTY.252

250 See, e.g., Expert Report, supra note 88, para. 67 (“The common law adversarial system…is
largely reflected in the Statutes of the Tribunals and in their Rules of Procedure and Evidence…(I)t is
not uncommon for accused to believe that it is in their interest to engage in obstructive and dilatory
tactics before and during trial”).
251 See, e.g., Expert Report, supra note 88, para. 67 (“The common law adversarial system…is
largely reflected in the Statutes of the Tribunals and in their Rules of Procedure and Evidence. This,
coupled with the presumption of innocence and the principles relating to self-incrimination, results
in accused, as is their right, not only under the Statutes, but also under basic human rights law, being
uncooperative and insisting upon proof by the Prosecutor of every element of the crime alleged. From
the standpoint of the accused, this represents optimum use of defence counsel. In turn, this reality is
one of the factors contributing to the extensive nature of prosecutorial and defence investigations
which often continue in distant places even after trial start…”).
252 See, e.g., in 2001, Patricia M. Wald, To Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence: the
Use of Affidavit Testimony in Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings, 42 HARVARD
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 535, at 549 (2001), claimed: “(S)o far, ICTY prosecutor has no formal
policy of encouraging guilty pleas by dropping charges or recommending a reduced sentence,
although there have been a few spontaneous pleas. Nor does she have any announced policy of
conferring immunity on a witness who testifies against another accused.”
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The second main problem that the adversarial system faced had its
origin in the coordinate ideal and its preference for the oral production of
evidence at trial.253 First, the number of witnesses that had to testify in these
trials was often huge.254 For instance, in the KordiG case, there were 241
witnesses.255 If all of the witnesses in this kind of case have to give full
testimony at trial, as the coordinate ideal generally would require, then the
trial necessarily will be very long. In addition, proving such facts as
widespread attacks on a certain civilian population can be both very timeconsuming and related to more than one defendant. But if all the (same)
testimony to prove these charges must be presented orally in each separate
case—as the coordinate model would indicate—then this too will
substantially lengthen each of these trials.256
In order to speed up the proceedings, the judges decided to move ICTY
criminal procedure away from the adversarial system, at least regarding a
substantial number of its features.257 Their two main approaches were to
make judges more active managers of cases to speed up the docket,258 and to

253 See, e.g., the article by the former President of ICTY Patricia M. Wald, To Establish Incredible
Events by Credible Evidence: the Use of Affidavit Testimony in Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal
Proceedings, 42 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 535, at 536 (2001) (“it is primarily the live
witnesses who take up trial time (an average witness is on the stand for a full trial day). If trials are to
be notably shortened, witnesses must be substantially cut.”).
254 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 13, at 584 (“The major difference between domestic trials and
those at the Tribunal lies in the scale of the proceedings. Few domestic trials will have as many as 50
witnesses for both parties. In contrast, only one Tribunal trial so far has had less than 50 witnesses
and some have had more than 100”); Patricia M. Wald, To Establish Incredible Events by Credible
Evidence: the Use of Affidavit Testimony in Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings, 42
HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 535, at 549 (2001) (“ICTY trials, on average, involve a
hundred witnesses or more, and each witness, on average, takes up a full trial day.”).
255 See Boas, Creating Law of Evidence for International Criminal Law, supra note 12, at 60.
256 See, e.g., Sixth Annual Report of ICTY, August 25, 1999, para. 13 (“The Tribunal’s Judges are
concerned about the length of time many of the trials and other proceedings are taking to
complete…There are a number of causes for the length of trials and other proceedings…(U)nlike the
Nürnberg and Tokyo trials, a great of reliance is placed on the testimony of witnesses rather than on
affidavits.”).
257 See CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6, at 385 (“it became clear fairly soon
that, to expedite proceeding which, being grounded on the adversarial model, were rather lengthy, it
was necessary to depart from the system whereby the court acts as a referee and has no knowledge of
the case before commencement of trial”).
258 See, e.g., Expert Report, supra note 88, para. 77-78 (“From the beginning, the judges have
been scrupulous in their respect for the distribution of responsibilities implicit in the common law
adversarial system and have tended to refrain from intervening in the manner of presentation elected
by the parties. This surely contributed to the length of the proceedings and is recognized as having
done so by the judges…Some judges in ICTY and ICTY…have been moving in the direction of
asserting greater control over the proceedings, and the Expert Group recommends that this be
accelerated and become general practice.”).
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change ICTY’s initial preference for oral production of evidence at trial.259
Even common law judges and the OP supported these ideas.260
Commentators generally have described these reforms as a shift from
common to civil law criminal procedure.261 This article’s claim in the next
three sections is that even if the reforms have moved ICTY criminal
proceedings away from the adversarial system, they have moved them not
toward the inquisitorial system, but toward the managerial judging system
that now prevails in complex litigation cases in U.S. civil procedure. In this
way, this article will show that the established view does not give the best
description of ICTY criminal procedure, because it has only conceived this
procedure according to the traditional, binary adversarial-versusinquisitorial paradigm.

259 For proposals in this direction by the Expert Group, see, e.g., Expert Report, supra note 88,
para. 86 and 88.
260 On the support of some common law judges, see Mundis, supra note 12, 369. Several
common law judges supported these reforms even if they went against their original predominantly
adversarial set of internal dispositions, because they agreed with the diagnosis that the adversarial
system was not dealing with cases in an expeditious way. In addition, despite the potential decrease
in their procedural powers, many members of the OP also supported these reforms. The explanation
seems to be the following. First, the OP had as much at stake as the judges in the success of the
tribunal in performing its tasks. In this sense, the slowness of the proceedings was a serious problem
for them too. Second, many members of the OP agreed that the adversarial system was one of the
explanations for this slowness. Therefore, they generally supported the reforms even if they carried a
decrease in their procedural powers.
261 See, e.g., Gideon Boas, Creating Law of Evidence for International Criminal Law, supra note
12, at 57-58; Boas, Developments, supra note 10, at 174 (“What all these amendments embody is a
radical change in the focus of ICTY on trial preparation. These amendments encompass continental
law concepts whereby it is the court that determines the nature and scope of the case and determines
which evidence is best tested”); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6, at
387 (“over the years there has been a gradual incorporation of significant features of the inquisitorial
model into the procedural system of ICTY and the ICTR, which initially was largely based on the
adversarial scheme. The need to speed up proceedings has been the primary rationale for this gradual
change”); Daryl A. Mundis, From 'Common Law' Toward 'Civil Law', supra note 12; Orie, supra
note 6, at 1463 (“Since the adoption of the original Rules, the judges of ICTY have amended them
more than twenty times. These amendments tend toward an inquisitorial direction”) and at 1492
(“The subsequent development of the law of procedure in the ad hoc Tribunals has on all major
points been in the direction of the civil law”); Tochilovsky, Rule of Procedure for the International
Criminal Court, supra note 12, at 359 (“Although most of ICTY Rules of Procedure were borrowed
from the common-law systems, ICTY practice has proved that the ad hoc Tribunal’s criminal
proceedings are evolving into a real hybrid of the two major legal systems in operation in the world
today. The proceedings tend to combine a common-law contest between two parties before
uninformed judges and a civil-law scrutiny of evidence with active, informed judges”) ; Tochilovsky,
Legal Systems and Cultures in the International Criminal Court, supra note 10, at 632 (“It was
mostly a wish to expedite trials and, for that purpose, to give the judges more control over
proceedings that prompter ICTY Judges to turn to a civil law practice”); SALVATORE ZAPPALÀ, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 10, at 2 (“[P]ractice evidenced the
drawbacks of applying a purely accusatorial model to international criminal proceedings, and thus
amendments were required. In amending the procedural system of the ad hoc Tribunals…some
inquisitorial elements were upheld, thereby diluting the originally adversarial imprint.”).
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VII. THE MANAGERIAL JUDGING SYSTEM
As explained in the previous section, around 1998, ICTY began to face
external pressures to process its cases more quickly. In order to speed up the
proceedings, the judges decided to move ICTY criminal procedure away from
various aspects of the adversarial system. The two main reform ideas were to
make judges more active and increase their procedural powers relative to the
prosecution and defense,262 and to change ICTY’s initial preference for oral
production of evidence at trial.263 Commentators have described these
reforms as a move from adversarial to inquisitorial conceptions of criminal
procedure.264
But the claim of this article is that these reforms have actually moved
ICTY procedure toward a third procedural model that fits neither adversarial
nor inquisitorial conceptions of the criminal process. This third type of
procedure is close to what has been characterized as managerial judging.265
Hence, in order to explain why ICTY criminal procedure fits in this third
model, it is necessary first to describe the managerial judging model.266 This

262 See, e.g., Expert Report, supra note 88, para. 77-78 (“From the beginning, the judges have
been scrupulous in their respect for the distribution of responsibilities implicit in the common law
adversarial system and have tended to refrain from intervening in the manner of presentation elected
by the parties. This surely contributed to the length of the proceedings and is recognized as having
done so by the judges…Some judges in ICTY and ICTY…have been moving in the direction of
asserting greater control over the proceedings, and the Expert Group recommends that this be
accelerated and become general practice.”).
263 See, e.g., Sixth Annual Report of ICTY, August 25, 1999, para. 13-14 (“The Tribunal’s judges
are concerned about the length of time many of the trial and other proceedings are taking to
complete…There are a number of causes for the length of trials and other proceedings…(U)nlike the
Nürnberg and Tokyo trials, a great deal of reliance is placed on the testimony of witnesses rather than
affidavits…The judges have taken a number of steps to reduce the length of trials. These include
adopting amendments to the Rules in July 1998…providing for the admission of affidavits in certain
instances.”).
264 See bibliography cited in note 261.
265 The classic description of managerial judging is found in Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges,
96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
266 There is an extensive literature on managerial judging in U.S. civil procedure, and I will only
cover a fraction of it in this article. See, e.g., Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases:
Extending the Judiciary or Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 394 (1986); Paul R. J.
Connolly, Why We Do Need Managerial Judges, 23 JUDGES’ JOURNAL 37 (1984); Jack H. Friedenthal
& Joshua E. Gardner, Judicial Discretion to Deny Summary Judgment in the Era of Mangerial
Judging, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 91 (2002); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in
Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges: the Potential Costs, 45
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW 686 (1985); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges and Court Delay:
the Unproven Assumptions, 23 JUDGES’ JOURNAL 8 (1984); Judith Resnik, The Assumptions Remain.
(Critique of Paul R.J. Connolly’s; Why We Do Need Managerial Judges’), 23 JUDGES’ JOURNAL 37
(1984).
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section will provide such a description by using U.S. civil procedure as an
example of managerial judging.267 A discussion of civil procedure for this
purpose will temporarily divert us from our analysis of the criminal
procedure of ICTY. But this diversion is justified for two different reasons.
The first is that U.S. civil procedure is one of the jurisdictions where the
managerial judging system initially arose. Thus, using this procedure as an
example will allow us to establish a dialogue with the civil procedure scholars
that initially identified and described this system in order to develop a more
refined version of the managerial judging system.268 In addition, given that
in Section X we will compare ICTY procedure with U.S. civil and criminal
procedures, it will be helpful to describe certain features of U.S. civil
procedure in this section.
For a long time, U.S. civil procedure was characterized as an adversarial
system.269 Even more than its sister, domestic criminal procedure,270 U.S.
civil procedure could be characterized as a dispute between two parties

267 For a challenge to whether the managerial judging system actually describes current U.S. civil
procedure in mass tort and security class actions today, see William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional
Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371 (2001) (proposing a new model, the transactional model, to
describe mass tort and security class actions). I do not need to get into this debate for the purposes of
this article for three different reasons. First, even if Rubenstein were right and the managerial
judging system no longer describes mass tort and security class actions, managerial judging still
would apply to other civil cases. Second, my goal in this Section VII is to describe the managerial
judging system as an ideal-type in order to use this ideal-type in the rest of this article to analyze the
criminal procedure of ICTY. My use of U.S. civil procedure in this Section is only aimed at providing
examples for my description of the system. So, even if Rubenstein were right and the managerial
judging system no longer captures all complex litigation in U.S. civil procedure, this would not
represent a challenge to this article’s main argument that the managerial judging system has arisen in
ICTY procedure. Finally, Rubenstein’s claim is that the managerial judging system no longer
describes mass tort and security class actions, not that this system never described them. So, his
claim would not constitute a substantial challenge either for my comparative analysis in Section X of
U.S. civil and criminal procedures and ICTY procedure, because the assumption in that section is that
U.S. civil procedure partially moved, at some point in time, from the adversarial system to the
managerial judging one. The fact that U.S. civil procedure later partially move from the managerial
judging system to the transactional model would not challenge that assumption.
268 Some commentators have characterized civil procedure in some civil law countries as also
close to the managerial judging system. See, e.g., Langbein, The German Advantage,52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 823 (1985). ; Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 16 . I do not need to analyze the accuracy
of this statement for the purposes of this article because questions of where this system initially arose
are not important for developing my different arguments. Even if the managerial judging system had
arisen in other civil procedures before than in the U.S., U.S. scholars were the first in identifying such
a model. Therefore, in order to define the managerial judging system as a theoretical model, engaging
in a dialogue with U.S. civil procedure and scholars is particularly important.
269 See e.g. STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO
ADJUDICATION 1 (1988); Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 16, at 380-2.
270 For an interesting comparative analysis of current U.S. civil and criminal procedure, see
Stephen C. Yeazell & David A. Sklansky, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home: What Civil
Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Viceversa (on file with the author).
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decisionmaker.271

before a passive
The private parties did their own pre-trial
investigation, framed both the factual and legal issues, and presented them
to the decisionmakers for their determination.272 The parties were the active
players in the process, and the roles of judge and jury were limited to
deciding those factual and legal issues that the parties presented.273
During the second half of the 20th century, though, the role of judges in
U.S. civil procedure started to change.274 Partly due to changes in the
discovery rules that gave judges more knowledge about the case long before
the trial started,275 an increase in the volume and complexity276 of federal
litigation,277 and increasing interactions between federal judges and
institutional changes in the Federal Judiciary,278 judges became active
managers of cases in order to speed up their cases and reduce their
dockets.279 In a path-breaking article, Judith Resnik diagnosed and
identified this change in U.S. civil procedure practices.280 She called the new

LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE, supra note 269, at 2.
Id. at 3-4; Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 16, at 381-2.
273 Id. at 3-4, 2-3, 15-6. On the traditional role of judges in the U.S., see Resnik, Managerial
Judges, supra note 16, at 374.
274 For a detailed description of these developments, whose background conditions can be traced
back to the 1920s and 1930s, see Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming
the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924 (2000). See also Resnik, Managerial Judges,
supra note 16, at 379, and 397-400.
275 Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 16, at 378-9 (“This new managerial role has emerged
for several reasons. One is the creation of pretrial discovery rights.”); also at 391-3.
276 On the concept of complex litigation, see Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of
Complex Litigation and the Limits of Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683 (1992).
277 Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 16, at 379 (“[P]artly because of increasing case loads,
many judges have become concerned with the volume of their work.”) also at 395-9. Resnik,
Managerial Judges, supra note 16, at 393-5 also mentions the use of lawsuits by diverse groups to
assert novel legal rights (i.e., prison conditions) as another reason for the emergence of managerial
judging in U.S. civil procedure. On the reasons of why the caseload of the courts has increased since
the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, see Resnik, Managerial Judges,
supra note 16, at 396-7 (The caseload of the courts has increased significantly because of the growth
of the population, Congress and the courts has created or articulated a multitude of new rights and
legally cognizable wrongs; more lawyers are available than before; and Congress has provided for the
payment of attorneys’ fees to various classes of victorious plaintiffs,thereby creating new incentives to
litigate). Resnik adds that in addition to increased case filings, motion practice under the discovery
rules has substantially increased the burdens of the federal court system.
278 See, generally, Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 274, at 943-49.
279 Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 16, at 379.
280 For other articles that propose models to capture these changes (even before Resnik did), see
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Owen
M Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979). For critiques of the Public
Ligitation Model that Chayes articulated, see Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary
and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980); Linda S. Mullenix,
271
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judging.”281

approach “managerial
But the move toward managerial judging
also was reflected in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure282 and the Federal
Judicial Center’s U.S. Manual for Complex Litigation.283
According to Professor Resnik, two main sets of changes followed this
re-definition of judges’ role in U.S. civil procedure. First of all, judges now
actively manage cases from very early in the litigation process and control
their evolution.284 In order to do this, judges hold pre-trial conferences to
establish early and continuing control over the way the parties manage their
cases so that the proceedings are not unnecessarily protracted;285 issue
scheduling orders that limit the time in which to file motions, complete
discovery, and establish the date or dates for pre-trial conferences, and
trial;286 and ensure that the participants formulate a plan for trial, including
a program for facilitating the admission of evidence.287 The second main
change has been that now judges have an active role in encouraging the
Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation: The New Private Law Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33
VAL. U. L. REV. 413 (1999).
281 Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 16, at 378 (“Judges have described their new tasks as
‘case management’—hence my term ‘managerial judges’.”). Even if Resnik provided the classic
description of this model, other articles described this tendency in U.S. civil procedure before she did.
See, e.g., Costantino, Judges as Case Managers, TRIAL, March, 1981; Peckham, The Federal Judge as
a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 779
(1981); Alvin B. Rubin, The Managed Calendar: Some Pragmatic Suggestions about Achieving the
Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive Determination of Civil Cases in Federal Courts, 4 THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
JOURNAL 135 (1978); Honorable Hubert L. Will, The Role of the Judge in the Settlement Process, 75
F.R.D. 203.
282 Managerial judging was explicitly introduced in the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
1983. The 1983 amendments to rule 16(a) were intended to make “case management an express goal
of pretrial procedure.” See Elliot, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 306, 323 (1986).
283 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (4th ed. 2004). The Manual is now in its fourth edition,
and it was first edited in 1969. It is not considered a legal or administrative policy authority (see id. at
1), but it has been very influential on judges and practitioners.
284 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 283, at 2 (“In offering an array of litigation
management techniques and procedures, the Manual does not recommend that every complex
litigation necessarily employ any such procedures or follow a standard pattern. Choices will depend
on the needs of the litigation and many other considerations. What the Manual does urge is that
choices be made, and that they be made starting early in the litigation.”); at 7 (“Fair and efficient
resolution of complex litigation requires at least that…the court exercise early and effective
supervision (and, where necessary, control).”); at 9 (“Judicial supervision is most needed and
productive early in the litigation.”)
285 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 16(a). See also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION,
supra note 283, at 9 (“The judge should hold an initial pretrial conference under Rule 16 as soon as
practical…”)
286 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 16(b) (The order must be issued as soon as practicable
but in any event within 90 days after the appearance of a defendant and within 120 days after the
complaint has been served on a defendant.)
287 See Rule 16(d).
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parties to reach agreements on factual and legal issues and, ideally, to settle
the case.288
In her classic description of this model, Resnik emphasized this redefinition of the role of judges to speed up cases; that is why she called the
model “managerial judging.”289 She also concluded that the managerial
judging model would only apply during the pre-trial and post-trial phases,
but would leave the trial intact.290 At trial, the traditional adversarial system
would still predominate in U.S. civil procedure.291
However, this section reveals that managerial judging, as a procedural
ideal-type, can and should be conceived much more broadly.
The
transformations implied by the model are both broader and more detailed
than what Resnik’s description suggested. The transformations are broader
because managerial judging redefines the role not only of the judge, but also
of the parties.292 The transformations are more detailed because managerial
judging explains many more procedural features than simply expanded
resources to promote settlements and new management techniques—the two
features that the first descriptions of the model emphasized.293 In order to
show these points, this section will analyze the aspects of procedure
previously linked to adversarial and inquisitorial systems,294 and will
compare these systems to managerial judging.295

288 See Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 16, at 390 (describing the new role of the judge in
settlements through a hypothetical case).
289 Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 16, at 378 (“Judges have described their new tasks as
‘case management’—hence my term ‘managerial judges’.”)
290 Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 16, at 377-8, 386, 403, where she only analyzes
managerial judging as a pre-trial and post-trial phenomenon, not as a trial one. The statement of the
main text should be qualified in the following way. Professor Resnik does not think that the
managerial judging system would apply at trial. However, this does not mean that she thinks that
the rise of the managerial judging system in U.S. civil procedure would leave the trial unaffected
because, by encouraging parties’ agreements, the managerial judging system would reduce the
number of trials and denigrate the importance of trial in the profession’s ideology.
291 See, e.g., Elliot, supra note 282, at 326 (“The jury is still out on managerial judging.”)
292 It is partially because of its concentration only on the role of the judge that Rubenstein does
not find Resnik’s description of managerial judging adequate to capture current securities and mass
tort class actions. See Rubenstein, A Transactional Model, supra note 74, at 418.
293 See, e.g., Rubenstein, A Transactional Model, supra note 74, at 416, who describes these
accounts as focused “on two salient features of current adjudicatory practice. First, judges do not
simply preside at trials following the development of a case by the attorneys; rather, judges ‘manage’
lawsuits from filing to finish. Second, ‘finish’ increasingly means settlement, not trial. In short,
judges manage cases, rather than adjudicate trials.”
294 See Sections 4 and 5.
295 The comparison will be to the adversarial and inquisitorial criminal procedure systems (as
defined). It will not be a comparison to civil procedure in civil law countries because the latter
comparison is not necessary to develop the main arguments of this article. However, it is worth
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The first point to be emphasized is that managerial judging redefines the
role not only of the judge, but also of the parties.296 It is true that in this
model the judge is no longer the investigator of the inquisitorial system or
the umpire of the adversarial system, but an active manager, negotiator and
mediator of the case.297 However, the role of the parties is also transformed.
Unlike the adversarial system in which the parties both are conceived mainly
as zealous advocates of their cases,298 and unlike the contemporary
inquisitorial system in which the prosecutor is conceived as an impartial
investigator299 and only the defendant as a zealous advocate of his case,300 in
the managerial judging system, the parties both are conceived not only as
zealous advocates of their positions, but also as collaborators with the judge
who have the duty to help the judge reduce the court caseload, simplify the
case and speed up the procedure.301 In other words, the parties can be
zealous advocates of their positions as long as this zeal does not delay the
proceedings, but they also have an active duty to collaborate with the court
and to coordinate with each other to expedite the case. These duties of the
parties also imply a transformation of the conception of the parties’ attorneys
in litigation, who also have a duty to collaborate with the court in expediting
the process.302 In this way, their role as officials of the court is deepened and
emphasized.303
mentioning that, contrary to what some U.S. commentators have stated, civil procedure is civil law
countries is not inquisitorial because it is as party-driven as U.S. civil procedure. For a description of
civil procedure in contemporary civil law jurisdictions as a party-driven procedure, see KUO-CHANG
HUANG, INTRODUCING DISCOVERY INTO CIVIL LAW 3-35 (2003).
296 On this transformation, see, generally, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 283, at
22-30.
297 Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 16, at 379.
298 On the conception of parties and lawyers as zealous advocates of their cases, see, e.g., DAVID
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988).
299 See, for instance, Thomas Weigend, Prosecution: Comparative Aspects, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF CRIME & JUSTICE 1233-4 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002).
300 The defendant in most contemporary inquisitorial systems is not only a target of investigation
but also a subject of rights, and these rights are similar in kind and in extent to those recognized in
common law countries. The defendant and his lawyer can use these rights—including the right
against compulsory self-incrimination, to produce evidence, to confront his accuser, to interrogate
witnesses, to an impartial court, to counsel, and so forth—to zealously advocate for their position.
301 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 283, at 7 (“Fair and efficient resolution of
complex litigation requires at least that…counsel act cooperatively and professionally; and…the judge
and counsel collaborate to develop and carry out a comprehensive plan for the conduct of pretrial and
trial proceedings.”)
302 The Manual for Complex Litigation, supra note 283, at 22-23, is explicit in this respect:
“Judicial involvement in the management of complex litigation does not lessen the duties and
responsibilities of the attorneys. To the contrary, such litigation places greater demands on counsel in
their dual roles as advocates and officers of the court. The complexity of legal and factual issues
makes judges especially dependent on the assistance of counsel …The added demands and burdens of
complex litigation place a premium on attorney professionalism, and the judge should encourage
counsel to act responsibly…Counsel need to fulfill their obligations as advocates in a manner that will
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In this sense, if the adversarial system conceives the relationship
between the main procedural actors as a dispute between two parties before a
passive umpire, while the inquisitorial system presumes an official
investigation run by one or more impartial officials in order to determine the
truth, the managerial judging system conceives procedure as a managerial
device run by the judge with collaboration and coordination from the parties
to process cases as swiftly as possible. This definition does not mean that its
only procedural goal is to process cases swiftly, just as dispute-resolution is
not the adversarial system’s only goal, nor impartial truth-determination the
only goal of the inquisitorial system. Managerial judging also tries to resolve
the controversy initially presented to the court by the parties, and in order to
do this, the procedure has a truth-determining dimension. But the goal of
processing cases swiftly is particularly important in the managerial judging
model,304 and determines the relationship between the main actors of the
process.305
In U.S. civil procedure, this re-definition of the role of the parties has
mainly happened during the pre-trial and post-trial phases, initially in
complex litigation and public litigation, because at trial, the presence of the
jury usually puts the judge and the parties back in their traditional roles.306
This is why Resnik originally characterized the managerial judging model as
limited to the pre-trial and post-trial phases.307 But this does not mean that
foster and sustain good working relations among fellow counsel and with the court. They need to
communicate constructively and civilly with one another and attempt to resolve disputes informally
as often as possible. Even where the stakes are high, counsel should avoid unnecessary
contentiousness and limit the controversy to material issues genuinely in dispute.”
303 Of course, in any contemporary procedural system in the West, lawyers are conceived of not
only as advocates of their clients but also as officials of the court. The point I am making is that the
duties of lawyers as officials of the court in the managerial judging system are broader and more
active than in contemporary adversarial and inquisitorial systems.
304 See, e.g., Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 16, at 431 (“Case processing is no longer
viewed as means to an end; instead, it appears to have become the desired goal.”).
305 It is because of this re-definition of their role that, in the managerial judging system, the
parties have the duty to collaborate with the management of the case by stipulating to as many factual
and legal issues as possible, trying to settle the case, meeting the schedule set by the court, disclosing
as much information as possible to the other party so that the trial transpires without major
surprises, not presenting unnecessary or repetitive evidence, limiting the number of witnesses and
the length of their interrogatories, and so on. Since the parties are conceived of as collaborators of the
court, sanctions can be imposed when these duties are not performed. Both the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Manual for Complex Litigation are explicit in this respect.
306 See, e.g., Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 268, at 19 (“managerial judging in
the pretrial process leaves adversary domination of the trial (especially jury trial) largely
unaffected.”).
307 Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 16, at 377-8, 386, 403 (she only analyzes managerial
judging as a pre-trial and post-trial phenomenon, not as a trial one).
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trial.308

this procedural model could not also apply at
Even during trial, the
parties have duties to disclose as much information to the other party as
possible to make the trial a foreseeable and manageable event,309 limit the
length of their cases and the extent of their interrogatories,310 and seek
stipulations on factual and legal questions.311 The judge also has a much
more active role in limiting the extent of the parties’ cases and the length of
their interrogatories than she usually does in the adversarial system.312 This
role includes avoiding repetitive or cumulative evidence,313 appointing court

308 An indication of this is that the Manual for Complex Litigation devotes an entire Section to
trial management. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 283, at 131-66.
309 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 283, at 138 (“Counsel should exchange lists
(with copies if not previously supplied) for each trial day indicating the order in which expected
witnesses and exhibits will be called or offered. The lists should identify those portions of depositions
to be read. The court should specify the amount of advance notice required, balancing opposing
counsel’s need for time to prepare against the possibility that intervening developments will require
changes. Some judges require a tentative listing of the order of witnesses and exhibits a week or more
in advance, with instructions to communicate changes as soon as known, and give a final list at a
conference at the close of the preceding day.”).
310 The number and length of interrogatories also have to be limited during the pre-trial phase.
See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 283, at 90-2.
311 See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 283, at 148 (“The judge may intervene,
even without objection, in order to…encourage stipulations by opposing counsel to avoid routine
testimony, such as the date of a document.”).
312 See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 283, at 127 (“Some attorneys
understand the advantages of selectively presenting evidence, but others leave no stone unturned,
resulting in trials of excessive length unless limited by the judge. Where the parties’ pretrial estimates
suggest that trial will be excessively long, the judge should discuss the possibility of voluntary, selfimposed limits with the lawyers, perhaps suggesting exhibits or testimony that could be eliminated
and inviting further suggestions…If this approach is not productive, consider imposing limits in some
form, using the authority under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(c)(4) and Federal Rules of
Evidence 403 and 611. Announcing an intention to impose such limits may suffice to motivate
counsel to exercise the discipline necessary to expedite the litigation to form a reasonable judgment
about the time necessary for trial and the scope of the necessary evidence…Limits may be imposed in
a variety of ways…by limiting the number of witnesses or exhibits to be offered on a particular issue
or in the aggregate; …by controlling the length of examination and cross-examination of particular
witnesses; …by limiting the total time allowed to each side for all direct and cross-examination; and …
by narrowing issues, by order or stipulation…Generally, limits are best imposed before trial begins so
that the parties can plan accordingly, but the need for limits may not become apparent until trial is
underway.”). Id. at 132 (“A trial schedule is essential to the orderly conduct of a trial. The schedule
may, but need not, limit the length of the trial itself or the time allotted to each side for examination
and cross-examination…It is appropriate to set the trial schedule only after consultation with counsel
and after making appropriate accommodations for other time demands of the participants.”); at 147
(“Limits on time and evidence are ordinarily set at the pretrial conference so that counsel can plan
accordingly before the trial begins…Judicial intervention may become necessary, however, if evidence
exceeds reasonable bounds and does not contribute to resolving the issues presented.”); at 149
(“Limits may grant each party a specified number of hours for all direct and cross-examination,
restrict the time for specific arguments, or limit the time for examination of particular witnesses.”).
313 See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 283, at 148 (“One judicial alternative
is to limit or bar the examination of witnesses whose testimony is unnecessary or cumulative and to
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parties,314

experts to avoid the repetition of expert witnesses presented by the
holding conferences during trial,315 reviewing the order in which the evidence
is produced,316 and asking her own questions to witnesses.317 Of course, the
judge also has almost all these powers in the adversarial system. But unlike
the adversarial judge who uses them very sparingly in order not to abandon
her role as a passive umpire, the managerial judge embraces these powers as
central to her work and does not shy away from actively using them.
In addition to these transformations in the role of the main actors in the
process, managerial judging also implies a re-definition and re-signification
of other procedural features. The main academic characterizations of this
model have also left out a number of these features. As we have seen, since
the adversarial system views procedure as a dispute between two parties
before a passive umpire, both parties have the power to dispose of the case by
dismissing the charges, pleading guilty,318 and reaching agreements, and the
judge remains in a passive position regarding these issues.319 Unlike the
inquisitorial system but like the adversarial one, the managerial judging
model also allows the parties to dispose of their case by similar methods, or
call for stipulations where a number of witnesses would testify to the same facts…The judge may
intervene, even without objection, in order to…bar testimony on undisputed or clearly cumulative
facts—testimony may be disallowed as cumulative if it relates to evidence to be covered in later
testimony, or matters beyond the scope of the examination”).
314 On the use of expert witnesses in complex litigation cases in U.S. civil procedure, see MANUAL
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 283, at 111-4.
315 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 283, at 135-6 (“The court should consider
scheduling a conference with counsel at the end of each trial day, after the jury has been excused. The
conference may be brief, but should generally be on the record to avoid later misunderstandings.
Such a conference helps avoid bench conferences and other trial interruptions. It can be used to plan
the next day’s proceedings and to fix the order of witnesses and exhibits, avoiding surprises and
ensuring that the parties will not run out of witnesses…The judge may, in light of other evidence
previously presented, determine that further evidence on a point would be cumulative”).
316 See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 283, at 148 (“Judges can review the
order in which witnesses are to be called to determine if it would interfere with an orderly trial. For
example, counsel may try to call an adversary’s expert witness before critical evidence has been
presented and before the party’s own expert has testified.”).
317 As I will explain later (see footnotes 338-43 and accompanying text), the ideal-type of the
managerial judging system that I propose for this article does not include a trial by jury, but trial by
professional judge or judges. In this sense, the U.S. civil procedure does not correspond to this
feature of the ideal-type. The presence of the jury in U.S. civil procedure explains why the MANUAL
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 283, at 139 suggests that judges refrain from asking questions
to witnesses as much as possible (“In jury trials, judicial restraint in questioning witnesses minimizes
both the appearance of partiality and the disruption of counsel’s presentation. The court should
generally refrain from asking questions until counsel have finished their examination and even then
limit questions to matters requiring clarification.”). In a similar way, see id. at 149.
318 See supra notes 143-46, and accompanying text.
319 See supra note 143, and accompanying text.
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agreements.320

to focus their controversy by stipulations or
In fact, these
features are prime ways to achieve the goal of reducing the caseload and
simplifying cases.321
But even if both the adversarial and managerial judging systems share
these features, they also present two differences on this point. The first has
to do with the role of the judge regarding stipulations and agreements.322 In
the managerial judging system, if the parties negotiate and reach stipulations
or agreements without the court’s participation, these agreements are
welcomed as a way to reduce the caseload and speed up the proceedings.323
But if the parties do not negotiate or reach agreements, the managerial judge,
unlike the adversarial umpire, not only can get involved in the negotiations,
but also must encourage the parties to reach agreements.324
The second difference is that in the managerial judging system, parties
have less power to dispose of procedural and substantive issues. In the
adversary system, when parties reach an agreement regarding a particular
issue, that generally disposes of the question. The role of the court is limited
to checking whether the agreement is voluntary and the parties understand
its extent. But in the managerial judging system, parties’ agreements on

320 See, e.g., Elliot,, supra note 282, at 320-6 (pointing out that the original function of
managerial judging was to narrow issues during the proceedings and that the new main function of
managerial judging is settling cases). See also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 283, at
167-82.
321 Between 1940 and 1990, the number of cases settled in U.S. federal civil procedure more than
doubled—from about 14% to about 34%. See Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences, supra note
122, at 638.
322 See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 283, at 94 (“The judge can…encourage
stipulations of facts that, after an appropriate opportunity for discovery has been afforded, should no
longer be genuinely in doubt.”).
323 See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 283, at 44 (“The process of
identifying, defining, and resolving issues begins at the initial conference. The attorneys should
confer and submit a tentative statement of disputed issues in advance, agree on to the extent
possible.”)
324 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 283, at 40 (At each pretrial conference, “the
judge should explore the settlement posture of the parties and the techniques, methods, and
mechanisms that may help resolve the litigation short of trial.”) ; 95 (“When voluntary means of
narrowing factual disputes have been exhausted, admissions may be obtained under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 36…Because parties often deny a requested admission on the basis of a trivial
disagreement with a statement or without indicating the portions of the stated fact that are true, the
court can urge the parties to observe their obligation under the rule of respond in good faith and point
out the availability of sanctions for failure to do so.”). For an example of judicial activism in
encouragement settlement, see, e.g., Lockhart v. Patel, 115 F.R.D. 44 (E.D. Ky. 1987), and Steve
Yeazell’s analysis of it in his The Misunderstood Consequences, supra note 122, at 657-59. On the
techniques that judges can use to identify, define, and resolve issues in complex litigation, see id. at
45.
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particular issues are only welcomed when they expedite the case or reduce
the caseload of the court; otherwise, the court will reject them.325
The next set of features of managerial judging that deserve emphasis are
those related to the structure of procedure. We saw that one of the
differences between the adversarial and inquisitorial systems was that in the
former, procedure is structured as a contest between the competing cases of
the prosecution (plaintiff) and the defense, while in the latter, procedure is
structured as a unitary investigation run by impartial officials. In the
managerial judging system, procedure is structured as a competition
between two cases, and in this respect it differs from the inquisitorial system.
But even if it conceives procedure as a competition between two cases, there
are two differences between managerial judging and the adversarial system
on this point.
First, in the managerial judging system, the cases of the plaintiff or
prosecutor and the defendant are as much in coordination and cooperation
as in competition. There is competition to the extent that each of the parties
runs its own pre-trial investigation and presents its case at trial. But at the
same time, the parties have to cooperate with each other in order not to delay
the proceedings unnecessarily.326 For instance, the parties may not use
discovery requests to delay the proceedings,327 and they have to limit the
controversy only to material issues genuinely in dispute.328 Second, the

325 Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 16, at 400-01, provides the following example of this
phenomenon: “In the hypothetical Ms. Paulson's attorney, Mr. Adams, filed the complaint on
January 4, 1982. But suppose that, instead of promptly replying, defendant asked for an additional
twenty days to respond. Plaintiff's counsel readily agreed, and the parties filed a stipulation to that
effect. However, Judge Kinser refused to permit any extension beyond the time permitted by the
Federal Rules - twenty days after receipt of service.” For another example of this feature of
managerial judging, see, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Lessons from Abroad: Complexity and
Convergence, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1, 18-9 (2001).
326 This duty usually is articulated as lawyers’ responsibility. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION, supra note 283, at 23 (“Counsel need to fulfill their obligations as advocates in a manner
that will foster and sustain good working relations among fellow counsel and with the court. They
need to communicate constructively and civilly with one another and attempt to resolve disputes
informally as often as possible. Even where the stakes are high, counsel should avoid unnecessary
contentiousness and limit the controversy to material issues genuinely in dispute. Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.2. requires lawyers to make ‘reasonable efforts to expedite litigation
consistent with the interests of the client’.”).
327 See, e.g., Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences, supra note 122, at 651 (“[d]iscovery in
the United States is supposed to function as a cooperative venture among the adversaries, who,
guided by the Rules, explore the facts) ; MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 283, at 23
(“The certification requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 and 26(g) reflect some of the
attorneys’ obligations as officers of the court. By presenting a paper to the court, an attorney certifies
in essence that he or she, based on a reasonable inquiry, has not filed the paper to delay, harass, or
increase costs.”).
328 Id. at 23.
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system.329

parties are less masters of their cases than in the adversarial
The
court exercises a constant control over their cases to expedite process.330
Thus, the court may set time limits for the pre-trial phase through scheduling
orders,331 put pressure on the parties to reach total and partial agreements,332
limit the presentation of the parties’ cases at trial333 and the number of
witnesses that may be produced,334 set time limits on direct and crossexaminations,335 call its own expert-witnesses,336 and act in other ways to
control and expedite the case.
In addition, the managerial judging system differs from the adversarial
and inquisitorial systems regarding those features related to the hierarchical
and coordinate models.337 First of all, juries and a bifurcated court are not
welcomed in the managerial judging system.338 Trial by jury are more timeconsuming than bench trials because of the jury selection process, jury
instructions, jury deliberations, and such.339 And a bifurcated court presents
additional problems of coordination as against a unitary court, and deprives
the judge, the most powerful figure in the managerial judging system, of

329 Mullenix, Lessons from Abroad, supra note 325, at 19-20 (“In modern complex litigation…,
the central role of adversariness has been diminished to the extent that judges no longer rely solely on
the parties to frame legal issues, present facts or evaluate legal conclusions. Moreover, activist judges
in complex litigation are perfectly willing to override the attorney’s role in controlling and conducting
the litigation, such as when the judges takes the lead in formulating the trial plan, examining
witnesses or freely admitting various forms of testimony into court records.”).
330 This statement should be qualified in the following way. It is true that in the managerial
judging system the court actively controls the parties through pre-trial conferences, scheduling orders
and so forth, and that this makes them less masters of their cases. But, at the same time, the pretrial
in the managerial judging system is longer and the trial is shorter than in the adversarial system
because of broader discovery and judicial encouragement to settlement. Since the court can
continuously watch the parties at trial but not during the pretrial phase, the move toward managerial
judging may, thus, reduce the level of scrutiny of the court over the parties. Yeazell makes this point
in his The Misunderstood Consequences, supra note 122, at 647.
331 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26(b).
332 See supra notes 322-24, and accompanying text.
333 See supra notes 312-17, and accompanying text.
334 See supra note 310, and accompanying text.
335 See supra note 310, and accompanying text.
336 See supra note 314, and accompanying text.
337 On the hierarchical and coordinate models, see Section V.
338 See, e.g., Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation—Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D.
199, 209 (1976) (arguing that the jury system is a limit on the institutional capacity of courts to
adjudicate complex cases and advocating abolition of the right to a jury in such cases), cited by Elliot,
supra note 282, at 309.
339 Of course, given that the U.S. Constitution mandates trial by jury even in civil cases, this
feature of U.S. civil procedure is not consistent with managerial judging as an ideal-type. On the
attempts to deal with these issues in complex litigation cases in U.S. civil procedure, see, generally,
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 283, at 150-63.
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powers.340

substantial
(At this level, then, U.S. civil procedure departs from
the managerial judging ideal-type, since the U.S. Constitutional establishes a
right to a trial by jury also in civil cases.341) In this sense, the managerial
judging system shares with the inquisitorial a preference for the
professionalization of the legal process. But unlike the inquisitorial system,
which distrusts lay participants out of a corporativist attitude which favors
bureaucratic control over legal cases,342 the managerial judging system
disfavors lay participants because they lengthen and complicate the handling
of these cases.343
The managerial judging system also differs from the inquisitorial and
the adversarial in its conception of how much hierarchy or coordination there
is between the various actors and levels of the legal process. Hierarchical
control between courts is very time-consuming, and this is why the
managerial judging system does not welcome broad appellate review of
either interlocutory or final decisions.344 In this sense, managerial judging
differs from the inquisitorial system. But at the same time, in its conception
of the relationship between the judge and the parties, managerial judging is
more hierarchical than both the adversarial and the inquisitorial systems. As
we saw, in the managerial judging system, the parties are conceived as
collaborators of the court that may be sanctioned if they do not perform their

340 On the bifurcated court in U.S. civil and criminal procedure, see DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW
ADRIFT, supra note 201, at 26-57.
341 See U.S. CONS., VII AM: “In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law.”
342 See DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY, supra note 43, at 18-19 (who,
describing the hierarchical ideal of inquisitorial systems, says: “Permanently placed officials carve out
a sphere of practice which they regard as their special province. Over time, they also develop a sense
of identity with similarly situated individuals, so that lines become rigid between ‘insiders’ and
‘outsides’. If outside participation in making of decisions is imposed upon such officials, it is viewed,
at best, as meddling which deserves to be contained and made innocuous.”).
343 See, e.g., JAY TIDMARSH & ROGER TRANGSRUD, COMPLEX LITIGATION AND THE ADVERSARY
SYSTEM 1209-19 (1998) (suggesting that juries should be eliminated in complex and technical
situations).
344 In U.S. civil procedure, the move toward managerial judging has limited the control of
appellate courts over the trial courts, especially during the pretrial phase. Since the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were initially enacted, the pretrial phase has become increasingly longer and
important because of broader discovery, joinder, and judicial encouragement of settlement. And
given the doctrine of final judgment in U.S. civil procedure—which basically states that only final
decisions can be appealed—the overall control of appellate courts over trial courts has diminished.
See Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences, supra note 122, at 646-48. On the interlocutory
appeals available in complex litigation cases in U.S. civil procedure, see MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION, supra note 283, at 208-11.
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duties of speeding up the procedure and reducing the court’s docket.345
Neither the adversarial nor contemporary inquisitorial systems conceive the
relationships between the judge, prosecution and defense in such a
hierarchical fashion.346
Since in the managerial judging system there is no jury and the court is
unitary, there is no justification for the existence of detailed technical rules of
evidence.347 In addition, parties’ discussions about the admission or
rejection of evidence at trial may be very time-consuming.348 And since the
judges need to know as much as possible about the case in order to manage it
efficiently, the managerial judging system does not welcome technical rules
of evidence that prevent the judge from getting this information.349
As to reliance on oral testimony or a written dossier for evidence, the
managerial judging system presents the following features. First, the judge
needs to have as much information as possible about the case in order to
manage it effectively. A written dossier could provide this information. But
other functionally equivalent ways to get this information are equally good.
For instance, in the case of U.S. civil procedure, this information is obtained
through pre-trial conferences and extensive discovery. In addition, in order
to shorten the pre-trial phase, the managerial judging system limits the
number and length of pre-trial depositions as much as possible,350 except
when depositions are helpful to avoid or shorten the trial.351 Furthermore, in
order to reduce the length of the trial, once a deposition or statement from a

See supra notes 296-303, and accompanying text.
See supra notes 79-81, and accompanying text. .
347 See, e.g., Mullenix, Lessons from Abroad, supra note 325, at 19 (“another attribute of the
judicial function that has been modified in complex litigation concerns the extent to which judges
flexibly administer evidentiary rules.”).
348 On this point, see, e.g., Langbein, Land without Plea Bargaining, supra note 153.
349 Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 16, at 408 (“The supposedly rigid structure of
evidentiary rules, designed to insulate decisionmakers from extraneous and impermissible
information, is irrelevant in case management. Managerial judges are not silent auditors of
retrospective events retold by first-person storytellers. Instead, judges remove their blindfolds and
become part of the sagas themselves.”).
350 See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 283, at 83 (“Depositions are often
overused and conducted inefficiently, and thus tend to be the most costly and time-consuming
activity in complex litigation. The judge should manage the litigation so as to avoid unnecessary
depositions, limit the number and length of those that are taken, and ensure that the process of
taking depositions is as fair and efficient as possible”). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2)(A),
31(a)(2)(A), 30(d)(2), 26(b)(2), among others, establish limits to the number and length of
depositions and give the court final authority over these issues.
351 Long depositions can contribute to shortening the trial in U.S. civil procedure, because the
information that is acquired through them may lead to summary judgments or narrow down the
issues under discussion at trial.
345

346
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witness has been taken, the managerial judging system welcomes the reading
of summaries of these depositions or statements rather than hearing live
witness.352
On the distinction between the guilt-determination and
sentencing phases, managerial judging does not make a clear distinction
between these phases, unlike the adversarial system and its coordinate
model.
Holding two separate sets of hearings for each of these
determinations can be very time-consuming; thus, the managerial judging
system includes them in a single process.
Finally, the managerial system is characterized by the use of a specific
set of management techniques to speed up the docket.353 These techniques
include the power of the court to hold pre-trial conferences to expedite the
disposition of the action, to establish early and continuing control over the
case, and to encourage stipulations and settlement;354 a case-management

352 See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 283, at 143 (“If the contents of a
deposition are a necessary element of a party’s proof, the preferred mode of presentation is a succinct
stipulated statement or summary of the material facts that can be read to the jury”). The Manual
clearly prefers these stipulated statements or summaries over reading the whole deposition at trial,
which is discouraged in jury trials (see id. at 143). In nonjury trials, the Manual even more strongly
encourages the introduction of written statements (“Where credibility or recollection is not at issue,
and particularly when the evidence is complicated or technical, a court may consider ordering
witnesses under the parties’ control to present their direct testimony in substantial part through
written statements prepared and submitted in advance of trial. At trial, the witness is sworn, adopts
the statement, may supplement the written statement orally, and is then cross-examined by opposing
counsel and perhaps questioned by the judge. The statement is received as an exhibit and is not read
into the record…This procedure—which may be particularly appropriate for expert witnesses,
witnesses called to supply factual background, or those needing an interpreter—has several
advantages. The proponent can ensure that it has made a clear and complete record; the judge and
opposing counsel, having read the statement, are better able to understand and evaluate the witness’s
testimony; opposing counsel can prepare for more effective cross-examination; and the reduction in
live testimony saves time.”)(id. at 164).
353 Elliot, supra note 282, at 311-2 (“The programs proposed by the proponents of managerial
judging have, by and large, been true to the implications of the image of judge as ‘manager’. Stripped
to their essentials, the techniques of managerial judging ration a scarce good—the procedural moves
available to litigants under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. According to the advocates of
managerial judging, this good is offered to its consumers (lawyers) at well below its true social cost;
therefore they consume too much of it. The essential function of managerial judging is to increase the
price of procedure. One can in fact define managerial judging as the selective imposition by judges of
costs on lawyers for the purpose of rationing the use of procedures available under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Managerial judging techniques accomplish their goal of increasing the costs to
lawyers of exercising their clients’ procedural rights in a number of different ways, some more explicit
than others.”)
354 See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 283, at 36 (“Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 16 authorizes the court to hold pretrial conferences in civil cases. These conferences are
the principal means of implementing judicial management of litigation”), at 32 (“The court’s first step
in establishing control of the litigation is promptly scheduling the initial conference with counsel,
generally within 30 to 60 days of filing, but with sufficient time for counsel to become familiar with
the litigation and prepare for the conference. The judge should hold the conference before any
adversary activity begins, such as filing of motions or discovery requests, and the order setting the
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plan that may include procedures for identifying and narrowing disputed
issues of fact and law, carrying out disclosure and conducting discovery in an
efficient and economical matter, and preparing for trial;355 scheduling orders
that limit the time to amend the pleadings, file motions and end the
discovery process;356 referring the case to magistrate judges or special
masters to closely supervise the parties’ progress toward simplifying and
streamlining the case during the pre-trial proceedings;357 and related
techniques.
conference may require that all such activity may be deferred.”) On the historical origin of the use of
pretrial conferences, see Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 274, at 939-40.
355 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 283, at 36-7. The Manual provides the
following checklist for designing case-management plans: identifying and narrowing issues of fact
and law; establishing deadlines and limits on joinder of parties and amended or additional pleadings;
coordinating with related litigation in federal and state courts, including later filings, removals, or
transfers; effecting early resolution of jurisdictional issues; severing issues for trial; consolidating
trials; referring, if possible, some matters to magistrate judges, special masters of other judges;
appointing liaison, lead, and trial counsel and special committees, and maintaining time and expense
records by counsel; reducing filing and service requirements; exempting parties from or modifying
local rules or standing orders; applying and enforcing arbitration clauses; planning for prompt
determination of class action questions, including a schedule for discovery and briefing on class
issues; managing disclosure and discovery; planning for the presentation of electronic or computerbased evidence at trial, including the use of any audiovisual or digital technology in the courtroom;
setting guidelines and schedules for the disclosure and exchange of digital evidentiary exhibits and
illustrative aids; establishing procedures for managing expert testimony; creating schedules and
deadlines for various pretrial phases of the case and setting a tentative or firm trial date; discussing
any unresolved issues of recusal or disqualification; evaluating prospects for settlement; instituting
any other special procedures to facilitate the management of the litigation. On the historical origins
of the use of special masters and magistrates in U.S. federal civil procedure, see Resnik, Trial as
Error,supra note 274 at 988-91.
356 See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 16(b). See also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION,
supra note 283, at 39 (“Scheduling orders are a critical element of case management. They help
ensure that counsel will timely complete the work called for by the management plan. Rule 16(b)
requires that a scheduling order issue early in every case, setting deadlines for joinder of parties,
amendment of pleadings, filing of motions, and completion of discovery. Scheduling orders in
complex cases should also cover other important steps in the litigation, in particular discovery
activities and motion practice.”)
357 Regarding the appointment of special masters, see, e.g., Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
53. See also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 283, at 114-6. Regarding the use of
magistrate judges, see Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 53(i) and 72. See also MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 283, at 13-4 (“The judge should decide early in the litigation
whether to refer all or any part of pretrial supervision and control to a magistrate judge…Even
without general referral to a magistrate judge, referral of particular matters may be helpful. Such
matters include supervision of all discovery matters or supervision of particular discovery issues or
disputes, particularly those that may be time-consuming or require an immediate ruling…Magistrate
judges may also help counsel formulate stipulations and statements of contentions, and may facilitate
settlement discussions…Referral of pretrial management to a special master (not a magistrate judge)
is not advisable for several reasons…Because pretrial management calls for the exercise of judicial
authority, its exercise by someone other than a district or magistrate judge is particularly
inappropriate.”); and at 117.
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It is important to mention three final general points about the
managerial judging system as a theoretical model. The first is that
managerial judging should not be confused with management in general or
case management in particular. 358 The managerial judging system should be
understood as a procedural system. The fact that this procedural system is
structured to process cases as quickly as possible should not bring confusion
about this issue. There are actually many management techniques and
devices that fit perfectly with all procedural models. For instance, increasing
the number of judges359 court employees, or courtrooms,360 or putting
judicial documents in a database which the judges and parties can access,361
are ways to increase the efficiency of most procedural models.
All procedural systems manage legal cases, and all seek to avoid
excessive delay.362 What distinguishes the managerial judging system is that
this goal of expediting cases becomes particularly important, and that the
judge becomes the main manager in charge of expediting the cases. This redefinition of the role of the judge and this aspiration to expedite cases bring
with them a re-definition of the role of the parties and other procedural
features. All of this together characterizes managerial judging as a
procedural model.
The second point is that the description of the managerial judging
system just provided should be taken as an ideal-type.363 Like the adversarial

358 The management techniques that I mentioned supra as characteristic of the managerial
judging system are such to the extent that they assume that the judge is the manager of the case or
has an active role in making sure that the proceedings are not delayed, or that they tend to incentive
agreements between the parties.
359 For instance, ICTY has increased the number of its judges over time, but this should not be
considered part of managerial judging as a procedural mode. The Tribunal started with 11 judges but
had 16 permanent judges and 8 ad litem judges by the end of 2003. The U.N. Security Council
created a group of 27 ad litem judges available for the Tribunal to draw upon to increase its judgment
capacity. See, e.g., Eight Annual Report ICTY, August 13, 2001, Summary. As many as 9 ad litem
judges can serve at one time.
360 For instance, ICTY started working with one courtroom and today has three. See First Annual
Report, para. 36; and Tenth Annual Report ICTY, August 20, 2003, para. 47.
361 ICTY has developed a judicial database. See Ninth Annual Report ICTY, August 14, 2002,
para. 290; See Tenth Annual Report ICTY, August 20, 2003, para. 314.
362 In the U.S. adversarial system, the VI Amendment right to a speedy trial and the Federal
Speedy Trial Act show this concern. Inquisitorial systems are also contemporarily concerned with the
speed of the proceedings, and human rights treaties—such as the European Convention of Human
Rights and the American Convention of Human Rights—reflect these concerns.
363 In his classic description of Weber's ideal-types methodology, Max Rheinstein writes:
“Situations of such ‘pure’ type have never existed in history. They are artificial constructs similar to
the pure constructs of geometry. No pure triangle, cube, or sphere has ever existed. But never could
reality have been penetrated scientifically without the use of the artificial concepts of geometry. For
the "pure" concepts created by him, Weber used the term ‘ideal type’.... The ‘ideal types’ ... are simply
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and inquisitorial systems described above, no actual procedure exactly
matches the ideal managerial judging system. But procedures in different
jurisdictions may be closer or farther from the ideal-type, and this proximity
or distance is helpful not only to classify a concrete procedure and compare it
to other procedures, but also to explain how this concrete procedure may
change and reproduce itself over time.
The third point bearing emphasis is that the managerial judging system,
like the adversarial and inquisitorial ones, is not only a technique to handle
legal cases and human and material resources for the administration of
justice, but also a procedural culture and a way to distribute powers and
responsibilities among the main actors in the legal process.364 As a
procedural culture, managerial judging conceives procedure as a managerial
device run by the judge with the collaboration of the parties whose goal is
processing cases as swiftly as possible. And, as with the adversarial and
inquisitorial systems, it is possible to identify within this procedural culture a
structure of interpretation and meaning through which the different
participants of the legal process understand procedure and their role within
the system, and the internal dispositions of the legal actors who have
internalized this structure of interpretation and meaning.365 The description
of managerial judging in this section has given content to this structure of
interpretation and meaning and set of internal dispositions. From these
features, it should also be apparent that as to the dimension of procedural
powers, the managerial judge has more power vis-à-vis the parties than the
adversarial judge, though she has less power than the inquisitorial judge who
can run the process by herself.366
mental constructs meant to serve as categories of thought the use of which will help us to catch the
infinite manifoldness of reality by comparing its phenomena with those ‘pure’ types which are used,
so to speak, to serve as guide in a filing system.” Max Rheinstein, Introduction to MAX WEBER ON
LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY XXIX-XXX (Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein trans., Max Rheinstein ed.,
1954).
364 On the conception of procedural systems as procedural cultures that have different ways to
distribute powers and responsibilities among the main actors and institutions of the criminal process,
see supra Section II.
365 On the concepts of structures of interpretation, meaning, and internal dispositions, see supra
respectively notes 69-70 and 71-73, and accompanying text.
366 In comparison to the adversarial system, the managerial judge is more powerful and has more
responsibilities than the adversarial passive umpire. The managerial judge has the power and
responsibility not only to adjudicate the issues presented to her by the parties but also of managing
the case. On the other hand, the parties of the managerial judging system, as collaborators of the
court, have less power and more responsibilities than their adversarial counterparts. The managerial
court has a much greater say in how the cases of the parties are handled. This is why the parties have
less power than in the adversarial system while the parties of the managerial judging system not only
have the right to zealously defend their interests but also the responsibility of disposing cases swiftly.
(At the same time, though, even if the court has more power over the parties in the managerial
judging system, it is possible that the trial court in current U.S. federal civil procedure exercises less
scrutiny of the parties due to the demise of the trial’s significance and the higher importance of the
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THE REFORMS TO ICTY CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE RISE OF
INTERNATIONAL MANAGERIAL JUDGING

Since July 1998, ICTY judges have introduced a substantial number of
reforms to ICTY’s procedure, moving it away from the adversarial system.367
These reforms have aimed to speed up the pace of the proceedings, not only
to reduce the length of pre-trial detention368 but also to defend ICTY’s
legitimacy and international support.369 Since two of the main reforms have
been to make the judges more active players and to rely more on written
evidence, commentators have described these reforms as a swing from the
pretrial phase. On this point, see Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences, supra note 122, at 64648.) Finally, the managerial judge is also more powerful because of the relatively weak control by the
Court of Appeals over him, which is even weaker than in the adversarial system. In comparison to the
inquisitorial system, the managerial judge has, simultaneously, more and less procedural powers than
the inquisitorial counterpart. The managerial judge has the power to put pressure on the parties and
tell them what to do to speed up proceedings, a power that contemporary inquisitorial judges do not
have. On the other hand, the managerial judge is less powerful because he cannot do the
investigation by himself but rather has to still rely on the parties to handle their own pre-trial
investigations and to present their cases at trial. In addition, the managerial and the inquisitorial
judges have a similar amount of responsibilities but of different kinds. While the managerial judge
has the responsibility of managing and adjudicating the case, the inquisitorial judge has the
responsibility to investigate and adjudicate it. Meanwhile, the parties in the managerial judging
system have more and less powers than their adversarial counterparts due to the flipside of the
analysis already done regarding the judge: the parties run their own pre-trial investigations and
present their cases at trial but, at the same time, can receive orders from the judge about how to do
things. Furthermore, the parties of the managerial judging system have more responsibilities than in
contemporary inquisitorial systems because they are at the same time advocates of their positions
and collaborators of the court. Vis-à-vis the court of appeals, the managerial judge has more power
than the inquisitorial one because there is less hierarchical control in the managerial judging system
than in the inquisitorial one.
367 Recall that, according to Article 15 of the Statute of ICTY, the judges have the power to amend
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal. The fact that ICTY judges have been in charge
of developing their own Rules of Procedure and Evidence has been criticized on the grounds that they
simultaneously perform legislative and adjudicative roles. See, e.g., Fabricio Guariglia, The Rules of
Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court. A New Development in International
Adjudication of Individual Criminal Responsibility, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1111 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002). Perhaps to address this
kind of criticism, the judges have reformed the Rules of the Tribunal to take into consideration the
opinions and interests of the Office of the Prosecutor and the representatives of the Defense Counsel.
See Ninth Annual Report ICTY, August 14, 2002, Summary.
368 See, e.g., Sixth Annual Report of ICTY, August 25, 1999, para. 13 (“The Tribunal’s judges are
concerned about the length of time many of the trials and other proceedings are taking to complete.
Since the accused is generally in custody from the time of his arrest or voluntary surrender until the
final disposition of his case, long trials result in lengthy periods of detention for the accused and also
affect other accused in custody awaiting trial.”).
369 See, e.g., Seventh Annual Report ICTY, July 26, 2000, Summary (“The judges are of the view
that the Tribunal has reached a turning point in its history and that its credibility and the
international support it enjoys are at stake. They also believe that the prompt return to a lasting,
deep-rooted peace in the Balkans is linked to the accomplishment of the Tribunal’s mission within a
reasonable time-frame.”).
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system.370

adversarial to the inquisitorial
But this section will show how
these reforms have actually moved the criminal procedure of ICTY toward
managerial judging.
The reforms have indeed made judges more active players during the
pre-trial and trial phases, but not in order to make judges more active
investigators of the truth as in the inquisitorial system. Rather, as in the
managerial judging system, ICTY judges have become more active managers
to assure that the parties do not delay the proceedings.371
During the pre-trial phase, no later than seven days after the initial
appearance of the accused, the presiding judge of the Trial Chamber must
designate from among its members a judge responsible for the pre-trial
proceedings.372
This pre-trial judge shall, under the authority and
supervision of the Trial Chamber, coordinate communication between the
parties during the pre-trial phase, ensure that the proceedings are not unduly
delayed, and take any measure necessary to prepare the case for a fair and
expeditious trial.373
In order to achieve this goal of expediting the proceedings,374 the pretrial judge uses a number of techniques characteristic of the managerial
judging system.375 These include holding pre-trial or status conferences “to
organize exchanges between the parties so as to ensure expeditious

See works cited supra note 12.
See, e.g., Sixth Annual Report of ICTY, August 25, 1999, para. 14 (“The judges have taken a
number of steps to reduce the length of trials. These include adopting amendments to the Rules in
July 1998, which provide for active pre-trial management of pending cases and strengthening the
ability of the Trial Chamber to control trial proceedings.”); Seventh Annual Report of ICTY, July 26,
2000, para. 288 (“28 rules were amended and 3 new rules were adopted, entering into force on 7
December 1999…Many of these amendments were intended to speed up trials and the pre-trial
process and to minimize delays…”).
372 Rule 65 ter (A). On the importance of early assignment of cases to a judge in U.S. civil
procedure, see MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 283, at 9-10 (“Courts that do not assign
actions automatically to a specific judge upon filing should nevertheless make an individual
assignment as soon as a case is identified as complex or a part of complex litigation.”)
373 Rule 65 ter (B). Trial Chambers have embraced these goals as the duty of the pre-trial Judge.
See, e.g., Naser Oric, Casa IT-03-68-I, Order Concerning Rule 66(A)(II) Materials, Expert Report and
Pre-Trial Briefts Decision of July 30, 2003, p. 1 (considering that the duty of the Pre-Trial Judge is to
ensure that the proceedings are not unduly delayed and to take any measure necessary to prepare the
case for a fair and expeditious trial).
374 See, e.g., Seventh Annual Report of ICTY, July 26, 2000, para. 288-89 (“Many of these
amendments were intended to speed up trials and the pre-trial process and to minimize
delays…(A)mendments were made to the powers and role of the pre-trial judges and to improve pretrial management…”).
375 See supra notes 353-57, and accompanying text.
370
371
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trial”;376

preparation for
establishing a work plan for the parties “indicating
the obligations that the parties are required to meet…and the dates by which
these obligations must be fulfilled”;377 setting a time for the making of pretrial motions and, if required, any hearing thereon;378 and ordering the
parties to meet to discuss issues related to the preparation of the case.379 In
doing all this, the judge may be assisted by a Senior Legal Officer380—who
plays a role similar to the special master of U.S. civil procedure381—whose job

376 Rule 65 bis (A) (“A Trial Chamber or a Trial Chamber Judge shall convene a status conference
within one hundred and twenty days of the initial appearance of the accused and thereafter within
one hundred and twenty days after the last status conference…to organize exchanges between the
parties so as to ensure expeditious preparation for trial”). Judges have embraced this goal of status
conferences. See, e.g., Naser Oric, Casa IT-03-68-I, Status Conference, July 29, 2003, p. 50 (“This is
the first Status Conference held in accordance with Rule 65 bis of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence. The purpose of having this Status Conference is to organize changes between the parties
and to review the status of the case so as to ensure the expeditious preparation for trial.”); Prosecutor
v. Vojislav Seselj, Case IT-03-67-I, Status Conference, October, 29, 2003, p. 116. The other stated
purpose of status conferences is to review the status of the accused’s case and to allow him or her the
opportunity to raise issues in relation thereto, including the mental and physical condition of the
accused. See Rule 65 bis (A)(ii).
377 Rule 65 ter (D)(ii). See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Damir Dosen and Dragan Kolundzija, Scheduling
Order, June 9, 2000.
378 Rule 65 ter (K).
379 Rule 65 ter (D)(iv). See also Rule 65 ter (D)(v) (“Such meetings are held inter partes or, at his
or her request, with the Senior Legal Officer and one or more of the parties.”). See, e.g., Prosecutor v.
Stanislav Galic, Scheduling Order and Order on the Prosecution’s Motion for the Trial Chamber to
Travel to Sarajevo, January 22, 2001 (ordering the parties to meet prior to the Status Conference on
January 30, 2001, and informing the parties that during the Status Conference they should be
prepared to report on the progress made on these issues, including matters regarding the trial
preparation of the case: disclosure of materials pursuant to Rule 66(A)(ii) and Rule 68; progress
toward completing the pre-trial filings required by Rule 65 ter, particularly whether the parties have
made any progress in agreeing on undisputed matters of law and fact; and, with respect to the
Prosecution, the filing of a pre-trial brief, a list of witnesses it intends to call at trial, and a list of
exhibits it intend to use at trial; and so forth).
380 See Seventh Annual Report of ICTY, July 26, 2000, Summary (“In November 1999, the new
President, the judges, the Registar and the Chambers Legal Support Service began to consider ways to
permit the Tribunal to accomplish its mission more effectively and to deal with its greatly increased
workload…In the end, the judges advocated a more flexible two-tier solution which would accelerate
pre-trial case management through increased utilization of senior legal officers from pre-trial case
management…”), para. 10 and para. 340 (“[T]he pre-trial management would be accelerated through
increased recourse to the senior legal officers, thus freeing up the judges to devote more of their time
to hearings and to the drafting of decisions and judgements.”); Eight Annual Report of ICTY, August
13, 2001, para. 58. Ninth Annual Report of ICTY, August 14, 2002, para. 295; See Tenth Annual
Report of ICTY, August 20, 2003, para. 318 (“This reporting period has continued to see the active
implementation of the substantial additional responsibilities assigned to the Senior Legal Officers…in
respect of pre-trial management. Pursuant to rule 65 ter (D) and under the authority and direction of
the pre-trial judge, the Senior Legal Officers now oversee the practical implementation of and
compliance with the rules governing pre-trial management.”).
381 On the use of special masters in U.S. civil procedure, see supra note 357. For a classic analysis
of the use of special masters in U.S. civil procedure, see Hazard & Rice, Judicial Management of the
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is to oversee the implementation of the work
and keep the pre-trial
judge informed of the progress of the discussions between and with the
parties.383 Other management techniques also are available.384
The court is also an active manager during the trial and its preparation.
Prior to the commencement of the trial cases of the prosecution and the
defense, the Trial Chamber must hold pre-trial conferences.385 In these
conferences, the Trial Chamber may call upon the prosecutor and the defense
to shorten the estimated length of the examination-in-chief for some
witnesses,386 determine the number of witnesses that each of the parties may
call,387 and set the time available to the prosecution and the defense to
present evidence at trial.388 The Trial Chamber also may select a number of
Pretrial Process in Massive Litigation: Special Masters as Case Managers, 1982 AM. B. FOUND.
RESEARCH J. 375.
382 See, e.g., Eight Annual Report of ICTY, August 13, 2001, para. 52 (describing reforms to the
Rules of Evidence and Procedure under which, in order to expedite the proceedings, the Senior Legal
Officers in Chambers may assist the Pre-Trial Judge in facilitating a work plan by which the parties
will be required to prepare cases for trial).
383 Rule 65 ter (D)(iii). Judges have made use of these powers. See, e.g., Naser Oric, Casa IT-0368-I, Initial Appearance, April 15, 2003, p. 7 (in which the judge wanted the senior legal officer to
recommend to arrange a conference with the parties in order to discuss matters relating to the
preparation of the trial and to establish a work plan for it. The judge also wanted the conference to be
held before the status conference which has to take place 120 days after the initial appearance).
384 Another technique that is worth mentioning is that, on 19 May 2003, the Security Council
adopted resolution 1481 (2003), amending the Tribunal’s Statute to permit ad litem judges to do pretrial work in addition to participating in trials. See Tenth Annual Report of ICTY, August 20, 2003,
para. 5. The use of ad litem Judges for this pre-trial management function is similar to the use of
Magistrate Judges for pre-trial management in U.S. civil procedure.
385 See Rule 73 bis (A) and Rule 73 ter (A).
386 See Rule 73 bis (B) and Rule 73 ter (B)
387 Rule 73 bis (C)(i) and Rule 73 ter (C). The rationale for the introduction of these reforms has
been expediting the procedure. See Eight Annual Report ICTY, August 13, 2001, para. 52-53. For
examples of how trial courts have used these powers, see Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario
Cerkez, “Lasva Valley”, Case IT-95-14/2, Open Session,February 16, 2000, p. 14418-19; Prosecutor v.
Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, “Lasva Valley”, Case IT-95-14/2, Scheduling Order, April 4, 2000
(noting that the provisions of Rule 73 ter (C) permit a Trial Chamber to call upon the Defense to
reduce the number of witnesses, consider the extensive nature of the Kordic Defense witness list, and
call upon the Cerkez defense to justify to the Trial Chamber the extensive number of witnesses to be
called); Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, “Lasva Valley”, Case IT-95-14/2, Scheduling
Order, April 28, 2000 (noting that the provisions of Rule 73 ter (C) permit a Trial Chamber to call
upon the Defense to reduce the number of witnesses, consider the extensive nature of the Cerkez
Defense witness list, and call upon the Cerkez defense to justify to the Trial Chamber the extensive
number of witnesses to be called); Prosecutor v. Sikirica, “Keraterm Camp”, Case IT-95-8-T, Pre-Trial
Conference, February 8, 2001.
388 Rule 73 bis (C)(ii) and Rule 73 ter (E). See, e.g., Eight Annual Report ICTY, August 13, 2001,
para. 3-4 (“[T]he reforms are intended to make the procedures more responsive to the International
Tribunal’s overriding need for expeditiousness through the fine-tuning of many of the rules of
procedure and evidence…[S]everal rules of procedure and evidence were amended: the judges may
now set the number of witnesses the parties call to testify, (and) determine the length of the cases…”)
and para. 19.
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crime sites or incidents as representative of the crimes charged in the
indictment, and restrict the prosecution’s presentation of evidence to those
sites or incidents.389
During trial, the Trial Chamber “shall exercise control over the mode
and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (i)
make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of
truth; and (ii) avoid needless consumption of time”.390 The Trial Chamber
may refuse to hear a witness whose name does not appear on the list of
witnesses submitted by the parties before the beginning of the presentation
of their cases.391
The judges have also used a number of managerial devices not explicitly
included in the Rules to simplify and speed up trials. For instance, in Stakic,
in response to a request from the Trial Chamber, the Prosecution conceded
that four specific allegations included in the indictment were unproven and
that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction.392 This saves
trial time because the defense does not have to deal with such allegations. In
the same case, the Trial Chamber held eleven meetings with the parties in
chambers while the trial was running, applying by analogy rule 65 ter that
regulates the work of the pre-trial judge as a case manager.393
Notice that this active court that controls the case during the pre-trial
and trial phases differs from an inquisitorial one on at least two levels. First,
the goal of its activism is not to be an active investigator of the truth, but an
active manager who tries to expedite and simplify the court’s cases.394 In

389 See Rule 73 bis (D). This last power was included in the amendment of Rule 73 bis of July 28,
2003, developed by the Judicial Practices Working Group in order to give the Trial Chambers greater
authority to control the scope of the case presented by the Prosecution. See Tenth Annual Report
ICTY, August 20, 2003, para. 12 and 34.
390 Rule 90 (F).
See, for instance, Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case IT-95-10, Trial Transcript,
September 7, 1999, p. 17 (applying Rule 90 (G)—the antecessor of the current Rule 90 (F)—to
establish that the time for carrying a cross-examination correspond as much as possible to the time
taken for the examination-in-chief). For examples of judges interrupting motu propio testimony
during the sentencing hearing to avoid repetitions and to make sure that the testimony remains
focused, see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Miroslav Deronjic, Case IT-02-61-S, Sentencing Hearing, January 27,
2004, p. 124 (judge interrupts a testimony to avoid the repetition of everything that has already been
admitted into evidence); id. at p. 126 (“Mr. Deronjic, please understand, our time is limited. Let’s try
to focus on the core issues that are relevant for the crime we are seized with”); similarly, id. at 131-32,
155-6. `
391 Rule 90 (G). The rationale for the introduction of this power to the Trial Chamber was
expediting the proceedings. See Eight Annual Report ICTY, August 13, 2001, para. 52-53.
392 Stakic, Judgment, para 971.
393 Id. at para. 980.
394 Seventh Annual Report of ICTY, July 26, 2000, para. 19 (“During the reporting period, the
judges were confronted with the problems resulting from the Tribunal’s significantly increased
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fact, the Tribunal itself has recognized that the main goal of these reforms is
to expedite proceedings.395 Furthermore, unlike an inquisitorial court, an
ICTY court does not make its own investigation before or during trial, but
rather leaves this responsibility to the parties.396 The main role of the court
is not to actively investigate the truth, but to actively coordinate and
supervise the work of the parties, so that their investigations and trial cases
get simplified and expedited.397
Also in accord with the managerial judging system, the reforms have redefined the role of the parties as not only zealous advocates of their cases, but
also collaborators with the court in the goal of expediting cases.398 As
collaborators, the prosecution and the defense now have a number of new
duties. For instance, before trial, both the prosecution and the defense have
to submit to the court pre-trial briefs that let the court perform its
workload and with its consequences for the length of the proceedings and, in particular, for pre-trial
detention. As a result, the judges have sought to maximize those resources available to them in
dealing with these difficulties. They have, for instance, prepared the cases more thoroughly at the
pre-trial phase so as to be in a position to hold fair and expeditious trials.”). An example of the
expediency goal of the reforms, rather than the truth-determination one, is the fact that the Expert
Report urged judges to be more active in the interrogation of witnesses as a way to reduce the length
of testimony, not to be more accurate in determining the truth. See Expert Report, supra note 88,
para. 75 (“it was noted that the interrogation of witnesses, other than experts, seems to be
characterized by the absence of crisp, focused questions and by long, rambling answers tending to be
narratives, at times vague, repetitive and irrelevant.”) and para. 76.
395 See, e.g., Sixth Annual Report of ICTY, August 25, 1999, para. 14 (“The judges have taken a
number of steps to reduce the length of trials. These include adopting amendments to the Rules in
July 1998, which provide for active pre-trial management of pending cases and strengthening the
ability of the Trial Chamber to control trial proceedings.”).
396 See, e.g., Rule 39 (establishing the powers of the prosecutor while conducting his
investigation); Rule 85 (regulating the order in which the parties present their evidence at trial).
397 Alphons Orie is the only commentator who correctly sees that the active judge incorporated by
ICTY does not resemble the inquisitorial judge. However, he does not propose any model to give an
account of this phenomenon and continues his analysis of international criminal proceedings in
terms of the adversarial-inquisitorial dichotomy. See Orie, supra note 6, at 1465 (“The introduction
of a pre-trial judge in Rule 65 ter, although often regarded as a feature taken from the inquisitorial
tradition, cannot, however, be compared with a pre-trial judge in the civil-law systems. The pre-trial
judge has no task in investigating the case. He is servingly mainly as a motor behind the parties in
their trial preparation.”).
398 In September 2002, pursuant to decisions made at the July 2002 plenary, the Tribunal
witnessed the establishment of an Association of Defence Counsel. Under revised Rule 44 (A),
attorneys representing accused persons at the Tribunal must belong to the Association, which makes
them subject to a code of professional conduct and a disciplinary system. See Tenth Annual Report
ICTY, August 20, 2003, para. 11. But the creation of this institution has been considered a way not
only to have more independent counsel but also to expedite the proceedings through a deepening of
the professionalization of ICTY defense attorneys. See, e.g., Ninth Annual Report ICTY, August 14,
2002, para. 17, that said on the plan presented by the Registar of the Tribunal to establish an
international bar for defense counsel: “The President supported the initiative, as it would result in
better-trained defense councel, which would in turn make the operation of the Tribunal more
efficient.” See also Tenth Annual Report ICTY, August 20, 2003, para. 11: “These reforms should help
improve the quality and accountability of defense counsel.”

2004]

THE RISE OF MANAGERIAL JUDGING IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

85

trial.399

management function more effectively during trial preparation and
In her pre-trial brief,400 the prosecutor has to disclose substantial parts of her
trial case and strategy and show her good will about settling as many issues
as possible by providing, among other things, a summary of the evidence
which the prosecutor intends to bring for each count, any admissions by the
parties, a statement of matters which are not in dispute, and a statement of
contested matters of fact and law.401
In addition, the pre-trial judge orders the prosecutor to submit, not less
than six weeks before the pre-trial conference, the list of witnesses the
prosecutor intends to call.402 This list includes a summary of the facts on
which each witness will testify,403 the points in the indictment as to which
each witness will testify,404 the total number of witnesses, the number of
witnesses who will testify against each accused on each count,405 an
indication of whether the witness will testify in person or by way of written
statement or use of a transcript of testimony,406 the estimated length of time
required for each witness, and the total time estimated for presentation of
the prosecutor’s case.407 The prosecutor also must provide a list of exhibits
she intends to offer, stating where possible whether the defense has any
objections as to authenticity.408

399 See Rule 65 ter (E) and Rule 65 ter (F). These two rules find antecessors in managerial
judging in U.S. civil procedure. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 283, at 124
(“One method used by judges to ensure adequate preparation, streamline the evidence, and prevent
unfair surprise is to have each party prepare and submit a statement listing the facts it intends to
establish at trial and the supporting evidence…If adopted, evidence not included in the statement
should not be permitted at trial. Exchanging such statements may help narrow factual disputes and
expedite the trial”). See also Elliot,, supra note 282, at 313 (“At one time, Judge Charles Richey’s
standard pretrial order required litigants to file detailed pretrial briefs identifying, among other
things, all issues and ‘all facts which plaintiff [defendant] intends to prove at trial to sustain [defend
against] each element of the claim for relief’. Then, counsel for each of the parties was required to go
through the opposing side’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and to underline the
disputed portions in red, the admitted portions in blue, and those portions deemed to be irrelevant in
yellow.”).
400 The prosecutor has to submit his pre-trial brief not less than six weeks before the pre-trial
conference. See Rule 65 ter (E).
401 Rule 65 ter (E)(i).
402 Rule 65 ter (E)(ii)(a).
403 Rule 65 ter (E)(ii)(b).
404 Rule 65 ter (E)(ii)(c).
405 Rule 65 ter (E)(ii)(d).
406 Rule 65 ter (E)(ii)(e).
407 Rule 65 ter (E)(ii)(f).
408 Rule 65 ter (E)(iii).
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brief,409

The defense also has to submit a pre-trial
which must indicate
the nature of the accused’s defense,410 any matters with which the accused
takes issue in the prosecutor’s pre-trial brief,411 and why the accused takes
issue with them.412 In addition, after the prosecutor has closed her case at
trial and before the commencement of its case, the defense also has to submit
lists of witnesses413 and exhibits the defense intends to offer in its case,
stating where possible whether the prosecutor has any objection as to
authenticity.414
All this information is aimed at making sure that the parties agree on as
many factual and legal issues as possible, to enable efficient trial
management and avoid cumulative or unnecessary evidence or potentially
disruptive surprises at trial.415
As a way to try to assure that the parties will collaborate with the court to
expedite the proceedings, Rule 65 ter (N) expressly provides that if a party
fails to perform these or other specified obligations, the Trial Chamber will

409 The defense has to submit its pre-trial brief after the pre-trial submission by the Prosecutor
and, within a time-limit set by the pre-trial Judge, though it cannot be later than three weeks before
the pre-trial conference. See Rule 65 ter (F).
410 Rule 65 ter (F)(i).
411 Rule 65 ter (F)(ii).
412 Rule 65 ter (F)(iii). For a justification of these reforms, see, e.g., Seventh Annual Report ICTY,
July 26, 2000, para. 288-89 (“Many of these amendments were intended to speed up trials and the
pre-trial process and to minimize delays…New rules now require the defence to set out its case in
more detail in advance and to raise matters relevant to its case in cross-examination whenever
possible”).
413 Rule 65 ter (G)(i).
With its list of witnesses, the defense has to indicate the name or
pseudonym of each witness; a summary of the facts on which each witness will testify; the total
number of witnesses and the number of witnesses who will testify for each accused and on each
count; an indication of whether the witness will testify in person or pursuant to Rule 92 bis by way of
a written statement or use of a transcript of testimony from other proceedings before the tribunal;
and the estimated length of time required for each witness and the total time estimated for the
presentation of the defense case. For an exchange on the extent of this defense duty, see, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, “Lasva Valley”, Case IT-95-14/2, Open Session,
February 16, 2000, p. 14419-20. See also Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškia et al, “Lasva Valley”, IT-9516, Decision, January 11, 1999 (ordering the defense to provide the Trial Chamber and Prosecution
with more detailed summaries of the witnesses it intends to call at trial); Prosecutor v. Radislav
Krstic, “Srebrenica-Drina Corps”, Case IT-98-33, Scheduling Order, September 12, 2000 (ordering
the defense to present its list of witnesses and exhibits).
414 Rule 65 ter (G)(ii). For an example of a pre-defense conference see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krstic,
“Srebrenica-Drina Corps”, Case IT-98-33, Pre-Defence Conference, October 5, 2000 (discussing,
among other things, the amount of detail needed in the summary of facts on which each witness will
testify and the list of exhibits and authentication of documents ).
415 See, e.g., Export Report, supra note 88, para. 89 (stating that the underlying logic for broader
disclosure duties by the defense would be expediting the trial by enabling the parties and the court to
focus on the real issues).
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party,416

decide on sanctions to be imposed on that
including possible
exclusion of testimonial or documentary evidence from trial.417 Other rules
and directives also include sanctions for a party that does not comply with its
discovery duties418 or other requirements imposed by the Tribunal.419 In
addition, the judges have used informal rewards,420 warnings421 and
sanctions to make sure that the parties collaborate. For instance, judges have
expected that the parties would agree to introduce a larger number of Rule
92bis written statements at trial, instead of producing oral testimony, and
the judges have not hesitated to pressure the parties to collaborate in this
endeavor.

416 The rationale for the introduction of these sanctioning powers have precisely been to expedite
proceedings. See Eight Annual Report ICTY, August 13, 2001, para. 52-53.
417 Rule 65 ter (N). For a discussion among a Trial Chamber and the parties on the meaning of
this Rule, see Prosecutor v. Mlanden Naletilic aka ‘Tuta’ and Vinko Martinovic aka ‘Stela’, IT-98-34,
Open Session, April 12, 2002. See also Rule 68 bis (the pre-trial judge or the Trial Chamber may
decide motu propio, or at the request of either party, on sanctions to be imposed on a party which
fails to perform its disclosure obligations pursuant to the Rules); Rule 77 (regulating the contempt
powers of the Tribunal); and Rule 90 (G) (establishing that the Trial Chamber may refuse to hear a
witness whose name does not appear on the list of witnesses compiled during the pre-trial and predefense conferences).
418 See Rule 68 bis: “The pre-trial Judge or the Trial Chamber may decide propio motu, or at the
request of either party, on sanctions to be imposed on a party which fails to perform its disclosure
obligations pursuant to the Rules.” This Rule was introduced in December 13, 2001 to enhance the
Tribunal’s ability to conduct trials expeditiously. See Ninth Annual Report ICTY, August 14, 2002,
para. 38 and 41.
419 See Practice Directive on Procedure for the Filing of Written Submissions in Appeal
Proceedings before the International Tribunal, IT/155 Rev. 1. This directive was amended mainly to
add a provision enabling the Appeals Chamber to punish parties for failing to respect the directives.
See Ninth Annual Report ICTY, August 14, 2002, para. 14.
420 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Limaj, Bala, and Musliu, Case IT-03-66-PT, Status Conference, June
25, 2003, p. 71 (where Judge Martin Canivell said: “I had heard that the Prosecution has mentioned
the possibility of speeding up, if possible, the case, the proceedings, and that perhaps will be able to
start with the case in mid-February. So I…rejoice of this possibility and encourage you to keep going
in this way so as to try to keep this alleged promised schedule.”).
421 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Mlanden Naletilic aka ‘Tuta’ and Vinko Martinovic aka ‘Stela’, IT-9834, Decision on the Accused Naletilic’s Motion to Continue Trial Date, August 31, 2001, para. 12 (The
prosecution failed to meet the deadline for discovery set in a status conference, and the defense used
this fact as one of the arguments to request the continuace of the trial. The Trial Court denied the
continuance request and said: “The administration of justice can only be carried out effectively and
fairly when parties to the proceedings undertake to fully co-operate with the Tribunal and efficiently
carry out instructions given. On this occasion no serious adverse consequences followed the late
compliance with the pre-trial judge’s direction at the Status Conference. Both the Prosecution and
Defence, however, should now consider themselves on notice that any failure to carry out an order or
direction of the Trial Chamber in an orderly and timely manner will be met with adverse
consequences for that party. In certain domestic jurisdictions it is the norm for parties to employ
dubious tactical trial strategies with a view to diverting the opposite party from the real issues in the
case. Such a practice is not to be encouraged before this Trial Chamber.”).
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The following exchange between Judge Hunt (acting as pre-trial judge)
and a prosecutor in a status conference provides an example of this
phenomenon:
Mr. McLoskey: I think we need to get Mr. Karnavas here
and get his views and just to find out what kind of strategy
he has. As you know, there are many different strategies
that can be employed, and if he wishes to take on
everything, it will be significantly longer.
Judge Hunt: Yes, I can believe that.
Mr. McCloskey: Though with 92 bis actively enforced, it
wouldn’t necessarily need to be taken that much longer.
As you know, the court has quite a bit of discretion about
that.
Judge Hunt: Oh, yes. It is actually starting to bite quite
well, that particular Rule, I believe, perhaps we’ve got—I’ve
been lucky to have had some cooperative Defence counsel,
but so far the matter has been delayed only by Prosecution
counsel. In one particular case, it took me three quarters
of an hour to get Prosecution counsel to tender the
statement.
Mr. McCloskey: Well, you shouldn’t have that much
trouble with this group.
Judge Hunt: I’m sure that everybody will know to whom
I’m referring, but it was difficult.422
Also characteristic of managerial judging, ICTY increasingly has relied
on parties’ agreements to dispose of or narrow down cases. For instance, the
number of plea agreements423 has substantially increased since 1998, and in
2003, there were more cases concluded through plea agreements than
through trials.424 Both the Rules and the judges have offered incentives to

Obrenovic, Status Conference, October 19, 2001, page 23-4.
The Tribunal has explicitly welcomed guilty pleas not only as a way to confirm the commission
of crimes and as a demonstration of remorse and acceptance of responsibility but also as a way to
save court time, including appeal court time. See, e.g., Tenth Annual Report ICTY, August 20, 2003,
para. 230.
424 While seven defendants were convicted through trials in 2003, eight defendants offered guilty
pleas (even if, in some cases, the sentencing judgments were entered 2004). See Nancy Amoury
Combs, Plea Bargaining after Mass Atrocities: Bridging Justice and Truth (on file with the author).
The trials were Prosecutor v. Simia et al., Case IT-95-9-T, Judgment, October 17, 2001 (convicting
Blagoje Simia, Miroslav Tadia, and Simo Zaria); Prosecutor v. Stakia, Case IT-97-24-T, Judgement,
July 31, 2003 (convicting Milomir Stakia); Prosecutor v. Naletilia & Martinovia, Case IT-98-34-T,
422
423
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the parties to agree on as many factual and legal issues as possible in order to
narrow down the issues under discussion.425 Thus, as we have seen, the
prosecution has to include in its pre-trial brief any admissions by the parties
and a statement of matters which are not in dispute, as well as a statement of
contested matters of fact and law,426 while the defense must indicate the
matters with which the accused takes issue in the Prosecutor’s pre-trial brief
and why.427
When the parties have not reached agreements by themselves,428 most
judges have followed the managerial judging model by actively encouraging
them to reach factual and legal agreements.429 Judges have used different
Judgment, March 31, 2003 (convicting Mlanden Naletilia and Vinko Martinovia); and Stanislav Galia,
Case IT-98-29-T, Judgment, December 5, 2003. Defendants were offered guilty pleas in Prosecutor
v. Meakia et al., Case IT-02-65-PT, Sentencing Judgment, October 28, 2003; Prosecutor v. Momir
Nikolia, Case IT-02-60-PT, Joint Motion for Consideration of Plea Agreement between Momir
Nikolia and the Office of the Prosecutor, Annex A, Amended Plea Agreement, May 7, 2003 (the
sentencing judgment was entered on December 3, 2003); Prosecutor v. Obrenovia, Case IT-02-60-PT,
Joint Motion for Consideration of Plea Agreement between Dragan Obrenovia and the Office of the
Prosecutor, Annex A, Plea Agreement, May 20, 2003 (the sentencing judgment was entered on
December 10, 2003); Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolia, Case IT-94-2-S, Judgment, December 18, 2003;
Prosecutor v. Darko Mrdja, Case IT-02-59-S, guilty plea entered on July 24, 2003 (the sentencing
judgment was entered on March 31, 2004); Prosecutor v. Miodrag Jokia, Case IT-01-41/1-S, Joint
Motion for Consideration of Plea Agreement between Miodrag Jokia and the Office of the Prosecutor,
August 27, 2003 (the sentencing judgment was entered on March 18, 2004); Prosecutor v. Deronjia,
Case IT-02-61-PT, Plea Agreement, September 29, 2003 (the sentencing judgment was entered on
March 30, 2004); and Prosecutor v. Cesia, Case 95-10/1-PT, Plea Agreement, October 8, 2003 (the
sentencing judgment was entered on March 11, 2004).
425 In the case of plea agreements, most negotiations have transpired between the prosecution
and defense. But most judges have encouraged the agreements by considering the guilty plea a
mitigating factor and respecting, in most cases, the upper sentence agreed to by the parties. See, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Banovia, Case IT-02-65/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, October 28, 2003 (para. 61: “The
Trial Chamber observes that co-operation with the Prosecutor is generally considered in mitigation of
sentence” and imposed a sentence of 8 years of imprisonment as the parties jointly recommended);
Prosecutor v. Miroslav Deronjic, Case IT-02-61-S, Sentencing Judgment, March 30, 2004, para. 235
(considering a guilty plea a mitigating factor, the Chamber imposed a sentence of ten years of
imprisonment as requested by the prosecution).
426 Rule 65 ter (E)(i).
427 Rule 65 ter (F)(ii) and (iii).
428 The prosecution has tried to reach agreements to simplify trials and cases. See, e.g., Naser
Oric, Case IT-03-68-I, Status Conference, July 29, 2003, p. 57-8 (mentioning the so-called Case Map
program presented by the prosecution that enables both parties to show the links between certain
events, certain locations, and certain persons, and that would show the strengths and weaknesses for
both sides, thus helping in terms of potential agreement between the parties).
429 The Expert Group encouraged ICTY judges to move in this direction. See Expert Report,
supra note 88, para. 84 (“Some judges have required that, when there is no apparent reason for a
dispute as to certain facts, the party declining to so stipulate, usually the accused, explain why. This
practice, is adhered to, could be quite helpful in eliminating the need for the introduction of
potentially massive amounts of evidence, particularly by the Prosecutor, to establish facts that may
not really be in dispute.”).
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purpose.430

techniques for that
For instance, in Stakic, Judge Schomburg
from Germany explicitly said that the collaboration by the defense on this
issue would weigh favorably at sentencing:
(I)t should be considered whether or not the accused in
person or the Defence, together or alone, make a
contribution giving us some common basis whereupon we
can work when we come to the central and the key issue of
this case, the individual responsibility of Dr. Stakic. And I
think Dr. Stakic know (sic) that of course it is his right to
remain silent, and no inference can be drawn from the fact
that he remains silent. But, on the other hand, in each
courtroom on the globe, and this is also true for this Court,
this Tribunal here in The Hague, every kind of
cooperation, also when it’s only a question of this

430 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Vojislav Seselj, Case IT-03-67-I, Initial Appearance, February 26,
2003, p. 4 ( Judge Schomburg told the defendant that any kind of substantial cooperation would be to
his advantage. In the event that it does not come to a sentencing stage, the defendant’s cooperation
will be in his own interest to speed up the proceedings. In case it would come to a sentencing stage,
such kind of substantial cooperation will always be held in defendant’s favor); Prosecutor v. Limaj,
Bala, and Musliu, Case IT-03-66-PT, Status Conference, June 25, 2003, p. 71 (where Judge Martin
Canivell said to the parties: “I would also ask you—tell you to remember that it is a possibility of
arriving to an agreement of facts. Of course, in the time this Tribunal has already been working,
many of the facts which are common from one case to the other had been—sometimes it has been
rejected by the accused, but in the course of the proceedings some of the facts have been really so well
proven that I would say it would be of little use, no use at all, to come again on that, that you can
make an effort so as to reach agreements of these facts. That would be helpful also in the disposal of
the case.”); Prosecutor v. Limaj, Bala, and Musliu, Case IT-03-66-PT, Status Conference, October 23,
2003, p. 83; Prosecutor v. Zeljko Meakic, Momcilo Gruban, Dusan Fustar, Predrag Banovic, and
Dusko Knezevic, Case IT-02-65-PT, Status Conference and Further Appearance, December 10, 2002,
p. 9-10 (Judge Patrick Robinson: “The Prosecution has prepared a list of facts for possible agreement.
And the list of findings from previous judgments. These have provided by the Defense, and the
parties are to meet to discuss this matter and come to an agreement, if that is possible. I encourage
the parties to do that as quickly as possible…I encourage the parties to come to agreement, if that is
possible, and shorten the case.”). Rule 65 ter (H) establishes that the pre-trial Judge shall record the
points of agreement and disagreement on matters of law and fact; and that, in this respect, he or she
may order the parties to file written submissions with either the pre-trial Judge or the Trial Chamber;
Prosecutor v. Banovic, Fustar, and Knezevic, Case IT-02-65-PT, Status Conference, April 8, 2003, p.
62 (Judge Patrick Robinson: “Rule 92 bis, I understand that the parties have been encouraged to
commence discussions on the use of transcript evidence, in particular from the Sikirica trial and that
most of the 92 bis material would be by way of transcript rather than witness statements. May I
inquire from Ms. Chana and from the Defence how these discussions are going? Because if they are
not proceeding well, then I think the Chamber will have to consider a particular course of action.”);
Id. at p. 67 (Judge Patrick Robinson: “I turn next to the length of trial. The Prosecutor had indicated
that if it got substantial agreement on the facts in the indictment, its case could be presented in about
six weeks; if not, it could be as much as six months. So it’s absolutely important to proceed with the
endeavour to get agreement.”); Prosecutor v. Zeljko Meakic, Momcilo Gruban, Dusan Fustar, Predrag
Banovic, and Dusko Knezevic, Case IT-02-65-PT, Status Conference and Further Appearance, July
23, 2003, p. 90-1.
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cooperation on agreed facts, to put it this way, will be
helpful for an accused, an accused being not guilty has of
course an interest…to have an expeditious as possible a
trial. Just in case, if, and I once again emphasize, if there
would be a sentencing stage in this case, it (sic) always this
kind of cooperation would be honoured in the sentencing
stage, ex officio by the Judges. And therefore, this should
be always—always be seen as an incentive at the beginning
of the trial because later on, and we have already some
judgements of this Tribunal, later on it may be too late,
and it may be not regarded as a kind of cooperation at all if
we have heard already numerous witnesses, and if then
there is an attempt to cooperate. Probably then it’s too
late. And this should be really discussed between the
Defence counsel and Dr. Stakic before we hear the pleading
and we hear the decision whether or not either to testify or
to make a statement in the beginning of the trial.431
The reforms have not changed the structure of procedure as a
competition between the investigations and trial cases of the prosecution and
the defense. But, as a consequence of the managerial judging reforms, the
cases of the parties are today as much in coordination and cooperation as in
competition.432 For instance, during the pre-trial phase, the parties have to
hold meetings inter partes to discuss issues related to the preparation of the
case.433 Before trial, they also must try to reach agreements on as many

Stakic, Pre-Trial Conference, 10 April, 2002, page 1568-70.
The judges have constantly tried to encourage a spirit of cooperation between the parties. See,
e.g., Naser Oric, Case IT-03-68-I, Status Conference, July 29, 2003, p. 50-1 (“Prior to present Status
Conference, there have been two Rule 65 ter conferences convened by the senior legal officer of this
Chamber. She has kept me well-informed of the conferences, and I would like to comment that the
spirit of cooperation demonstrated by both parties is very much welcomed by the Trial Chamber, and
I strongly encourage such spirit to continue.”); Prosecutor v. Zeljko Meakic, Momcilo Gruban, Dusan
Fustar, Predrag Banovic, and Dusko Knezevic, Case IT-02-65-PT, Status Conference and Further
Appearance, July 23, 2003, p. 93 (Defense Attorney: “Your Honour, I would like to inform you and
that the Defence will by no means obstruct the schedule that you set. We shall do everything in order
to be prepared for trial when you are prepared. If we should not have enough time, but if our time is
not drastically shortened, we would accept to start with the trial if we were allowed to present
evidence. We will do everything in order to be prepared for trial when you decide that the trial should
start.” Judge Robinson: “Thank you very much, Mr. Simic, for your spirit of cooperation. There are
many strategies that can be employed and that are open to Trial Chambers to deal with a matter of
this kind. But at the—at the bottom, of course, we have in mind that the question of fairness to all the
accused.”).
433 Rule 65 ter (D)(v). See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic, Scheduling Order and Order on the
Prosecution’s Motion for the Trial Chamber to Travel to Sarajevo, January 22, 2001 (ordering the
parties to meet prior to the Status Conference on January 30, 2001, and informing the parties that
431

432
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factual and legal issues as
duties toward each other.435

possible,434
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and they have broader disclosure

Also typical of managerial judging, the parties now are less masters of
their cases than before the reforms. During the pre-trial phase, the pre-trial
judge now establishes a work plan indicating, in general terms, the
obligations that the parties are required to meet and the dates by which these
obligations must be fulfilled.436 At trial, the court has broad powers to limit
the length of the examination-in-chief of the prosecution and the defense for
some witnesses,437 determine the number of witnesses that each side may
call,438 and determine the time available to each for presenting evidence.439
during the Status Conference they should be prepared to report on the progress made on such matters
as the trial preparation of the case, including the following: disclosure of materials pursuant to Rule
66(A)(ii) and Rule 68; progress toward completing the pre-trial filings required by Rule 65 ter,
particularly whether the parties have made any progress in agreeing on undisputed matters of law
and fact; and, with respect to the Prosecution, the filing of a pre-trial brief, a list of witnesses it
intends to call at trial, a list of exhibits it intend to use at trial; and so forth).
434 See supra notes 425-31, and accompanying text.
435 On the disclosure duties by the parties in the current regime of ICTY, see Rules 65 ter (E), 65
ter (F), and 66 to 70. Judges constantly remind the parties about their discovery duties. See, e.g.,
Naser Oric, Case IT-03-68-I, Initial Appearance, April 15, 2003, p. 6; Prosecutor v. Franko
Simatovic, Case IT-03-69-I, Initial Appearance, June 2, 2003, p. 4-5; Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanisic,
Case IT-03-69-I, Initial Appearance, June 13, 2003, p. 11. The judges supervise the discovery process
to assure that it goes smoothly, put pressure on the parties to cooperate in allowing the discovery
process to proceed as smoothly as possible, and apply pressure to reach agreements on discovery
issues. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Limaj, Bala, and Musliu, Case IT-03-66-PT, Status Conference,
October 23, 2003, p. 82 (where Judge Martin Canivell said: “it seems to me there is not complete
accordance between the Prosecution and the counsels about the possibility of cooperating in this last
one—I mean the counsels for the accused—in tracing and devising what could be the points of the
methods even of exculpatory evidence that could be included in the Prosecutor’s papers. I think they
had offered you to give to the Office of the Prosecution an answer about how to devise—how to get, to
recover, in other words, whatever could be exculpatory evidence for your clients. So I would
encourage you to try to find a solution to that, and then that you find for you to do that. Well, I hope
that could be done in order to push a little bit the expeditiousness of the—and the resolution of the
case.”); Prosecutor v. Miroslav Deronjic, Case IT-02-61-S, Status Conference, October 30, 2002, para.
27-8 (Judge Mumba: “The Trial Chamber is keen to have this stage of the preparatory stage
completed as quickly as possible, because it normally holds the preparation stages because the
Defence are not given the materials on time…So the Trial Chamber would very much appreciated the
process of disclosure to move very fast, because then it will provide materials for discussion at the
meeting in which the Defence may want to deal with.”).
436 Rule 65 ter (D)(ii).
437 Rule 73 bis (B) and Rule 73 ter (B).
438 Rule 73 bis (C)(i) and Rule 73 ter (C). For an interesting reaction by the prosecution against
these powers of the Trial Chamber, see Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, IT-95-14/2, Transcript, July
19, 1999, where Geoffrey Nice, from the OP, said: “As to the general proposition that a Trial Chamber
can say ''Enough's enough,' of course, it can. The Rules give you that power, and we recognise that.
There is, of course, a potential problem, and that is that if a Prosecutor is cut off, 'Well, you've had one
witness on that topic, and that's enough,' and the Defence then call contrary evidence at a later stage,
the Trial Chamber may be embarrassed by having indicated satisfaction at an early stage when, on
reflection, it finds it cannot be satisfied because of the Defence evidence that may be put on, and the
Prosecutor may also be in the embarrassing position of then having to seek by rebuttal to add further
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Besides this increase in judges’ activism, which clearly fits the
managerial judging system much better than the inquisitorial one, there are
other series of reforms that commentators have considered inquisitorial. The
first of these reforms is the introduction of a sort of proto-written dossier
that would let the judges be more active during the proceedings.440 After the
prosecutor files her pre-trial brief and lists of witnesses and exhibits for trial,
the pre-trial judge must submit to the Trial Chamber a complete file
consisting of all the filings of the parties, transcripts of status conferences
and minutes of meetings held in the performance of his or her functions.441
Once the defense presents its pre-trial brief and list of witnesses and exhibits,
the pre-trial judge submits a second file.442
These two files are functionally equivalent to a written dossier and give
the Trial Chamber considerable information about the case. As they present
certain similarities to the written dossier and allow judges to be more active,
commentators have seen them as a shift toward the inquisitorial system.443
However, given that judges have needed more information mainly to become
active managers rather than active investigators, the introduction of these
proto-written dossiers is much better described, again, as a reform in the
direction of managerial judging. The aim of these reforms has been to give
more information to the Trial Chamber so that it can manage trials more
efficiently. In addition, unlike the written dossier of the inquisitorial system
that documents all activities performed in the pre-trial phase and is gathered
by an impartial official, the two files that the pre-trial judge presents to
ICTY’s Trial Chamber are mainly based on the pre-trial briefs of the parties.
As such, they do not document all previous activity and are not impartial.
Similarly, the reforms have changed the orientation of ICTY criminal
procedure from a clear preference for oral production of evidence at trial to
to the evidence, but it only can do that if it knows what the Trial Chamber's later decision is, so there
are problems there. All of those problems, in the standard adversarial system, are dealt with by the
Prosecutor making his decision as to how many bits of evidence he wants to put in this scale on one
side to ensure that however much the other side puts other evidence on the other scale, the scale stays
down on the ground. I'm the first to recognise that we may need to be more flexible than that here in
the interests of economy of time, but there are obvious difficulties with that, and I think they were
difficulties that arose in the original case of Tadic, where there was an indication that something was
satisfactorily dealt with by evidence, and then some counter-evidence emerged to outweigh it.”
439 Rule 73 bis (C)(ii) and Rule 73 ter (E).
440 See, e.g., CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6, at 386 (characterizing as
inquisitorial the process at the beginning of trial by which the prosecution and the defense hand over
to the judges a file with the essentials of their cases).
441 Rule 65 ter (L)(i).
442 Rule 65 ter (L)(ii).
443 See, e.g., CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6, at 386 (characterizing as
inquisitorial the process at the beginning of trial by which the prosecution and the defense hand over
to the judges a file with the essentials of their cases).
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evidence.444

liberally allowing the introduction of written
The original
version of Rule 90(A), which established that “(w)itnesses shall, in principle,
be heard directly by the Chambers”,445was replaced by Rule 89(F),446 which
in a much more ambivalent way states that a “Chamber may receive the
evidence of a witness orally or, where the interests of justice allow, in written
form.”447
Furthermore, Rule 92 bis (A) now establishes: “A Trial Chamber may
admit, in whole or in part, the evidence of a witness in the form of a written
statement in lieu of oral testimony which goes to proof of a matter other than
the acts and conduct of the accused as charged in the indictment.”448 In
addition, Rule 92 bis (B) now says: “A written statement under this Rule
shall be admissible if it attaches a declaration by the person making the
statement that the contents of the statement are true…and…the declaration is
witnessed by…a person authorized to witness such a declaration in
accordance with the law and procedure of a State…and the person witnessing
the declaration verifies in writing that the person making the statement is the
person identified in the said statement.”449 In a similar direction, Rule 92 bis
(D) states that a Chamber may admit a transcript of evidence given by a
witness in another proceedings before the Tribunal which goes to proof of a
matter other than the acts and conduct of the accused.450 And Rule 92 bis
(E) declares that the “Trial Chamber shall decide, after hearing the parties,

444 For an analysis of this tendency, see, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, To Establish Incredible Events by
Credible Evidence: the Use of Affidavit Testimony in Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings,
42 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 535, at 545-48 (2001).
445 See Rules, version of October 6, 1995.
446 The new version of Rule 89 (F) was introduced in the reform of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence of December 13, 2000.
447 Rule 89 (F). For applications of this rule to sentencing hearings, see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milan
Babic, Case IT-03-72-S, Decision on Defence Motion for Admission of Witness Statements and to Call
Witnesses, March 29, 2004, p. 2; Prosecutor v. Miroslav Deronjic, Case IT-02-61-S, Order on
Admission into Evidence of Psychological Report, December 19, 2003 (considering that it is in the
interests of justice to allow the psychological report’s admission into evidence in written form, as it
saves the Tribunal’s resources).
448 Rule 92 bis (A). For decisions discussing how the phrase “other than the acts and conduct of
the accused” should be interpreted, see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Case IT-02-54,
Decision on Prosecution’s Request to have Written Statements admitted under Rule 92 bis, March 21,
2002.
449 Rule 92 bis (B).
450 Rule 92 bis (D). The Tribunal has used this rule extensively. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Mlanden
Naletilic aka ‘Tuta’ and Vinko Martinovic aka ‘Stela’, IT-98-34, Decision Regarding Prosecutor’s
Notice of Intent to Offer Transcripts under Rule 92 bis (D), July 9, 2001, para. 7 (admitting
transcripts of testimonies and accompanying exhibits produced in the Blaskic and Kordic cases in
order to prove the existence of an international armed conflict, as well as the widespread or
systematic nature of the attack).
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whether to admit the statement or transcript in whole or in part and whether
to require the witness to appear for cross-examination.”451 Finally, Rule 94
bis regulates the testimony of expert witnesses and establishes that if “the
opposing party accepts the statement of the expert witness, the statement
may be admitted into evidence by the Trial Chamber without calling the
witness to testify in person.”452
These changes are also best described as a move toward the managerial
judging system.453 Commentators, again, have characterized them as part of
the swing toward an inquisitorial conception of the criminal process.454 But
if we analyze the changes and their motivation carefully, the increasing

451 Rule 92 bis (E). On the criteria for applying this rule, see Prosecutor v. Sikirica, “Keraterm
Camp”, Case IT-95-8-T, Decision on Prosecution’s Application to Admit Transcripts under Rule 92
bis, May 23, 2001, para 4 (establishing that the principal criterion for determining whethera witness
should be required to appear for cross-examination pursuant to Rule 92 bis (E) is the overriding
obligation of a Chamber to ensure a fair trial under Articles 20 and 21 of the Statute. In that regard,
among the matters for consideration are whether the transcript goes to proof of a critical element of
the Prosecution’s case against the accused and whether the cross-examination of the witness in the
other proceedings dealt adequately with the issues relevant to the defense in the current proceedings).
See also Prosecutor v. Mlanden Naletilic aka ‘Tuta’ and Vinko Martinovic aka ‘Stela’, IT-98-34,
Decision Regarding Prosecutor’s Notice of Intent to Offer Transcripts under Rule 92 bis (D), July 9,
2001, para. 12 (The Chamber established that the element requiring the existence of a widespread or
systematic attack may be linked to the conduct of the accused because, in order to be convicted of a
crime against humanity, the accused must have knowledge that there is an attack on the civilian
population and that his or her act is part of the attack. However, the Chamber denyied the recall of
the witnesses for cross-examination in the present case because (1) the witnesses had been subjected
to cross-examination in previous cases by accused persons having a similar interest to the present
accused in contesting the existence of a widespread or systematic attack; and (2) the accused did not
provide any specific information as to why cross-examinations in the previous cases were inadequate
or the substance of additional lines of inquiry).
452 Rule 94 bis (C). For examples of the use of this Rule, see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al.,
IT-95-16, Open Session, January 29, 1999 (accepting cross-examination of expertwitnesses by the
prosecution despite the fact that its request was presented long after the deadline established by Rule
94 bis); Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvocka et al., “Omarska, Keraterm and Trnolopje Camps”, Case IT98-30/1, Order Granting Request for Admission of Testimony of Expert Witness, March 19, 1999;
Prosecutor v. Sikirica, “Keraterm Camp”, Case IT-95-8-T, Order Admitting into Evidence Expert
Witness Statements under Rule 94 bis, May 16, 2001 (admitting the statements without requiring the
witnesses to be called to testify in person given that the defense did not oppose the prosecution
request within the period established then by the Rule 94 bis). For examples of invocation of this rule
motu propio by the Trial Chamber to shorten the proceedings, see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al.,
IT-95-16, Open Session, January 27, 1999. For examples of the use of Rule 94 bis in the sentencing
phase motu propio by the Trial Chamber, see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Miroslav Deronjic, Case IT-02-61-S,
Order on Admission into Evidence of Testimony of Expert Witness Prof. Dr. Ulrich Sieber, December
17, 2003.
453 Another reform in the direction of relying more on written evidence that I will not analyze here
is the changes introduced by the reform of the Rules of November 17, 1999, to Rule 71 that regulates
the use of depositions.
454 See, e.g., Boas, Creating Laws of Evidence for International Criminal Law, supra note 12, at
58 (characterizing the reforms introduced in Rule 92 bis as a trend toward the continental system).
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reliance on written evidence is not motivated by a bureaucratic preference
for documentation as in the hierarchical model of the inquisitorial system.455
Rather, as ICTY has expressly acknowledged, written evidence has been
increasingly accepted at trial as a way to speed it up,456 even at the expense of
fairness457 and truth-determination458—which goes against an inquisitorial
conception of the criminal process. In addition, in inquisitorial systems, the
written statements directly introduced at trial have been gathered in the
written dossier by the impartial official in charge of the pre-trial
investigation. This is why they are particularly trusted by trial judges for
evidentiary purposes.459 But in the context of ICTY, as a consequence of the
party-driven investigations, written statements admitted at trial include
statements not gathered in such an impartial fashion.460

See supra note 342, and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Sixth Annual Report of ICTY, August 25, 1999, para. 13-14 (“The Tribunal’s judges
are concerned about the length of time many of the trial and other proceedings are taking to
complete…There are a number of causes for the length of trials and other proceedings…(U)nlike the
Nürnberg and Tokyo trials, a great deal of reliance is placed on the testimony of witnesses rather than
affidavits…The judges have taken a number of steps to reduce the length of trials. These include
adopting amendments to the Rules in July 1998…providing for the admission of affidavits in certain
instances.”); Eight Annual Report ICTY, August 13, 2001, para. 51 (pointing out that the purpose of
Rule 92 bis “is to facilitate the admission by way of written statement of peripheral or background
evidence in order to expedite proceedings while protecting the rights of the accused under the
Statute.”). See also, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., IT-95-16, Open Session, September, 1998
(Judge Cassese: “This Rule 94 bis, testimony of expert witnesses, was drafter precisely to avoid any
delay in the proceedings.”); Prosecutor v. Mlanden Naletilic aka ‘Tuta’ and Vinko Martinovic aka
‘Stela’, IT-98-34, Decision Regarding Prosecutor’s Notice of Intent to Offer Transcripts under Rule 92
bis (D), July 9, 2001, para. 7 (“Rule 92 bis (D) was intended to alleviate the need for witnesses to
reappear before the Tribunal multiple times to present similar testimony, thus avoiding unnecessary
expense and reducing the length of trials, in situations where it will not infringe the rights of the
accused.”); Patricia M. Wald, To Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence: the Use of
Affidavit Testimony in Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings, 42 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL
LAW JOURNAL 535, at 549 (2001) (“The new Rules sharply respond to the problem of lagging trials.”).
457 For an analysis of the risks that this tendency entails for the fairness of proceedings at ICTY,
see Patricia M. Wald, To Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence: the Use of Affidavit
Testimony in Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings, 42 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW
JOURNAL 535, at 549 (2001)
458 The increasing reliance on written statements in ICTY trials and verdicts has probably
diminished their truth-determination abilities. On the connection between both, see FERRAJOLI,
supra note 60.
459 See DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE, supra note 43, at 50 (“In order not to confuse the file of
the case with its false cognates, it is important to realize that hierarchical officials prefer to decide on
the basis of written records. Documents contained in the file are not internal official documents,
helping a particular official to organize his activity, but rather sources of information on which to
base both original and reviewing decisions…And while the accuracy of information in the file is not
unchallengeable, it commands considerable weight.”).
460 Rules 92 bis (A) and (C) include cases in which written statements gathered by the parties may
be accepted at trial in lieu of oral testimony.
455

456

2004]

THE RISE OF MANAGERIAL JUDGING IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

97

Finally, two additional reforms that also have gone in the direction of the
managerial judging system are the elimination of a distinction between the
guilt-determination and sentencing phases,461 and the limitation of
interlocutory appeals.462 Regarding the first of these reforms, the original
Rule 100 that established the possibility of a pre-sentencing procedure463 was
modified, and now the trial is used both for adjudicatory and sentencing
purposes in every case.464 Regarding interlocutory appeals, decisions on
preliminary motions465 are without interlocutory appeal save in very limited

461 For a characterization as inquisitorial of the merging of the determination of guilt phase and
the sentencing phase, see, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6, at 87.
462 The Expert Report pointed out interlocutory appeals as one of the areas in which reforms were
needed to expedite the process. See Expert Report, supra note 88, para. 102-04. The Judicial
Practices Working Group—created in September 1999 and composed by judges and representatives of
the Office of the Prosecutor, the Registry and defense counsel—proposed reforms to address the
impact that interlocutory appeals was having in the length of the proceedings. See Seventh Annual
Report ICTY, July 26, 2000, para. 316-17 (“[T]he Group first drafted proposed amendments to the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence in order to accommodate the many interlocutory appeals and their
impact on the length of the trials. The proposals were reviewed by the judges of the Chambers and
then submitted to the judges to the Rwanda tribunal…Similar proposals were submitted to the judges
of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, who also approved them at their plenary session on 13 and 14 July
2000”). Furthermore, in April 2002, “at the proposal of the Appeals Chamber, the judges of the
Tribunal adopted an amendment to rules 72 and 73 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
restricting applications for leave to appeal to issues certified by the Trial Chamber” (see See Ninth
Annual Report ICTY, August 14, 2002, para. 14).
463 See Version of the Rules of October 6, 1995, Rule 100 (“If a Trial Chamber finds the accused
guilty of a crime, the Prosecutor and the defence may submit any relevant information that may assist
the Trial Chamber in determining an appropriate sentence”). Applying the rationale of this rule,
“Trial Chamber II consistently refused to hear any motion on the form of the indictment that came
down to the allegation that one and the same act resulted in charges of different crimes, since it
considered this to be relevant only for sentencing once the defendant had been found guilty.
Therefore the sentencing stage was the proper time to hear these complaints” (see Orie, supra note 6,
at 1473, mentioning Tadia, Delalia et al, and Delia and Lablo as cases in which the Trial Chamber
applied this rationale).
464
See, e.g., Rule 85(A)(vi) (establishing that any relevant information in determining an
appropriate sentence shall be presented at trial).
465 See Rule 72(A) (preliminary motions include motions which challenge jurisdiction, allege
defects in the form of the indictment, seek the severance of counts or defendants, or raise objections
based on the refusal of a request for assignment of counsel).
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cases,466

and decisions on all other motions are without interlocutory appeal
unless certified by the Trial Chamber.467
These two last reforms also fit nicely in the managerial judging system
as described in this article, and their motivation has been, once again, to
speed up the docket of ICTY.468 Other original features of ICTY—such as
broad prosecutorial discretion,469 guilty pleas, no technical rules of evidence,

466 See Rule 72 (B) (“Decisions on preliminary motions are without interlocutory appeals save…(i)
in the case of motions challenging jurisdiction;…(ii) in other cases where certification has been
granted by the Trial Chamber, which may grant such certification if the decision involves an issue that
would significantly affect the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings or the outcome of the
trial, and for which, in the opinion of the Trial Chamber, an immediate resolution by the Appeals
Chamber may materially advance the proceedings.”). In the case of appeals for denial of provisional
release, the decision is subject to appeal in cases where leave is granted by a bench of three judges of
the Appeals Chamber. See Rule 65 (D). On the appeal by the prosecution against a decision by the
Trial Chamber to release the accused, see Rule 65 (E) to (G).
467 Rule 73 (B) (“Decisions on all motions are without interlocutory appeal save with certification
by the Trial Chamber, which may grant such certification if the decision involves an issue that would
significantly affect the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings or the outcome of the trial, and
for which, in the opinion of the Trial Chamber, an immediate resolution by the Appeals Chamber may
materially advance the proceedings.”). For the rationale of this rule as a way of expediting the
proceedings, see Eight Annual Report ICTY, August 13, 2001, para. 52-53. For applications of this
rule by the Trial Chamber see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj, Haradin Bala and Isak Musliu,
Decision on Musliu’s Application for Certification to Appeal Decision on Prosecution’s Motion to
Amend the Amended Indictment, February 25, 2004 (denying the application for certification of
appeal against the amendment of the indictment because it does not involve an issue that would
significantly affect the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings or the outcome of the trial).
See also Practice Directive on Procedure for the Filing of Written Submissions in Appeal Proceedings
before the International Tribunal, IT/155 Rev. 1. This directive was amended mainly to add a
provision enabling the Appeals Chamber to punish parties for failing to respect the directive. See,
e.g., See Ninth Annual Report ICTY, August 14, 2002, para. 14.
468 See supra note 462; Eight Annual Report ICTY, August 13, 2001, para. 3-4 (“[T]he reforms are
intended to make the procedures more responsive to the International Tribunal’s overriding need for
expeditiousness through the fine-tuning of many of the rules of procedure and evidence…[S]everal
rules of procedure and evidence were amended: the judges may now…take the measures required to
preclude interlocutory appeals from interrupting the trials.”), and para. 19.
469 In Prosecutor v. Agim Murtezi and others, the prosecutor withdrew the indictment against Mr.
Murtezi and requested that Mr. Murtezi be immediately released from the United Nations Detention
Unit because there was doubt on whether Mr. Murtezi was the actor in the events laid out in the
indictment. The judge accepted the withdrawal of the indictment. See Prosecutor v. Agim Murtezi
and others, Case IT-03-66-PT, Motion Hearing, February 28, 2003. See also Prosecutor v. Miroslav
Deronjic, Case IT-02-61-S, Sentencing Hearing, March 5, 2004, p. 314 (Mr. Harmon, official of the
OP in charge of the case, explaining why the prosecution had limited the charges included in the
indictment in this case: “[T]his is indeed a limited Indictment. It was purposefully done so because,
among other things, this institution has had trials that have lasted more than two years. Indeed, I
participated in one of those trials, and we could have a huge trial on a case that can be resolved very
quickly on facts that are clearly provable in this case. So a decision was made by me to limit this
Indictment for purposes of resolving this case quickly in order to fulfill the mandate of this
institution. The choice being we could have a 25-month trial on this, which would consume huge
resources and limit the number of cases that are heard before this institution, or the Prosecutor using
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and the absence of a trial by jury—also fit within the managerial judging
system. This system thus provides the best account of the current criminal
procedure of ICTY, including the reforms that have been adopted from July
1998 onward.
The fact that managerial judging as conceptualized in this article
provides the best account of the procedure of ICTY does not mean that
system is unchallenged within ICTY procedural practices. First, as already
mentioned, managerial judging is an ideal-type.470 Thus, the claim of this
article is that the procedural practices of ICTY have become closer to the
managerial judging ideal-type than to the adversarial or inquisitorial ones.
This does not mean, though, that every single rule, decision and practice of
ICTY fits perfectly with managerial judging. But to the extent that ICTY
criminal procedure is closer to managerial judging than to any other system,
managerial judging provides the best account of its rules and practices.
Given that it provides the best account of ICTY procedural rules and
practices, managerial judging has gradually become the predominant
structure of interpretation and meaning, set of internal dispositions, and way
of distributing powers and responsibilities for ICTY’s legal actors. But this
does not mean that there has not been resistance to managerial judging, just
as there was resistance to the adversarial system in ICTY’s early years.
Even if the analyzed changes in the rules came out of a consensus
between ICTY judges,471 not all judges have been equally comfortable about
becoming active managers of cases. For instance, in plea agreements, some
judges have felt that the defendant deserved a sentence higher than the one
the parties had agreed on,472 a reaction that goes against incentivizing the
rapid disposition of case through plea bargains.
Furthermore, due to their internal dispositions, their reluctance to lose
some of their procedural powers, and defense strategy, the parties in some
cases have resisted re-definition of their roles as collaborators toward
expedited process, and thus they have not always collaborated with the court
as judges expected. For instance, defense attorneys and defendants have
her discretion can limit the case to very serious cases, I might add, that are provable and can be
resolved expeditiously. That is why that choice was made in this case.”).
470 See supra notes 363, and accompanying text.
471 Recall that the rules are changed by the judges. See Statute, Art. 15.
472 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Banovia, Case IT-02-65/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, Judge Patrick
Robinson’s Dissenting Opinion, October 28, 2003; Prosecutor v. Miroslav Deronjic, Case IT-02-61-S,
Sentencing Judgment, Judge Wolfgang Schomburg’s Dissenting opinion March 30, 2004, para. 19.
The Tribunal has repeatedly emphasized that the Trial Chamber’s discretion to impose a greater
sentence than the one the parties agreed on remains untouched. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Banovia,
Case IT-02-65/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, October 28, 2003, para. 89; Prosecutor v. Miroslav
Deronjic, Case IT-02-61-S, Sentencing Judgment, March 30, 2004, para. 41.

100

THE RISE OF MANAGERIAL JUDGING IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

[Vol. :

trial.473

been reluctant to agree on factual issues before
Another example
comes from the length limits to parties’ motions and briefs that the Tribunal
established as a way to shorten the proceedings.474 In Seselj, the defendant
had the following reaction to such limitations:
After one and a half months…, some legal counselor tried
to give me back my motion, and his explanation was that it
was longer than ten pages. My motion totaled 116
pages…You said that it couldn’t be longer than so many
pages, and I was able to reduce it to 116 pages and it could
not have been shorter than that. Now my complaint to the
indictment is my absolute right which nobody can take
away from me…It was your duty to respond to my
complaint to the indictment to rule. You accept it or you
don’t accept it. I expected you to reject it straight away,
but it was up to you to respond in one way or another. As
the Trial Chamber, you cannot fail to respond to my
submission and just say that it was too long.475
But even if such resistance and challenges are undeniable, this section
has shown that managerial judging has gradually been imposed as the
predominant system in ICTY criminal procedure.

IX. THE SEMANTIC AND HYBRIDIZATION CRITIQUES AND THE LIMITS OF
BINARY THINKING ABOUT CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
This section will discuss two potential critiques to this article’s argument
that the post-1998 reforms have moved ICTY toward the managerial judging
system, not toward the inquisitorial system. It will also explore why most
commentators and judges have considered these reforms to be inquisitorial.

473 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Banovic, Fustar, and Knezevic, Case IT-02-65-PT, Status Conference,
April 8, 2003 (defense notes the limited nature of facts to which it can agree because they are beyond
the knowledge of the accused).
474 Former President of ICTY Claude Jorda issued the Practice Direction on the Length of Briefs
and Motions, IT/184/Rev. 1. On the rationale of the directive to expedite the work of the Tribunal,
see Eight Annual Report ICTY, August 13, 2001, para. 50 and 59.
475 Prosecutor v. Vojislav Seselj, Case IT-03-67-I, Status Conferece, July 3, 2003, p. 100-101.
Seselj is a case where the defendant had been particularly confrontational to the Tribunal and had
questioned its legitimacy. This exchange is also part of this broader dynamic that exceeds the
procedural context.
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According to the first critique, which I will call the semantic critique,
this article’s disagreement with the rest of the commentators is not
substantial, but merely semantic. 476 Under this critique, the origin of the
disagreement is simply that my definition of the inquisitorial system in this
article is different from that of other commentators, but we are all describing
the same phenomena using different labels. By this reasoning, the only
disagreement between us concerns the labels we use to describe ICTY
procedure, not the substance of the procedure we are describing or whether
it has moved toward the inquisitorial system.477
However, this is not the case. First, the definition of the inquisitorial
system used in this article is not substantially different from the definitions
used by commentators that have characterized ICTY as inquisitorial.478 In
addition, beyond the question of definitions, there is a real debate between
us about whether the recent reforms of ICTY match the conceptions of
criminal procedure that traditionally have prevailed in civil law countries.
The commentators’ claim that these reforms make ICTY’s procedure more
like criminal procedure practices in civil law jurisdictions.479 This article

476 For an application of the semantic critique to debates on whether or not the importation of
U.S. plea bargaining by civil law countries is a move toward the adversarial system, see Langer, La
Importación de Mecanismos Procesales, supra note 58, at 102-11.
477 This kind of criticism or analysis has a long tradition in analytical philosophy. Within
contemporary debates, Dworkin has made use of it with his “semantic sting” argument. See RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 45-46 (1986). For answers to the challenge that Dworkin’s semantic sting
argument presents to Hart’s theory of law, see, e.g., H.L. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW Postcript, (2d
ed. with postscript, Penelopy A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz eds. 1994); and Joseph Raz, Two Views of the
Nature of the Theory of Law, 4 LEGAL THEORY 258 (1998).
478 For instance, CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6, at 365-66; Mundis, supra
note12; Orie, supra note 6, at 1442-56; and Tochilovsky, Rules of Procedure for the International
Criminal Court, supra note 10; who give definitions of criminal procedure in civil law jurisdictions
that are not substantially different from the one I use article. Some of these authors even mention the
opposition between the ideas of the dispute and the official inquiry as one of the basic differences
between the criminal procedures of common and civil law (see, e.g., CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6, at 396; Tochilovsky, Rules of Procedure for the International Criminal
Court, supra note 10, at 344). Boas, Creating Laws of Evidence, supra note 12, does not give any
explicit definition of the systems, but seems to assume a conception of them not substantially
different from the one provided here. Given the central role that the adversarial and inquisitorial
systems play in his analysis, ZAPPALÀ, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 10, surprisingly does not provide a clear definition of these systems.
479 See, e.g., Gideon Boas, Creating Law of Evidence for International Criminal Law: ICTY and
the Principle of Flexibility, supra note 12, at 58 (“This trend in the admission and testing of evidence
toward the continental system can be seen in some of the recent amendments to the Rules”
[underlining is not in the original text]); Boas, Developments, supra note 10, at 174 (“What all these
amendments embody is a radical change in the focus of ICTY on trial preparation. These
amendments encompass continental law concepts whereby it is the court that determines the nature
and scope of the case and determines which evidence is best tested” [underlining is not in the original
text]); Daryl A. Mundis, From 'Common Law' Toward 'Civil Law': The Evolution of ICTY Rules of
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claims that they do not. The question is, of course, an empirical one. This
article already has shown why the new ICTY reforms fit with neither the
adversarial nor the inquisitorial system, but rather with managerial judging.
The second potential critique to this article’s main argument, which I
will call the hybridization critique, would be that the new ICTY criminal
procedure does not fit in either the adversarial or the inquisitorial systems
because it is merely a hybrid between them. Therefore, instead of developing
a new model, it is only necessary to describe which features of the new ICTY
criminal procedure correspond to each of the two traditional systems.480
This potential criticism would correspond, in fact, to the predominant view
regarding the current ICTY criminal procedure that has described it as a
mixture between adversarial and inquisitorial systems.481 I will address it in
detail here.
The first point I wish make about this position is that this kind of merehybridization analysis would ignore the current state of ICTY criminal
procedure—and also of any other procedures that ultimately include
elements of this system. One of the main points of this article is precisely
that the new conceptions of the judge, the prosecutor, and the defense in
ICTY do not find any parallel in either of the two traditional systems; thus,
Procedure and Evidence, supra note 12 (the characterization of the amendments as a move toward
civil law jurisdictions conceptions is even in the title); Orie, supra note 6, at 1492 (“The subsequent
development of the law of procedure in the ad hoc Tribunals has on all major points been in the
direction of the civil law” [underlining is not in the original text]); Tochilovsky, Rule of Procedure for
the International Criminal Court, supra note 10, at 359 (“Although most of ICTY Rules of Procedure
were borrowed from the common-law systems, ICTY practice has proved that the ad hoc Tribunal’s
criminal proceedings are evolving into a real hybrid of the two major legal systems in operation in the
world today. The proceedings tend to combine a common-law contest between two parties before
uninformed judges and a civil-law scrutiny of evidence with active, informed judges” [underlining is
not in the original text]); Tochilovsky, Legal Systems and Cultures in the International Criminal
Court, supra note 10, at 632 (“It was mostly a wish to expedite trials and, for that purpose, to give the
judges more control over proceedings that prompter ICTY Judges to turn to a civil law practice”
[underlining is not in the original text]).
480 This classificatory work is what many commentators have done regarding the procedure of
ICTY. See, e.g., CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6, at 384-87; Orie, supra note 6,
at 1463-74; Tochilovsky, Rules of Procedure for the International Criminal Court, supra note 10, at
345-55.
481 See, e.g., Tochilovsky, Rules of Procedure for the International Criminal Court, supra note ,
at 359 (“Although most of ICTY Rules of Procedure were borrowed from the common-law systems,
ICTY practice has proved that the ad hoc Tribunal’s criminal proceedings are evolving into a real
hybrid of the two major legal systems in operation in the world today. The proceedings tend to
combine a common-law contest between two parties before uninformed judges and a civil-law
scrutiny of evidence with active, informed judges”); SALVATORE ZAPPALÀ, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 10, at 22 (“Originally, the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence…of the Tribunals were mainly based on common law procedure; in particular, they bore
strong resemblance to the American model. However, since their adoption they have undergone
several significant amendments, and thus to a large extent it can be said that a new procedural system
has been created: a sort of hybrid that fits somewhere in between adversarial and inquisitorial.”).
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they cannot be explained as just a hybrid between them. For instance, the
conception of the judge as an active case manager who has the responsibility
of expediting cases, and of the prosecutor and the defense attorney as
collaborators with the judge in this endeavor, cannot be captured using the
contemporary conception of criminal procedure of the adversarial and
inquisitorial systems.
We need new theoretical tools—like the ones
developed in this article—to capture these and other phenomena.
The second point about the hybridization critique is that it would be
possible to present the current ICTY criminal procedure as just a mixture
between adversarial and inquisitorial systems by redefining the fundamental
aspects of these two systems. There would be two main ways to do this. The
first would be simply to define the adversarial system as the procedure in
which the judge is passive and oral evidence is used, and the inquisitorial
system as the procedure in which the judge is active and written evidence is
utilized. Under this redefinition, ICTY reforms, by definition, would be a
move toward the inquisitorial system because they have made judges more
active and have increased the use of written evidence.482
The problem with this definition is that judges can be active for many
different reasons: for example, to investigate the truth, as in civil law
countries; to expedite proceedings, as in managerial judging systems; to
implement state policies, as in certain socialist systems; or to protect
constitutional rights, as some judges in the U.S. adversarial system seek to
do. To put all these different kinds of judicial activism under the same label
would blur the important differences between these different types of
procedure.483 In other words, commentators would have to broaden the
content of the adversarial and inquisitorial systems in order to make ICTY
procedural reforms fit into them, but in so doing, they would strip the
adversarial and inquisitorial systems of their analytical power to describe and
distinguish between different kinds of criminal procedure. The same would

482 At least some of the commentators have implicitly made this move.
See, e.g., Boas,
Developments in the Law of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 10, at 174 (“What all these
amendments embody is a radical change in the focus of ICTY on trial preparation. These
amendments encompass continental law concepts whereby it is the court that determines the nature
and scope of the case and determines which evidence is to be tested”).
483 I think this may be a problem into which the first dichotomy of Prof. Damaška’s theoretical
framework—the opposition between conflict-solving and policy-implementing types of procedure—
may also fall, given that the policy-implementing type of procedure seems to equate judicial activism
with policy-implementing goals. On Prof. Damaška’s opposition between conflict-solving and policyimplementing types of procedure, see his THE FACES OF JUSTICE, supra note 43, at 71-180. This is one
of the reasons why I do not use this opposition to define adversarial and inquisitorial systems in
Section IV, and I rather use the opposition between the model of the dispute and the model of the
official investigation.
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happen regarding the reliance on written evidence. There are many potential
reasons for such reliance, and traditionally, the inquisitorial system has
relied on written evidence collected by disinterested officials for reasons of
hierarchy and impartiality. Thus, it would be a mistake to characterize as
inquisitorial an exclusively pragmatic rationale for relying on written
evidence mostly gathered by the parties.484
A second possible redefinition would be to define the inquisitorial
system as an official investigation designed to process cases as swiftly as
possible, not to determine the truth, or as an official investigation in which
truth determination and expedited process are coequal goals of the
procedure. Under this redefinition, ICTY reforms could be described as
inquisitorial. However, there are two problems with this position. The first
is that commentators and judges have not used either of the definitions of the
inquisitorial system just suggested, but rather the traditional one described
above in answer to the semantic critique.485 Yet under that definition, they
nevertheless have considered the recent ICTY reforms to represent a move
toward the inquisitorial system. This would mean that those who maintain
that ICTY criminal procedure has shifted toward the inquisitorial system
should at least redefine the basic aspects of this last category.
More importantly, the second problem is that changing the traditional
content of the inquisitorial system as defined in this article—and also by
commentators on ICTY—would not be warranted under current
circumstances. The definition of the inquisitorial system as an official
investigation to determine the truth run by impartial officials who are
members of a hierarchical structure still basically captures the conception of
criminal procedure that prevails in civil law countries.486 If commentators
changed their definition of the inquisitorial system to make ICTY reforms fit
in this system, they could not use this category to accurately describe the
current criminal procedures of most civil law jurisdictions.
This does not mean that the conception of criminal procedure that
prevails in civil law countries could not change over time, or that the content
of the inquisitorial system as a theoretical category could not also change.
The adversarial and inquisitorial systems have evolved over time in the
past,487 and a change in the prevailing conception of criminal procedure in

484 Rules 92 bis (A) and (C) include cases in which written statements gathered by the parties may
be accepted at trial in lieu of oral testimony.
485 See supra note 478.
486 See Sections 4 and 5.
487 On the evolution of the adversarial and inquisitorial systems over time, see the works cited
supra note 52.
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civil law toward conceiving it as an investigation done to process cases as
swiftly as possible could happen in the future. In fact, changes in this
direction have been identified in Germany, which has one of the most
emblematic criminal procedures among civil law jurisdictions.488 But since
this change has not happened yet and may never happen in most civil law
countries, modifying the content of the inquisitorial system as a theoretical
category would be unwarranted at present. The traditional content of the
inquisitorial system still has theoretical value to explain the predominant
conception of criminal procedure in civil law. Thus, it would be a mistake to
change it just to make ICTY criminal procedure fit the traditional
adversarial-inquisitorial dichotomy.
The next point worth mentioning as to the hybridization critique is that
this article still would make at least two substantial contributions to
comparative criminal procedure as a discipline, even if the evolution of
criminal procedure in civil law countries eventually required changing the
content of the inquisitorial system at some point in the future. The first
contribution would be highlighting that the traditional definition of the
inquisitorial system could become obsolete at some point and that we should
pay attention to such a possibility—even if this change of content is not
warranted at present. The second is that, even if this happened, this article
still would provide a model to understand the particular kind of criminal
procedure currently used by ICTY.
This last point is particularly important. Commentators analyzing ICTY
criminal procedure have been content with pointing out what features of this
procedure would correspond to either the adversarial or the inquisitorial
system, and describing ICTY criminal procedure as a hybrid of both
systems.489 But saying that a particular procedure is a hybrid between the
adversarial and inquisitorial systems does not tell us much about such a
procedure, because there could be many very different possible hybrid or
mixed procedures with different combinations of elements from each
system.490 Thus, it is necessary to explain not only what the features of a

See Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations, supra note 30, at 42-45.
See, e.g., supra notes 480 and 481.
490 As already mentioned, Mirjan Damaška has developed a sophisticated typology of procedural
systems in his THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY, supra note 43. Based on his two
oppositions of conflict-solving and policy-implementing proceedings, as well as hierarchical and
coordinate ideals, he has developed four possible combinations of these two opposing pairs (the
policy-implementing process of hierarchical officialdom, the conflict-solving process before
hierarchical officialdom, the conflict-solving problem before coordinate officialdom, and the policyimplementing process of coordinate officialdom). The models do explain how their features are
connected and interact with each other as well as strengths and weaknesses of each of these models.
However, his typology is limited to four possible combinations, and two of them (the policy488
489
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particular procedure are, but also the relations and interactions between
them.491 A model such as the one offered in this article would provide such
an account. Therefore, if the content of the adversarial and inquisitorial
systems were to change in the future such that the managerial judging
system could be considered a hybrid of the two classic systems, then this
article would have provided a detailed model to analyze this kind of
procedure.
This situation remains purely hypothetical because, as noted, we should
neither see managerial judging as a hybrid between the traditional systems
nor change the content of the two classic models. Rather than analyzing the
reforms of ICTY criminal procedure as a move from the adversarial to the
inquisitorial system, it would be more accurate and fruitful to analyze them
as one of the potential paths that an adversarial system may take when
reacting to pressures to process cases more swiftly.
When an adversarial system reacts to such pressures by transforming
the judge into the main actor responsible for the management of cases, then
the system undergoes the changes described in the last two sections. In other
words, the system that ICTY currently uses is not the product of the
importation of inquisitorial features into an adversarial system. Rather it is
mainly the product of the adoption by an adversarial system of certain case
management techniques handled by the judge. The inquisitorial system need
not play any role in this transformation. This is precisely what has happened
to the adversarial system in U.S. civil procedure, without any borrowing from
the inquisitorial system. And this is what has happened to a certain extent to
the adversarial system in ICTY.
This does not mean that there have been no inquisitorial influences on
ICTY reforms. In fact, the Expert Group that proposed some of these reforms
framed some of them in terms of the inquisitorial system,492 and ICTY
implementing process of hierarchical officialdom and the conflict-solving problem before coordinate
officialdom) would actually correspond to the traditional criminal procedures of civil and common
law. So, there would be only two potential mixed systems. However, the combinations I have in
mind between adversarial and inquisitorial elements, as well as other elements that fit in neither of
the two traditional categories, are more numerous.
491 For good analyses of mixed systems in the direction indicated in the text, see id.; Sean Doran
et al., Rethinking Adversariness in Nonjury Criminal Trials, 23 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL
LAW 1 (1995); and JOHN JACKSON AND SEAN DORAN, JUDGE WITHOUT JURY: DIPLOCK TRIALS IN THE
ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1995) (analyzing the impact of having trials based on the model of the dispute
but without jury).
492 See, e.g., Expert Report, supra note 88, para. 78 (asking for more judicial activism and stating
that this is not an unusual practice in civil law countries). A caveat should be stated here, though.
The fact that the Expert Group framed part of its proposals as a move toward civil law systems should
not be necessarily read as an actual influence of this kind of jurisdiction given that the Expert Group
also carried out its analysis in terms of the binary paradigm adversarial-inquisitorial.
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necessarily is constantly influenced by the civil law, due to the very fact that
many of its legal actors—including judges—come from civil law
jurisdictions.493 But these inquisitorial influences have neither translated
into inquisitorial reforms nor moved ICTY toward the inquisitorial system for
two different reasons. The first reason is that inquisitorial influences were a
much less important engine for the reforms than the urgency to expedite the
docket.494 Thus, the content of the reforms was determined by pragmatic
needs more than by cultural influences of inquisitorial models.
The second reason is that when legal ideas and institutions are
transferred between legal systems, they may be deeply transformed in the
process.495 A way to think about this circulation of legal ideas between legal
systems is through the metaphor of the legal translation. If we think of legal
systems not only as technical tools to decide cases but also as systems of
production of meaning—as our conceptualization of procedural systems as
procedural cultures allows us to do496—then we can understand the process
of transferring a legal institution from legal system A to legal system B as a
translation between these two different systems of production of meaning.
Due to this process of translation, the original and the translated legal ideas
may differ deeply either due to decisions by the translators (the legal
reformers) not to be faithful to the original “text” (the original legal idea or
institution), or due to structural differences between the source and the

493 On these unavoidable influences, see the conception of internal dispositions in Section II, and
examples of the manifestation of this concept in Sections 4 and 5.
494 In fact, even if the Expert Group framed some of its proposals in terms of civil law, one of its
main focuses, if not the main, was on judicial management. See, e.g., Expert Report, supra note 88,
para 7. (“the Advisory Committee believed that the review, with full participation of the Tribunals,
should focus on judicial management rather than administrative management…”), para. 8 (“The
Expert Group concluded instead that its evaluation should examine the operation and functioning of
the three principal organs of each Tribunal—the Chambers, the Office of the Prosecutor and the
Registry—with a particular focus on judicial management, but at the same time assessing the
organizational structure of each as well as the optimum use of investigation personnel, trial and
defence attorneys, co-counsels, witnesses and expert witnesses.”).
495 This has been one of the main ideas under discussion in debates about the importation and
exportation of legal ideas and institutions between legal systems. For analyses on the transformation
that legal ideas and institutions may undergo when transferred between legal systems, see Langer,
From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations, supra note 30; Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of
'Legal Transplants,' 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 111 (1997); Gunter Teubner, Legal Irritants:
Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11
(1998).
496 See the concept “structures of interpretation and meaning” developed in Section II.
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target systems of production of meaning (the original and receiving legal
systems).497
This heuristic device helps to explain why the inquisitorial influences on
ICTY procedure neither translated into inquisitorial reforms nor took ICTY
procedure in the direction of civil law criminal procedure. The inquisitorial
idea of having “active judges investigate the truth by themselves,” found in
civil law jurisdictions, was translated to ICTY as “active judges controlling
parties’ activities to expedite the process.” The transformation is so deep that
that we can hardly recognize the first idea in the second. The transformation
is explained by decisions of the judges—the translators—not to be faithful to
the inquisitorial idea, and by structural differences between the inquisitorial
system of civil law countries and the originally adversarial system of ICTY.
The judges decided to become active managers to expedite the cases,
instead of active investigators of the truth, because they had to handle
intense pressures to speed up the docket—and the inquisitorial system was
not an appealing option for achieving this goal. In addition, given the
originally adversarial structure of ICTY procedure, in which the parties
already were in charge of running their own investigations and trial cases, it
would have been practically impossible for the judges to completely
disempower the parties and start to run the pre-trial and trial phases by
themselves—as the inquisitorial idea of the investigating judge would have
required. Both judges’ decisions and the pre-existing adversarial procedure
of ICTY thus explain why, even if there were some inquisitorial influences in
the changes to ICTY procedure, they neither translated into inquisitorial
reforms nor moved ICTY procedure toward a hybrid between adversarial and
inquisitorial systems.
In a similar way, the adoption of a proto-written dossier, and the
increasing use of written statements at trial—ideas that also may have had
some inquisitorial inspiration—also were transformed when translated to
ICTY adversarial procedure. The proto-written dossier—files based on the
pre-trial briefs of the prosecution and the defense that the pre-trial judge
presents to the Trial Chamber—is substantially different from the written
dossier of the inquisitorial system, and these differences again are explained
either by decisions by the judges that introduced the reforms or by structural
differences between civil law inquisitorial systems and the originally
adversarial system of ICTY.

497 For a more detailed analysis of how the metaphor of the legal translation can be used to
analyze the transfer of legal ideas and institutions between legal systems, see Langer, From Legal
Transplants to Legal Translations, supra note 30.
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First, the judges introduced these pre-trial briefs to know more about
the case before trial in order to be more active case managers, not active
investigators.498 In addition, these proto-written dossiers do not document
every act of an investigation run by impartial officials.499 Rather, they reflect
the pre-trial briefs gathered by the parties which, by definition, do not
document every act performed during the pre-trial phase,500 are not official,
and gathered by parties with an interest in winning the case.501 This is
because the idea of the inquisitorial written dossier was translated to a
procedure where the parties already did their own investigations.502 Thus,
instead of creating a written dossier that entirely reflects one impartial
official investigation, as in the inquisitorial system, the reform created a

498 On the introduction of pre-trial briefs by the prosecution and the defense, and the elaboration
of files based on them that the pre-trial Judge submits to the Trial Chamber, see Rule 65 ter (E), (F),
(G), and (L).
499 Even if they have analyzed ICTY procedure in terms of the adversarial-inquisitorial paradigm,
some commentators have correctly pointed out that this file does not correspond to the civil law
written-dossier. See Orie, Accusatorial v. Inquisitorial Approach in International Criminal
Proceedings, supra note 6, at 1470 (“The introduction of a pre-trial judge…and his authority to order
the parties to explain their position in one or more pre-trial briefs is not yet to be compared with the
creation of a dossier in the civil-law tradition…(T)he briefs give general information on the case of the
parties and sometimes in more detail their views on certain (legal) issues. The exact content of the
evidentiary materials, as they have been presented only in lists and summaries to the pre-trial judge,
is still unavailable to the Trial Chamber.”); Tochilovsky, Legal Systems and Cultures in the
International Criminal Court, supra note 10, at 634 (“…the witnesses statements submitted to the
Trial Chambers by the prosecution in the Ad Hoc Tribunals is not equivalent to the civil law ‘dossier’.
For instance, unlike civil law judges, the Tribunals’ judges would have received only statements of
those witnesses whom the Prosecutor intend to call. Moreover, the unique nature of the international
criminal justice inevitably affects the reliability of these written statements. Most of the victims and
witnesses do not speak ICTY working languages. For numerous ICTY investigators and lawyers the
working languages of the Tribunal are also foreign languages.”).
500 The pre-trial briefs by the prosecution and the defense basically are required to include a
summary of the evidence the prosecutor intends to bring; the nature of the accused’s defense; the list
of witnesses for the prosecution and the defense and a summary of the facts on which each witness
will testify; and the list of exhibits the parties intend to offer in the case.
501 Boas, Creating Laws of Evidence for International Criminal Law, supra note 12, at 66, has
correctly pointed out some of the consequences of having an adversarial pre-trial phase: “An obvious
distinction between the continental system and the procedure of ICTY is the manner in which crimes
are investigated and indictments brought before the court. In the continental system, the
investigating judge forms an essential part of the independent investigation and assessment of
evidence. ICTY has been given an adversarial structure…, leaving the prosecutor sole power in the
investigation of alleged crimes and the presentation of the indictment. The tribunal cannot therefore
rely upon a member of the independent judiciary in the presentation of evidence before it and must
treat any such material presented by the prosecution as part of the prosecution case in an adversarial
structure…”.
502 See, for instance, Rules 39, 66, 67, and 68 that reflect that each party does its own pre-trial
investigation.
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investigations.503

dossier that reflects two non-impartial
This, along with the
judges’ motives for shaping the reforms as they did, explains why this written
dossier could not substantially move ICTY procedure toward the inquisitorial
system. In an inquisitorial system, a written dossier connects and unifies the
echelons of the bureaucracy that run the process and allows hierarchical
control between them, precisely because it is official.504 But a pre-trial
judge’s brief based on the parties’ incomplete, self-serving briefs hardly could
play such a role.
In a similar way, the increasing use of written statements at trial,
although partly inspired by civil law models, also was deeply transformed
when translated to an adversarial system such as ICTY’s. First, in
inquisitorial systems, the written statements directly introduced at trial have
been gathered in the written dossier by the impartial official in charge of the
pre-trial investigation. This is why they are particularly trusted by trial
judges and can be used for evidentiary purposes.505 But in the context of
ICTY, as a consequence of the party-driven pre-trial investigations, written
statements admitted at trial include statements not gathered in such an
impartial fashion.506 In addition, judges have admitted written statements as
a way to expedite process, not because they trust them.507
Thus the inquisitorial influences on the reforms have not only been
relatively minor as against the pressures to expedite the docket, but also have

503 Besides reflecting the pre-trial briefs presented by the parties, the files that the pre-trial Judge
submits to the Trial Chamber include all the other filings of the parties, transcripts of status
conferences and minutes of meetings held in the performance of her pre-trial functions. See Rule 65
ter (L).
504 See DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE, supra note 43, at 50 (“A multistage hierarchical process
needs a mechanism to integrate all its segments into a meaningful whole. Material gathered over
time by various officials must be assembled for decision making, and traces of official audits must be
preserved for future audits. Officials in charge of procedural stages are therefore expected to
maintain files to ensure completeness and authenticity of documentation.”).
505 See DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE, supra note 43, at 50 (“In order not to confuse the file of
the case with its false cognates, it is important to realize that hierarchical officials prefer to decide on
the basis of written records. Documents contained in the file are not internal official documents,
helping a particular official to organize his activity, but rather sources of information on which to
base both original and reviewing decisions…And while the accuracy of information in the file is not
unchallengeable, it commands considerable weight.”).
506 Rules 92 bis (A) and (C) include cases in which written statements gathered by the parties may
be accepted at trial in lieu of oral testimony.
507 The Judges have tried to diminish the impact of the potential unreliability of these written
statements in two main ways. First, by liming their use “to proof of a matter other than the acts and
conduct of the accused.” See Rule 92 bis (A). On how the Tribunal has interpreted such a limitation,
see supra note 448. Second, by establishing that the Trial Chamber, after hearing the parties, decides
whether the witness whose statement is incorporated to the trial has to appear at trial for crossexamination.
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been radically transformed when translated from civil law jurisdictions to the
originally adversarial system of ICTY. As a consequence of these deep
transformations, the reforms cannot be characterized as inquisitorial, and
they have not brought ICTY procedure closer to the criminal procedure
practices of civil law jurisdictions.
There is a final argument to analyze in relation to the hybridization
critique—that the current procedure of ICTY is a hybrid not only between
adversarial and inquisitorial systems (as the first version of the hybridization
critique suggests), but also between these systems and case management
techniques designed to expedite the docket. In principle, this article has no
strong quarrel with such a characterization of the procedure of ICTY, because
this variation of the hybridization argument would no longer think in binary
terms about criminal procedure. In other words, it would acknowledge one
of the points this article has insisted upon: that the adversarial-inquisitorial
dichotomy alone cannot give an adequate account of the procedure of the
Tribunal. It would acknowledge that this procedure cannot be described
simply as a hybrid of the two traditional systems.
Two comments are on point, though. First, note that the hybridization
argument would be vague and insufficient if it stopped here, as
commentators analyzing ICTY generally have done. It is not sufficient to say
that the procedure of ICTY is a hybrid or mixture between adversarial and
inquisitorial elements and case management techniques to expedite the
docket, because again, there are many possible combinations between these
three kinds of elements. It is necessary to provide a model to explain
specifically how the different features of this and other procedures are
combined and relate to each other.
Second, although some might be inclined to view managerial judging as
this sort of three-way hybrid, it is neither analytically nor historically
accurate to describe the managerial judging systems of U.S. civil procedure
and ICTY as a hybrid between these three kinds of elements.508 An
adversarial system can move in the direction of managerial judging without
substantial elements from the inquisitorial system. U.S. civil procedure and,
to a lesser extent, the procedure of ICTY provide historical examples of this
possibility.
The preceding analysis raises a question: why have the sophisticated
jurists who have analyzed ICTY procedure perceived the post-1998 reforms

508 It is necessary to point out, though, that even if the managerial judging system is not
necessarily a mixture between these three kinds of elements, it is possible that individual procedures
that get closer to this system be a combination of adversarial, inquisitorial and expediency-casemanagement elements. My point in the text is that this is not necessarily the case.
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as a move toward the inquisitorial system? There are at least two
explanations for this phenomenon. The first has to do with how the field of
comparative criminal procedure has framed its analyses and debates. The
main theoretical dichotomy in this field has long been the distinction
between the adversarial and inquisitorial systems.509 Comparative criminal
procedure traditionally has assumed that any existing criminal procedure—at
least within the West—has to be either adversarial, inquisitorial, or
somewhere between these two poles.510 The assumption has been a fruitful
one, because comparative criminal procedure developed as a discipline and
produced some of its best scholarship based on this assumption.
But the example of ICTY also shows that this binary way of thinking can
be problematic in our present context. As has been shown, the procedural
model that has arisen in ICTY cannot be explained simply as a mix between
the traditional conceptions of criminal procedure. Hence, if we do not
develop new categories to describe these new legal phenomena, but instead
limit ourselves to our old theoretical tools, the adversarial and inquisitorial
systems may become procrustean beds into which commentators try to force
legal realities that do not actually fit into these systems. To a great extent,
this is what has happened with the analysis of ICTY reforms. Since the post1998 reforms moved ICTY procedure away from the adversarial system,
commentators have assumed that the reforms had to be inquisitorial
instead.511 But, in fact, they are neither.
The second explanation of why the rise of managerial judging in ICTY
has not been noticed is also related to the dichotomy between the adversarial
and inquisitorial systems, but in a different way. As explained in Section II,

509 Mirjan Damaška’s THE FACES OF JUSTICE, supra note 43, has been an exception in this respect
because he has developed his own categories. However, he has partially done so because he wanted to
explain differences between all kinds of procedure—not only criminal ones. See id. at 6.
510 See, e.g., ZAPPALÀ, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 10, at
14-15 (“Among concepts usually adopted in comparative criminal procedure the distinction made
between accusatorial and inquisitorial criminal proceedings stand out.”).
511 See, e.g., CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 6, at 365-66 (framing his
analysis of international criminal procedure in terms the adversarial and inquisitorial systems as the
two available models for international criminal procedure); Orie, Accusatorial v. Inquisitorial
Approach in International Criminal Proceedings, supra note 6, at 1440 (framing his whole analysis
of international criminal proceedings in terms of the adversarial and inquisitorial categories);
ZAPPALÀ, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 10, at 14-15 (“Among
concepts usually adopted in comparative criminal procedure the distinction made between
accusatorial and inquisitorial criminal proceedings stand out. The purpose of this paragraph is not
to discuss the validity of such categories; on the contrary, it is accepted that this dichotomy is
appropriate, at least for descriptive purposes. Our intention is to adopt this categorization and apply
it to international criminal proceedings to try to explore the relationship between the provisions on
the rights of the accused and procedural mechanisms derived from one model or the other.”).
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the traditional legal systems in particular—and common and civil law more
broadly—function as legal identities in certain contexts.512 In other words,
legal actors may attach to them a role in defining themselves.513 Again, this
identity role of the adversarial and inquisitorial systems has been particularly
relevant in the context of ICTY, where interactions between lawyers from
differing legal traditions are a daily experience. As shown in Sections IV and
5, this has played a role in the interactions between the actors of ICTY. The
adversarial and the inquisitorial as legal identities also may have played a
role regarding how the procedural reforms were defined. In a context where
legal actors agreed that ICTY criminal procedure was predominantly
adversarial514—with the consequent feeling by civil law actors that they were
operating in a system that was not “theirs”515—defining these reforms as a
move toward the inquisitorial may have been comforting or compensatory
for those within ICTY who identify with the inquisitorial system as a legal
identity.516

X. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DISCOVERY OF THE MANAGERIAL JUDGING
SYSTEM IN ICTY
The discovery of managerial judging in ICTY has all kinds of
implications for the Tribunal. From a descriptive perspective, it provides a
much better account of what kind of procedure ICTY has. The existing

See supra note 75, and accompanying text.
For examples of some of the ways these identities have been constructed in the U.S. and
Europe, see supra note 31.
514 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Case 96-21, Decision on the Motion on Presentation of
Evidence by the Acussed, Esad Landzo, May 1, 1997, para. 15 (“the Judges adopted a largely
adversarial, instead of the inquisitorial, approach in the Rules”); Prosecutor v. Kupreškic et al., Case
IT-95-15, Transcript, August 27, 1998 (Judge Cassese: “As for the point of, 'Our witnesses, their
witnesses,' I'm afraid this is the procedure. And this is, of course, as you know, Mr. Radovic, better
than me, it is the adversarial system, which is totally different from the inquisitorial system with
which you are familiar in your country and also other European persons from Continental Europe are
also familiar with namely the inquisitorial system where you have a totally different approach, but we
have to stick to our rules”).
515 See, e.g., Tochilovsky, Legal Systems and Legal Cultures, supra note 10, at 642 (“…because of
the numerous technical rules governing adversarial trials, civil law lawyers do find themselves in a
position of ‘students’ who are to be ‘mentored’ and ‘educated’ by their common law counterparts.”)
516 See, e.g., Sikirica et. al, Case IT-95-8, Transcript, April 4, 2001, p. 1752 (defining as
inquisitorial the possibility of the Trial Chamber to ask questions in a predominantly adversarial
system). The question of balance between the different legal traditions has been constantly present in
ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC at all levels. See, e.g., Expert Report, supra note 88, para. 230
(describing how the ICTR Registar has considered the balance of the principal legal systems of the
world as one of the criteria to select appointed counsel).
512
513
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characterizations of this procedure as a mixture of the adversarial and
inquisitorial systems is not particularly helpful to understand what ICTY has
been doing. It only provides a sort of taxonomy of what features of the
tribunal procedure fit in one or the other system, but it does not propose a
model—like the one proposed here—to explain ICTY procedural practices
and their evolution over time. In addition, it does not provide an account of
all those features that are not adversarial or inquisitorial, such as the
conception of a judge as a manager in charge of expediting proceedings, the
transformation of the role of the parties as collaborators of the court, the
active role of judges in encouraging factual and legal agreements, the fact
that the cases of the parties are as much in coordination and cooperation as
in competition, and the pragmatic attitude of the system toward relying on
oral or written production of the evidence.
Instead, this article’s characterization of ICTY procedure as managerial
judging not only provides a comprehensive and coherent description of this
procedure, but also explains what the judges have attempted to do with the
reforms they have introduced. The judges have not randomly picked out
features of the adversarial and inquisitorial systems. They also have not
sought to become more active investigators of the truth as in the inquisitorial
system. Rather than incorporating inquisitorial features in an adversarial
model, the reforms have adopted a particular set of case management
techniques to speed up the docket. Under pressures to process cases more
quickly, ICTY judges departed from a predominantly adversarial system and
decided to become active managers. This re-definition of their role brought
with it a re-definition of the parties’ roles and of other features of ICTY
criminal procedure. And the product of this decision and the resulting
transformations is a criminal procedure that can be best described as close to
the managerial judging system.
The managerial judging system provides the best account of ICTY
criminal procedure not only understood as a set of rules but also as a
procedural culture.517 In recent years, ICTY judges have been at least as
worried about processing cases swiftly as about truth-determination and
fairness in a given case,518 and they have required the parties to collaborate in

517 On the conceptualization of managerial judging as a procedural culture, see supra notes 36465, and accompanying text.
518 This should not be read as implying that the judges have acted in bad-faith or convicted people
they thought were innocent. Rather, ICTY judges have put a lot of good faith and energy in their work
and have tried to make ICTY succeed in achieving its goals. But, there is a tension between judicial
activism to expedite proceedings on the one hand and fairness and truth-determination on the other.
For instance, this judicial activism may have created problems of impartiality, and the use of written
statements has probably worsened the truth-determination ability of ICTY trials. Of course, there are
also situations in which expediting proceedings and fairness go together because shorter proceedings
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this endeavor and to add the goal of expediting the docket to their other
professional duties and concerns. In this sense, managerial judging and the
resistance against it explain many of the current interactions between ICTY
legal actors, as was shown in Section VIII. Whether the arrival of the
managerial judging procedural culture at ICTY is good or bad for the
Tribunal is something that this article will not analyze.519 But the
development itself is undeniable.
The arrival of managerial judging at ICTY is also important regarding
the dimension of procedural powers. As we saw, during its initial years, the
Tribunal used a predominantly adversarial system in which the parties—and
particularly the prosecution—had the main responsibility to run the
proceedings in international criminal cases. With ICTY’s adoption of
managerial judging, the distribution of powers and responsibilities has
shifted. Now the judges, as a professional group, have much greater
responsibility and control over how the Tribunal prosecutes and tries its
cases. Again, this article will not address whether this is good or bad for
ICTY and its goals. But this development is something that should be taken
into account in both descriptive and normative analyses of the Tribunal.
Besides its importance for understanding and explaining the work of
ICTY, the discovery of the managerial judging system in this jurisdiction has
implications for the adversarial and inquisitorial systems in international
criminal procedure generally, and even broader implications for the
adversary system both at the national and the international levels. The two
questions that will be explored in the rest of this section are, first, why is it
that ICTY judges chose neither of the two traditional systems to deal with the
external and internal pressures to process cases more swiftly? Second, why is
it that other adversarial systems—such as U.S. criminal procedure—have not
moved in the direction of managerial judging despite facing similar pressures
to expedite the handling of criminal cases?
may benefit the defendant. However, this is not always the case. I say in the main text that truthdetermination and fairness may have been compromised “in a given case” because one could say that,
at a more systematic level, faster proceedings could produce fairness and more truth-determination
in the sense that more defendants could be convicted for the commission of international crimes and
that this could enhance the process of determining the historical truth for the events that occurred in
the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Analyzing all these issues in detail would require a normative
analysis that is beyond the scope of this article.
519 For normative analyses of managerial judging, though in reference to civil, not criminal
procedure, see Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 16, at 414-31; Judith Resnik, Managerial
Judges: The Potential Costs, 45 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW 686 (1985); Judith Resnik,
Managerial Judges and Court Delay: the Unproven Assumptions, 23 JUDGES’ JOURNAL 8 (1984);
Judith Resnik, The Assumptions Remain, 23 JUDGES’ JOURNAL 37 (1984).. For a response to some of
these criticisms, see, e.g., Paul R.J. Connolly, Why We Do Need Managerial Judges, 23 JUDGES’
JOURNAL 34 (1984).
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I will start with the first of these two questions. Regarding the
inquisitorial system, there are two main reasons why ICTY judges did not
move in that direction. The first has to do with characteristics of the
inquisitorial system itself. With its emphasis on determining the real
truth,520 its highly formalistic written documentation of every act of the
process,521 and its distrust of consensual dispositions of the cases by the
parties,522 the inquisitorial system is not the fastest system for prosecuting
and adjudicating criminal cases.523 The system may have other virtues, but
speed is not one of them. Actually, at the national level, inquisitorial
jurisdictions have been adopting features of the adversarial system to deal
with increasing caseloads and public opinion pressure to process cases
faster.524
Second, the judges faced a question of path dependence.525 In other
words, when the judges decided to start the reforms, they did not start from
scratch, but rather from criminal procedure practices that were
predominantly adversarial in their structure of interpretation and meaning,
the predominant internal dispositions among most of their actors, and the
dimension of procedural powers, as discussed in Sections IV to VI. Thus, to
swing ICTY criminal procedure from an adversarial to an inquisitorial system
would have been very difficult. It would have required modification of most
features of ICTY’s procedure and a very deep change in its procedural culture
and institutional structure, which assumed a certain distribution of powers
and responsibilities between the office of the prosecutor, the defense bar, and
the judges.526

See supra note 133.
See supra note 215, and accompanying text.
522 See supra note 153-56, and accompanying text.
523 Statistics are not always easily comparable on this point. So, we should be careful in their
evaluation and in making broader conclusion from them. But, for instance, in 2002, the average
length of criminal proceedings in U.S. federal district courts was 6.1 months for cases in which the
defendant pleaded guilty, 3 months in cases decided by bench trials, and 11.9 months in cases decided
by trial by jury (see Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2002, pages 445-46); in France, the
average length of only the pre-trial investigation by an investigating judge was 21.7 months (see
Annuaire statistique de la Justice—Édition 2004, page 117).
524 On these tendencies in Argentina, France, Germany and Italy, see, e.g., Langer, From Legal
Transplants to Legal Translations, supra note 30.
525 Questions of path dependence and the challenges it presents to legal analyses and legal
reforms have been recently explored in the literature of law and economics —i.e., in relation to issues
like corporate governance. See, for instance, Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path
Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999).
526 On the particularly hard obstacles that procedural reforms face when importing legal ideas
and institutions from other legal traditions, see, e.g., Mirjan Damaska, The Uncertain Fate of
Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-American and Continental Experiences, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 839
(1997); Elisabetta Grande, Italian Criminal Justice: Borrowing and Resistance, 48 AM. J. COMP. L.
520
521
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To be sure, moving ICTY criminal procedure from a predominantly
adversarial system to a managerial judging one has not been easy, either. As
we have seen, not all the judges have felt equally comfortable about their new
role, and the parties have resisted the disempowerment that came with the
redefinition of their roles as collaborators with the court.527 But the
transition has been easier than a transition from an adversarial to an
inquisitorial system would have been. The managerial judging system shares
a number of features with the adversarial one that made the transition
between systems more feasible in ICTY’s institutional context. In both the
managerial judging and adversarial systems, criminal procedure is
structured as a competition between two cases, and it is still the parties who
have the responsibility to conduct their own pre-trial investigations and
present their cases at trial. Both systems welcome prosecutorial discretion,
guilty pleas, plea bargains, and stipulations.528 Given these shared features,
the transition from the adversarial to the managerial system was more
feasible.
That ICTY judges faced a question of path dependence when deciding
what reforms were needed is a very important element that cannot be
overemphasized regarding institutional design of international criminal
tribunals. These tribunals historically have been created from scratch, and
the number of lawyers, judges, prosecutors and personnel participating in
them has been low in comparison to national jurisdictions.529 Therefore, one
might assume that path dependence issues should have much less impact in
this context than in a national context. In other words, given that the
procedural culture and the distribution of powers and responsibilities
between the main actors of the legal process are fairly new in these tribunals,
one could expect that moving between different models of criminal
procedure would be easier than in a long-established legal system.
However, the short history of ICTY provides a caveat against such an
assumption. It is true that ICTY was created from scratch and that any
227 (2000); Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, in SELECTED WRITINGS
294, 310 (1978); John H. Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the United States, 43
AM. J. COMP. L. 545 (1995); John H. Langbein, The Influence of the German Emigrés on American
Law: The Curious Case of Civil and Criminal Procedure, in DER EINFLUSS DEUTSCHER EMIGRATEN
AUF DIE RECHTSENWICKLUNG IN DEN USA UND IN DEUTSCHLAND 321 (Marcus Lutter et al. eds., 1993);
Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations, supra note 30; William T. Pizzi &
Mariangela Montagna, The Battle to Establish an Adversarial Trial System in Italy, 25 MICHIGAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 429 (2004).
527 See supra note 471-75, and accompanying text.
528 See supra notes 143-46 and 469, and accompanying text.
529 The Tribunal currently has a total of 24 judges: 16 permanent judges and eight ad litem
judges. The current number of posts authorized for the Office of the Prosecutor is 1058. See Tenth
Annual Report ICTY, August 20, 2003, Summary.
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procedural model could have been chosen at that initial moment. But within
a few years after ICTY adopted a predominantly adversarial path, the range
of options for procedural change was already limited. The point here is not
that it was good or bad for ICTY to end up adopting the managerial judging
system. Rather, the point is that policy makers have to be very careful in
choosing what initial model they adopt for international criminal courts and
tribunals, not only because certain models may be better or worse than
others for dealing with international crimes, but also because once a model is
adopted and takes root in certain procedural practices, the range of
possibilities for introducing substantial changes to this model is limited.
This is another lesson from this article which should be taken into account in
designing international criminal procedures and tribunals.
Another question is why ICTY judges did not keep the adversarial
system—perhaps by introducing reforms to improve its efficiency—instead of
moving toward managerial judging. We have already explored the problems
that the adversarial system experienced in dealing with international
criminal cases rapidly, including delays caused by the system of incentives
and reliance on oral evidence in adversarial procedure, that led ICTY judges
to move away from that system. But here I would like to explore this issue
from a different perspective by comparing ICTY’s reaction to external
pressures to process cases more quickly with the reactions of U.S. civil and
criminal procedure to similar pressures. The comparison of ICTY to these
latter two systems will highlight different paths that adversarial systems can
take in response to such pressures, and will reveal certain features of ICTY
relative to national jurisdictions that we have not analyzed so far.
As explained in Section VII, managerial judging partly arose in U.S. civil
procedure as a way to deal with the adversarial system’s problems in
handling an ever larger and more complex caseload faster.530 Dissatisfied

530 Elliot, supra note 282, at 319-20, says: “the problem that managerial judging aims to solve is,
at base, structural: it results from a fundamental imbalance in the Rules between the techniques
available for developing and expanding issues and those for narrowing or resolving them prior to
trial…That the issue-narrowing capacity of the Federal Rules is emaciated can be brought into focus
by recalling the predecessor system of "common law pleading."' We all learned in law school about the
old practice of pleading back and forth until a single issue was joined. The drafters of the Federal
Rules understood well the frailties of this system, which required parties to narrow their contentions
prior to developing a full understanding of the facts. Moreover, under a system which narrows issues
based on common law pleadings, litigants' cases are likely to turn on procedural choices by counsel,
rather than on the legal merit of a party's case…The new system under the Federal Rules was
supposed to be different. Through full discovery of the facts, lawyers were supposed to learn which of
their contentions were supportable at trial and which were not…And if an occasional recalcitrant
litigant refused to accept the results of discovery voluntarily, summary judgment was to be available
to dispose of unsubstantiated claims prior to trial. Thus, as the framers envisioned their new system,
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with the manner and pace at which parties were handling cases, judges
became active managers of the proceedings.531 As already described, a
similar process has happened in ICTY. Under increasing pressures to
process cases more swiftly, the judges also moved ICTY’s criminal procedure
from a predominantly adversarial to a managerial judging model.532
Interestingly, despite confronting similar pressures to process cases
more swiftly,533 U.S. criminal procedure has handled these pressures without
substantially deviating from its traditional adversarial system.534 In this
procedure, the judge basically has remained a passive umpire,535 and the
the issue-narrowing function was to be performed not by pleading, but by discovery and summary
judgment…According to the proponents of managerial judging, it hasn't worked out that way.”
531 As explained supra, this redefinition of the role of the judge was not only motivated by an
increasing caseload but also by broader discovery rules and by increasing interactions between
federal judges and institutional changes in the Federal Judiciary. See Resnik, Managerial Judges,
supra note 16, at 378-79; Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 274, at 943-49.
532 See supra Section VIII.
533 On the increase in state trial courts, see Bureau of Justice Statistics Sourcebook of Criminal
Justice Statistics—2001 (showing that the total of criminal cases filed in these courts between 1993
and 2002 increased 19 %). On the increase of criminal cases in the federal system, see, e.g., J. Clifford
Wallace, Tackling the Caseload Crisis, June 1994 ABA JOURNAL 88 (pointing out that between 1981
and 1991, the number of criminal cases filed in the federal district courts increased by nearly 50
percent, which resulted in increased delay and expense); Stephen Chippendale, More Harm Than
Good: Assessing Federalization of Criminal Law, 79 MINN. L. REV. 455, at 456 and 472 (1994)
(federal criminal cases filings between 1980 and 1990 increased nearly seventy percent while the
number of judges remained relatively static).
534 There have been some tendencies in U.S. criminal procedure in the direction of managerial
judging. See, e.g., Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 17.1 (“On its own, or on a party’s
motion, the court may hold one or more pretrial conferences to promote a fair and expeditious trial.
When a conference ends, the court must prepare and file a memorandum of any matters agreed to
during the conference.”); and MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 263 (3rd edition, 1995)). But, despite
these tendencies, U.S. criminal procedure has remained basically adversarial and judges still behave,
to a great extent, as passive umpires. An indication of this is that the different editions of the Manual
for Complex Litigation—probably the main tool to evaluate managerial judging in the U.S.—have
either failed to include a Section on criminal cases (see the last edition of the Manual) or have
included only a short Section on it emphasizing the differences between criminal and civil cases (see,
e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 263 (3rd edition, 1995)).
535 In the last years, criminal courts have incorporated a number of management techniques such
as “differentiated case management” (DCM) that put different cases on different tracks to speed up
the docket and encourage plea agreements. On DCM see, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice, Office of
Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Fact Sheet, Differentiated Case Management. The
implementation of this kind of programs may have led certain judges to step out of their traditional
roles. See, e.g., Legrome Davis, Developing Felony Tracks, 33 JUDGES’ J 9, at 32 (Winter 1994)
(describing a differentiated case-management program in Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas that
would often require planning sessions with the attorneys in which the judges would step out of his or
her traditional role). But the incorporation of these management techniques have not radically
transformed the traditional role of criminal judges as passive umpires as it has happened in complex
cases in U.S. civil procedure. As explained in the text, this is partially because, in U.S. criminal
procedure, the prosecutor has actually become the main manager of cases. Thus, the role of the judge
did not need to be radically transformed to speed up the docket. Recall, also, that the adversarial
system should be understood as an ideal-type. So, even if some judges may have become more active
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proceedings.536

parties still have the main responsibility to carry on the
This
has been possible because the prosecutor—instead of the judge—has become
the main manager of criminal cases.537 In order to expedite the docket, the
prosecutor has used a number of features that are characteristic of the
adversarial system, such as broad prosecutorial discretion,538 plea
agreements539 and stipulations, and also a number of features which are not
characteristic of the adversarial system but do not substantially challenge
it,540 such as diversion mechanisms.541 These mechanisms—combined with
as a consequence of the incorporation of these case management techniques, this would not question
the general point made in the text to the extent that the adversarial system, understood as an idealtype, still provides the best account of U.S. criminal procedure before regular criminal courts.
536 This statement applies to regular criminal proceedings before regular criminal courts.
However, even if U.S. criminal procedure remains basically adversarial today in these kinds of courts,
there has been a departure from the adversarial system in the case of specialized courts—such as drug
and domestic violence courts. These specialized courts have been created partly as a way to deal with
an increasing number of specific kinds of cases (such as drug and domestic violence cases), partly as
an attempt to give more effective answers to certain situations. In these specialized courts, the roles
of the judge and the parties have been transformed, and their procedure has moved away from the
adversarial system. On the transformation of the roles of the judge and the parties before drug
courts, see, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent
Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831 (2000); Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I on
Anyway? Musings of a Public Defender about Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 37 (2000-2001).
537 See, e.g., Robert L Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
717 (1996) (“In the past thirty years, the diffusion of responsibility has begun to abate and power has
increasingly come to rest in the office of the prosecutor. Developments in the areas of charging, plea
bargaining, and sentencing have made the prosecutor the preeminent actor in the system…he
centralization of authority in the prosecution is a development necessary for a coordinated and
responsive criminal justice system in which the prosecutor will ultimately be held accountable to the
voters for the successes and failures of the system.”).
538 See, e.g., Robert L Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
717 (1996).
539 On the predominant role of prosecutors in the bargaining process—that according to many
have been strengthened with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, see, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The
Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U.CHI.L.REV. 901 (1991); Albert
W. Alschuler, Departures and Plea Agreements Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 117 F.R.D. 459
(1988); Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM.L.REV. 1 (1979); Albert W.
Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U.CHI.L.REV. 50 (1968); George Fisher, Plea
Bargaining's Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857 (2000); Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea
Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U.ILL.L.REV. 37; Wayne R. LaFave, The
Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP.L. 532 (1970); Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Criminal Justice Discretion in a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43 (1988). Most plea
negotiations transpire between the prosecutor and the defense without the participation of the judge.
However, courts can still contribute by providing incentives for plea agreements without abandoning
their passive role. For instance, a firm judicial criminal calendar may provide those kinds of
incentives. See, e.g., Burrell Ives Humphreys, Taking Control, April 1994, ABA JOURNAL 46, at 47.
540 Diversion mechanisms do not challenge the adversarial system because these cases get
diverted from the formal criminal proceedings. Thus, they leave intact the adversarial structure of
U.S. criminal procedure. At another level, though, when the defendants whose cases are diverted
cases are subjected to drug treatments, community work, and so forth, they cannot use the legal tools
that they would have in adversarial proceedings.
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other tools that will be analyzed later in this section—have allowed U.S.
prosecutors to handle even complex criminal cases swiftly, without requiring
U.S. criminal procedure to abandon the adversary system.
The question here is why U.S. civil procedure and ICTY criminal
procedure have taken such a different path from that followed by U.S.
criminal procedure. U.S. criminal procedure basically has remained close to
the adversarial system, while ICTY criminal procedure and U.S. civil
procedure have moved toward managerial judging.542 In the case of civil
procedure the answer may have to do with the fact that U.S. civil procedure
could not effectively give the management of the case to one of the parties—
as U.S. criminal procedure gave it to the prosecutor—because all parties in
U.S. civil procedure are private. Within this context, reformers had a more
limited range of options, and they may have thought that the judge, as a
public official, had to bear the public responsibility of systematically
managing cases in a swifter way.543
But if we compare U.S. and ICTY criminal procedure, the answer is not
that obvious. In each of these two procedures, there is a prosecutor who can
also be the main manager of cases, yet policymakers have taken different
paths with each. So, why is it that these two similar procedures took different
paths when subjected to similar pressures? I would like to suggest two main
sets of reasons.
541 See, e.g., Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 143, at 744 (“decisions
regarding diversion programs…are left to the unreviewable discretion of the prosecutor.”)
542 The statement that U.S. civil procedure has moved in the direction of managerial judging
should not be understood as implying that judges actively manage all civil cases in the U.S. Actually,
most civil cases in the U.S. are solved by the parties without the judge’s participation. However, this
is not a challenge to my statement that U.S. civil procedure has moved in the direction of managerial
judging for three different reasons. First, recall that, as defined in this article, the managerial judging
system welcomes parties’ agreements without participation of the court because they are a way to
keep the court’s docket under control. In other words, the fact that most civil cases in the U.S. are
solved by parties agreements without the participation of the court is not in tension with
characterizing U.S. civil procedure as having moved toward managerial judging. Second, to the
extent that the judges actively control civil cases (as opposed to simply ruling on the parties’ motions
as they present themselves), they generally do so by using the techniques of managerial judges.
Finally, recall that the managerial judging system is an ideal-type. So, even if there were cases in U.S.
civil procedure that do not fit into this model, this would not necessarily constitute a challenge to the
statement that U.S. civil procedure has to some extent moved toward managerial judging.
543 This is not a necessary path, though. There are ways to incorporate management techniques
in civil procedure without making the judge the main manager. For instance, court personnel can
become the main case managers, or alternative dispute resolutions centers that take cases away from
the civil courts can be implemented. For these and other alternatives to deal with an increasing
caseload in civil justice, see, e.g., Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 16, at 436-44.
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powers.544

The first involves the dimension of procedural
As adversarial
systems, in both U.S. criminal procedure and the initial procedure of ICTY,
the prosecution and the defense were responsible for carrying on the
proceedings, and they had more procedural powers vis-à-vis the judge than
in an inquisitorial system. U.S. criminal judges and ICTY judges were
basically passive umpires.545 But U.S. judges have faced a number of
institutional, legal and ideological limitations and constraints that ICTY
judges have not had.
The lack of these limitations explains why
disempowering the parties by making judges active managers was an option
available in ICTY, but not in U.S. criminal procedure.
The first limitation is that in criminal cases, U.S. judges are very
reluctant to tell the prosecutor what to do—at least regarding certain issues
such as prosecutorial discretion—because of the doctrine of separation of
powers.546 Since prosecutors are members of a different branch of
government—the Executive power in the federal system547—judges, as
members of the Judiciary, usually assume they are not legally allowed to tell
prosecutors what to do, or at least that their power is limited in this
respect.548 Within this context, managerial judging’s conception of the

544 On the dimension of procedural powers in adversarial, inquisitorial and managerial judging
systems, see supra notes 79-81and 364-66.
545 See supra note 127-28 and 164-69, and accompanying text.
546 See, e.g., U.S. v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, at 464 (1996) (“A selective-prosecution claim asks a
court to exercise judicial power over a ‘special province’ of the Executive”); U.S. v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862,
at 864 (2002). See also James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Discretion, 94
HARV.L.REV. 1521, at 1546 (1981) (“Courts often justify their refusal to review prosecutorial discretion
on the ground that separation-of-powers concerns prohibit such review.”). U.S. courts have also
justified judicial deference to decisions by prosecutors based on the institutional competence of
prosecutors and courts and on the delay that judicial revision of prosecutorial decisions would bring.
See U.S. v. Wayte, 105 S.Ct. 1524, at 1530-31 (1985) (“This broad discretion rests largely on the
recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such factors as
the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement
priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan are not readily
susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake. Judicial supervision in this
area, moreover, entails systemic costs of particular concern. Examining the basis of a prosecution
delays the criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's
motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by
revealing the Government's enforcement policy. All these are substantial concerns that make the
courts properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute.”).
547 See, e.g., U.S. v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, at 464 (1996) (“The Attorney General and United
States Attorneys retain ‘broad discretion’ to enforce the Nation’s criminal laws…They have this
latitude because they are designated by statute as the President’s delegates to help him discharge his
constitutional responsibility to ‘take care that the Laws be faithfully executed’. U.S. Const., Art II, §3;
see 28 U.S.C. §§516, 547.”).
548 See, e.g., Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 143, at 743 (“The
prosecutor's decision not to prosecute a case is virtually unreviewable. Although for some this
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prosecutor as a collaborator with the court would be in tension with these
separation-of-powers concerns.549 The Tribunal has established that the
principle of separation of powers is included in its Statute, but it has not
given this principle the same reach that it has in the U.S. legal system.550
Thus, ICTY judges did not find it an impediment to re-defining their role and
the role of the prosecutor.551
The second limitation has to do with the rights of the defendant.552 In
U.S. criminal procedure, the defendant is protected by a number of
constitutional rights, such as the right against compulsory selfincrimination,553 the right to counsel,554 the right to cross-examination,555 the
right to confrontation,556 and the right to an impartial court.557 These
constitutional rights would prevent U.S. judges from considering the
defendant and the defense attorney as collaborators with the court in the goal
of expediting proceedings, from substantially limiting the defense case at
trial, from using certain types of written statements, and from participating
authority "border[s] on anarchy,"…the case law in both federal and state jurisdictions have ignored
the criticism and have only rarely constrained the decision in any meaningful way.”).
549 Evidence of these difficulties is that even radical proposals to limit prosecutorial discretion
have generally not been adopted. Among these proposals, see, e.g., James Vorenberg, Decent
Restraint of Prosecutorial Discretion, 94 HARV.L.REV. 1521 (1981).
550 Based on arts. 12 and 13 of the Statute, the Tribunal has established that the doctrine of
separation of powers not only applies to the Tribunal but also includes the principles of judicial
independence and impartiality. See Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic et. al, Case IT-96/21, Appeals
Chamber, Judgment, February 20, 2001, para. 689. However, it has not included this principle in its
analysis of prosecutorial discretion in ICTY. See id. para. 596-619.
551 Note that the separation of powers doctrine similarly does not apply in U.S. civil procedure
where there are two private parties and only one public official—the judge.
552 See, e.g., Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation 145 (as revised May 18, 1970)
(“Because of the guarantees afforded criminal defendants under the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth
Amendments to the Constitution, pretrial proceedings in criminal cases must be on a purely
voluntary basis, except the extent that discovery by the government is authorized under division (c) of
Rule 16, F.R.Cr.P.”).
553 U.S. CONST. amend. V. (“No person… shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself”).
554 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right…to
have the assistance of counsel for his defense.”).
555 The right to cross-examination has been considered part of the Confrontation Clause of the VI
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (see, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986)) and
essential to due process (see, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)).The Supreme Court
has established that the right is constitutionally protected. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308
(1974).
556 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right…to be
confronted with the witnesses against him”).
557 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a…trial, by an impartial jury”). The right to an impartial trial also includes the right to an unbiased
judge. See, e.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57
(1972).
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actively, as the managerial judging system would require. To be sure, ICTY
Statute recognizes similar rights.558 But ICTY judges have interpreted them
less strictly than in the U.S.,559 and have determined they are not an obstacle
to the adoption of managerial judging in ICTY criminal process.560 Thus,
these rights have been additional potential limitations that have not
prevented ICTY judges from moving toward managerial judging.561
The third limitation to moving U.S. criminal procedure toward
managerial judging is institutional and consists of the presence of the grand
jury during the pre-trial phase.562 In the U.S. federal system and in many
states, the grand jury exercises not only the screening function of issuing

558 Art. 21 of the Statute of the Tribunal reproduces art. 14 of the International Covenant for Civil
and Political Rights. Thus, art. 21 of the Statute includes the right not to be compelled to testify
against himself or to confess guilt (art. 14 (g)); the right to defend himself through legal assistance of
his own choosing (art. 14 (d)); and the right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him
(art. 14 (e)). ICTY Court of Appeals have held that the right to be tried before an independent and
impartial tribunal is generally recognized as integral component of the requirement that an accused
should have a fair trial. See Prosecutor v. Furundbija, Case IT-95-17/1-A, Appeals Chamber,
Judgment, July 21, 2000, para. 177.
559 A way in which ICTY judges have restricted defense rights has been by conceiving some of
these rights as rights of the prosecution. This would be unthinkable in the U.S., where it is clear that
constitutional rights are protections of the individuals against the government. ICTY Appeals
Chamber made this interpretation and refused to apply more lenient standards of admissibility to
hearsay evidence presented by the defense, arguing that the prosecution is also entitled to a fair trial.
See Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case IT-95-14/1-A, Decision on Prosecutor’s Appeal on
Admissibility of Evidence, February 16, 1999, para. 22-28. The Tribunal has also established that the
excessively succinct and summary nature of many defense-witnesses’ statements violated the
principle of equality of arms. See Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškia et al, “Lasva Valley”, IT-95-16,
Decision, January 11, 1999. For an analysis of the two decisions just mentioned, see CASSESE, supra
note 6, at 396.
560 A clear example of this has to do with the admission of written statements authorized by Rule
92 bis that is in tension with the right to confrontation and the right to cross-examination. For
analyses of this tension, see, e.g., Cristian Defrancia, Due Process in International Criminal Courts:
Why Procedure Matters, 87 VA. L. REV. 1381 (2001); Megan A. Fairlie, Due Process Erosion: The
Diminution of Live Testimony at ICTY, 34 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 47 (2003); Wald, supra note 227, at 550
(“even when the written testimony is concededly background or jurisdictional, defendants can be
expected to raise the core issue of whether written testimony not subject to cross-examination
violates ICTY statutory Article 21 mandate that the accused be allowed to question witnesses against
him.”). One of the justifications for the use of written statements despite its tension with the rights to
confrontation and cross-examination has been the specific characteristic of the Tribunal. See, e.g.,
Wald, supra note 227, at 536-37 (“A trial at ICTY is usually more akin to documenting an episode or
even an era of national or ethnic conflict rather than proving a single discrete incident”). I will not
analyze here whether this justification makes the use such written statements normatively
permissible. Rather, my point is a positive one about how ICTY has given a more restrictive
interpretation to the rights included in its Statute than the interpretation given to similar rights in the
U.S. and in other national jurisdictions.
561 These rights are much weaker or do not exist in U.S. civil procedure.
562 On the grand jury in the U.S., see, generally, SARA S. BEALE & WILLIAM C. BRYSON, GRAND JURY
LAW AND PRACTICE (1986).
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prosecutor,563

“true bills” that become indictments once signed by the
but
also an important investigatory role—especially in complex criminal cases.564
While performing their functions, grand juries usually act under the control
of the prosecutor,565 judges are not present during their proceedings,566 and
the regulation of grand juries’ proceedings is basically considered beyond the
judge’s powers.567 Thus, this is another constraint that would prevent U.S.
judges from becoming active managers during the pre-trial phase. Unless
the grand jury proceedings are deeply modified or eliminated—a difficult
reform given the constitutional stature of the grand jury in the federal
system568—there would be a whole part of the proceedings that managerial
judges could not control, and there would be an important institution that
they could not treat as a court collaborator in the goal of expediting the
docket. But the grand jury is an institutional constraint that has not existed
in ICTY.569
The fourth limitation is also institutional and is related to the jury.570
Like the grand jury, the presence of the jury in U.S. criminal procedure is

563 On the screening function of grand juries, see, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do
Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260 (1995).
564 See, e.g., RONALD JAY ALLEN ET. AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 888 (2001) (“It is
beyond doubt…that the modern grand jury’s most prominent role is investigatory. Federal grand
juries, in particular, are extremely important to the unraveling of complex crimes that may be
impervious to investigation and prosecution by means of traditional police investigative
techniques.”).
565 See, e.g., FRANK W. MILLER ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 538 (5th ed. 2000)
(“Although prosecutors have no formal legal power to control the grand jury, they have immense
practical authority. Prosecutors generally propose avenues of inquiry, subpoena witnesses, question
witnesses when they appear, and advise the grand jurors concerning all matters.”).
566 See, e.g., Leipold, supra note 563, at 266 (“The most striking feature of grand jury hearings is
their secrecy. The press and public are barred from the proceedings, as are suspects and their counsel.
Even judges are not allowed in the grand jury room; attendance is limited to the prosecutor, the
jurors, the court reporter, and the single witness being questioned.”)
567 The courts can quash grand jury subpoenas but have almost no supervisory powers to regulate
grand jury proceedings. See U.S. v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992) (“any power federal courts may have
to fashion, on their own initiative, rules of grand jury procedure is a very limited one, not remotely
comparable to the power they maintain over their own proceedings. It certainly would not permit
judicial reshaping of the grand jury institutions, substantially altering the traditional relationship
between the prosecutor, the constituting court, and the grand jury itself.”).
568 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury”).
569 The grand jury is not present in U.S. civil procedure either.
570 U.S. CONST. amend. VI: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a…trial, by an impartial jury.” The right applies to serious offenses (usually offenses that have a
maximum potential punishment of more than six months of imprisonment). See Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Blanton v. City of North Las
Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989); U.S. v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1 (1993)(per curiam); Lewis v. U.S., 518 U.S.
322 (1996).
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relevant for the dimension of procedural powers because it also reduces the
power of the judge—in this case, during trial. The presence of the jury
prevents U.S. judges from becoming too active at trial for several reasons.
First of all, jurors may perceive a too-active judge as partial toward one of the
parties.571 In addition, given that the jury adjudicates the case, trial judges
have fewer tools to subtly or not-so-subtly encourage the parties to
collaborate with the goal of expediting proceedings.572 The presence of the
jury also brings back to the system technical rules of evidence,573 another
feature that the managerial judging system rejects.574 Interestingly, the jury
probably has been the main factor preventing managerial judging during trial
in U.S. civil procedure.575 ICTY criminal procedure has not faced this
limitation, and this also explains why ICTY has been able to move in this
direction even during trial.576
The fifth limitation for U.S. criminal procedure is that the U.S.
institutional setting is more complex and would require broader consensus
than ICTY to move strongly in the direction of managerial judging. I have
two issues in mind here. First, even if ICTY has said that the principle of
separation of powers applies to its institutional setting,577 the Tribunal is
clearly the most powerful actor in ICTY.578 ICTY’s Office of the Prosecutor is

571 See, e.g., People v. Davis, 549 N.W.2d 1, at 50-51 (Mich.App., 1996) (“The principal limitation
on a court's discretion over matters of trial conduct is that its actions not pierce the veil of judicial
impartiality… The trial court may question witnesses in order to clarify testimony or elicit additional
relevant information. However, the trial court must exercise caution and restraint to ensure that its
questions are not intimidating, argumentative, prejudicial, unfair, or partial. The test is whether the
"judge's questions and comments 'may well have unjustifiably aroused suspicion in the mind of the
jury' as to a witness' credibility, ... and whether partiality 'quite possibly could have influenced the
jury to the detriment of defendant's case.' ").
572 On the impact that the bifurcated character of the court has in several features of common law
jurisdictions, see MIRJAN DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 46-57 (1997).
573 On the relationship between the jury and detailed rules of evidence, see supra note 209-13.
574 On the tension between the managerial judging system and detailed rules of evidence, see
supra Section VII.
575 See, e.g., Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 268 , at 19 (“managerial judging in
the pretrial process leaves adversary domination of the trial (especially jury trial) largely
unaffected.”).
576 The Expert Group that proposed deepening judicial activism at ICTY hinted that this would be
enabled by the absence of a jury in this system. See Expert Report, supra note 88, para. 78 (“Such
increased control would in no sense be inconsistent with the Statutes or with the unique character of
the Tribunals as International Tribunals drawing upon common and civil law traditions. In the latter
and even in the former, particularly in non-jury cases, it is not unusual for the court to take a strong
hand in the entire process...”).
577 See Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic et. al, Case IT-96/21, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, February
20, 2001, para. 689.
578 For criticisms that affirm that the Tribunal has too much power in the institutional setting of
ICTY, see, e.g., Fabricio Guariglia, The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International
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body,579

an independent
but it is not considered an essential part of a strong
Executive branch as in the U.S. federal system, and does not have the sort of
legitimacy and public support enjoyed by popularly elected local prosecutors
in the U.S.580 In addition—and also related to the fact that the Tribunal is the
most powerful actor in its institutional setting—ICTY judges have the power
to issue and change their own rules of procedure,581 a power that is not
subject to review and that has been crucial in the adoption and
implementation of managerial judging reforms.582 U.S. courts also can issue
rules of criminal procedure as part of their supervisory powers,583 and the
U.S. Supreme Court has a very prominent role in the amendment of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.584 But Congress also participates in
this process.585
Besides the different legal, ideological and institutional constraints that
judges have faced in U.S. criminal procedure and at ICTY, the second set of
reasons that explains why these two adversarial criminal procedures have
moved in different directions is related to the degree of success that the
prosecutor has had in being an effective manager of criminal cases. In this
regard, the U.S. prosecutor clearly has been more successful than his ICTY
Criminal Court, supra note 367; André Klip, The Decrease of Protection under Human Rights
Treaties in International Criminal Law, 68 INT’L REV. PENAL L. 291, at 302-03 (1997).
579 ICTY Statute, art. 16.2 (“The Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ of the
International Tribunal. He or she shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from
any other source.”).
580 On the election of local prosecutors in the U.S. and its impact in U.S. criminal procedure, see,
e.g., William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The Limits of
Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325 (1993).
581 ICTY Statute, art. 15 (“The judges of the International Tribunal shall adopt rules of procedure
and evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials and appeals, the
admission of evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and other appropriate matters.”).
582 For criticisms of the fact that that there is no review on the power of ICTY judges to issue their
own rules of procedure and evidence, see, e.g., BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL, supra note 100, at 824, 827.
583 On this power by Federal District Courts, see Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule
57(a)(1) (“Each district court acting by a majority of its district judges may, after giving appropriate
public notice and an opportunity to comment, make and amend rules governing its practice. A local
rule must be consistent with—but not duplicative of—federal statutes and rules adopted under 28
U.S.C. § 2072 and must conform to any uniform numbering system prescribed by the Judicial
Conference of the United States.”).
584 28 U.S.C. 2072(a) (“The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of
practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including
proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals.”).
585 28 U.S.C. 2074(a) (“The Supreme Court shall transmit to the Congress not later than May 1 of
the year in which a rule prescribed under Section II072 is to become effective a copy of the proposed
rule. Such rule shall take effect no earlier than December 1 of the year in which such rule is so
transmitted unless otherwise provided by law.”).
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counterpart,586

though the latter had little time to show his managerial
abilities before managerial judging reforms started to be introduced just four
years after the work of the tribunal started.587 To the extent that U.S.
prosecutors have become successful managers of the system, there has been
less pressure to move in a different direction. There are several reasons that
explain the relative success of the U.S. prosecutor in performing this task as
against the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor.
The first reason is that while in U.S. criminal procedure most cases are
very simple, and thus prosecutors can handle them more easily with a
traditional adversarial system, almost all ICTY cases are very complex588 and
have presented many more challenges to the adversarial procedure of the
Tribunal.589 The second reason is that, even regarding complex criminal
cases, U.S. prosecutors can rely upon more powerful legal tools to investigate
and prosecute these cases.
First of all, U.S. prosecutors have at their disposal a criminal justice
system with its own law enforcement mechanisms, which is usually close to
the place where the alleged criminal events occurred, does not require
translation of documents and proceedings into several languages, and does
not have to deal with lawyers and judges from different legal traditions.590 In
addition, U.S. federal prosecutors, who handle most complex criminal cases
in this country, can make use of grand juries that have very broad and
powerful investigative powers.591 For instance, grand jury proceedings are

586 Of course, there have been criticisms of the role of U.S. prosecutors as the main managers of
cases. However, these criticisms have either been circumscribed by particular prosecutors or cases or
have resulted in substantial reforms—like with the criticisms to the excessive power of U.S.
prosecutors in plea bargains. In fact, during the 1990s, the power of U.S. prosecutors as managers of
cases probably increased after the enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in the second half
of the 1980s.
587 See supra Section VIII.
588 See, e.g., Expert Report, supra note 88, para. 126 (“While national criminal investigations
normally focus on a perpetrator, known or unknown, of a crime, ICTY and ICTR investigations focus
on atrocities in geographic and functional areas.”).
589 On the complexity of cases in ICTY, see Wald, supra note 227, at 536-37 (“A trial at ICTY is
usually more akin to documenting an episode or even an era of national or ethnic conflict rather than
proving a single discrete incident”); Sixth Annual Report of ICTY, supra note 91, para. 13 (“The
Tribunal’s cases involve complex legal and factual issues, as well as the application of legal principles
that have not previously been interpreted or applied”); and CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW,
supra note 6, at 442-43.
590 See supra notes 88-95, and accompanying text.
591 On the investigatory powers of grand juries, see., e.g., SARA S. BEALE & WILLIAM C. BRYSON,
GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE (1986).
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witnesses593

and the grand jury can subpoena
who in most
jurisdictions cannot be assisted by a lawyer,594 need not be given the
equivalent of Miranda warnings before testifying,595
and are not
constitutionally required to be informed that they are targets of the
investigation.596 The grand jury also has a subpoena power with few limits
regarding documentary and other physical evidence.597 As already pointed
out, ICTY prosecutors cannot rely upon this institution in running their
investigations.598
Furthermore, U.S. prosecutors can make extensive use of plea
bargains599 and stipulations. Plea bargains provide U.S. prosecutors not only

592 See generally Fed. Rules Crim. P. 6(d): “Who may be present: (1) While Grand Jury is in
Session. Attorneys for the government, the witness under examination, interpreters when needed
and, for the purpose of taking the evidence, a stenographer or operator of a recording device may be
present while the grand jury is in session”; and Fed. Rule Crim. P. 6(e). On this last rule, see, e.g.,
Daniel C. Richman, Grand Jury Secrecy: Plugging the Leaks in an Empty Bucket, 36 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 339 (1999).
593 Also called subpoena ad testificandum. See, e.g., ALLEN ET. AL, supra note 564, at 894-95 (“it
is important to note that grand jury’s broad subpoena power is not limited to physical and
documentary evidence, but rather that it is actually founded on the authority to compel oral
testimony, at least in the absence of a valid privilege. Indeed, many criminal investigations become
grand jury investigations when potential witnesses either cannot (because they are under legal
obligations committing them to secrecy in the absence of legal compulsion) or will not voluntarily
provide information to police. In such circumstances, neither the police nor prosecutors can compel
disclosure in most cases; it is the grand jury that provides investigators with this authority.”).
594 ALLEN ET. AL, supra note 564, at 896 (“There are also strict limits on the people who may be
present during grand jury proceedings—to the point that in the federal system and most states, not
even the lawyer representing the witness may attend.”). On the role of defense attorneys in
investigations carried out by grand juries on white-collar crimes, see, e.g., KENNETH MANN,
DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME (1985).
595 U.S. v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (plurality opinion).
596 U.S. v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977).
597 In order to issue this kind of subpoena—called subpoena duces tecum —it is not even
necessary to show probable cause that an offense has been committed or that there are even reasons
to believe that the target of the subpoena possessed documents or other evidence related to the
commission of an offense. There are three major limits to the subpoena power of the grand jury
regarding documentary and other physical evidence: “First, the subpoena must seek material that is
relevant to a lawful grand jury investigation…Second, the subpoena must not be ‘unreasonably broad
or oppressive…Third, grand jury subpoenas seeking the production of documents or other physical
evidence may be subject to claims of compelled self-incrimination, though these claims will generally
relate only to the act of production of such materials.” See, e.g., ALLEN ET. AL, supra note 564, at 893.
On the first limit, see U.S. v. R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. 292 (1991); on the second, see Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43 (1906); on the third, see, e.g., U.S. v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
598 Note that similarly there are no grand juries in U.S. civil procedure.
599 Plea bargains are such an essential tool for U.S. prosecutors today that even Attorney General
John Ashcroft, who issued guidelines to reduce plea agreements based on a tough-on-crime rationale,
has established important exceptions based on expediency and investigative purposes. See, e.g.,
Vanessa Blum, Ashcroft Memo Endorses Plan for Swift Pleas, LEGAL TIMES, September 29, 2003,
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with a mechanism to obtain convictions without having a trial—with
corresponding savings of time and human and material resources—but also a
powerful investigatory tool to deal with complex criminality, because they
enable prosecutors to make deals with lower echelons in a criminal
enterprise.600 In other words, as part of the plea agreement, lower members
of a criminal enterprise not only may have to plead guilty, but also provide
information and testify at trial for the prosecution against the upper echelons
of a criminal enterprise or organization.601
ICTY prosecutors also have used plea bargaining for these purposes.602
But the incorporation of this technique has been gradual,603 and came only
page 1 and 12 (explaining the exception created by Attorney General John Ashcroft’s guidelines
regarding fast-track programs).
600 See, e.g., Sheila Creaton, Progressing the Fight against Crime or Fighting Witnesses?, 5
SUFFOLK JOURNAL OF TRIAL AND APPELLATE ADVOCACY 37 (2000) (“Cases aimed at dissolving
notorious organized crime rings hinged on the validity of plea-bargains signed by accomplices.
Rejecting this practice threatens to eradicate any possibility of conviction and allows reputed
criminals to go unpunished. Prosecutors have alternative methods, including the use of the
government's agents, surveillance, and resources, to aid in the investigation and prosecution of
criminals. Plea bargains, however, help connect evidence gathered in the field investigation to
courtroom testimony.”).
601 See, e.g., Leo Romero, Procedures for Investigating and Prosecuting White Collar Crime, 11
UNITED STATES-MEXICO LAW JOURNAL 165, at 167 (2003) (“For the target witness who asserts a Fifth
Amendment privilege, the prosecutor may obtain his or her testimony and cooperation by means of a
plea bargain. Because a white-collar crime may involve the investigation of multiple targets, the
prosecutor can pick one that might have information that would be valuable for prosecuting the other
defendants, and offer him or her a plea to a lesser crime or lesser number of counts or charges.
Generally, the prosecutor will give the chosen target a sweet deal in exchange for his or her testimony
and cooperation. If the particular offer is advantageous to the target individual that person can agree
to plead guilty to a lesser offense in exchange for testifying against the other members or the other
targets of the investigation.”).
602 ICTY plea agreements today normally contain a clause where the defendant commits himself
or herself to cooperate with the prosecutor’s investigation by providing information or testimony. For
example, the Miroslav Deronjic plea agreement bound the defendant to such levels of cooperation as
the following: “Miroslav Deronjic agrees to meet as often as necessary with members of the Office of
the Prosecutor and to co-operate with and provide them with truthful and complete information that
is known to him regarding individuals and events in the former Yugoslavia. He agrees to be truthful
and candid and to freely answer all questions put to him by members of the Office of the Prosecutor.
Miroslav Deronjic agrees to testify truthfully in any trials, hearings, and proceedings before the
Tribunal where the Prosecutor deems his evidence may be relevant, whether those matters are
presently before the Tribunal or may be in the future.” See Prosecutor v. Miroslav Deronjic, Case IT02-61-PT, Plea Agreement, September 30, 2003. Other plea agreements are more specific with
regards to the defendant’s obligations to testify in a certain case. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Momir
Nikolic, Case IT-02-60-PT, Joint Motion for Consideration of Plea Agreement Between Momir
Nikolic and the Office of the Prosecutor, Annex A, Amended Plea Agreement, May 7, 2003;
Prosecutor v. Dragan Obrenovic, Case IT-02-60-T, Joint Motion for Consideration of Plea Agreement
Between Dragan Obrenovic and the Office of the Prosecutor, Annex A, Plea Agreement, May 20,
2003; Prosecutor v. Zeljko Mejakic et al., Case IT-02-65-PT, Annex 2 to Plea Agreement, June 26,
2003 (filed June 2, 2003). In these cases, the parties jointly recommended to delay sentencing until
after the defendant has testified in order to gauge the level of cooperation, which can be used as a
mitigating factor. Thus, a number of people who entered into these agreements have actually testified
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after ICTY judges already initiated the post-1998 managerial reforms.604
Furthermore, in making plea agreements, U.S. prosecutors have a lot of
leverage vis-à-vis the defense because of the harshness of U.S. criminal
law.605 The death penalty,606 mandatory minimum sentences,607 threestrikes laws,608 and lengthy prison terms609 are examples of this
for the prosecution at trial. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojevic and Dragan Jokic, Case IT-0260-T, Open Session, September 19, 2003 (Momir Nikolic begins testifying); id, Open Session,
October 1, 2003 (Dragan Obrenovic begins testifying); Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simic et al, Case IT-959-T, Open Session, June 6, 2002 (Stevan Todorovic begins testifying).
603 For instance, there were only two plea agreements in 1998, none in 1999, one in 2000, three
in 2001 (all involving defendants in the same case), two in 2002, eight in 2003, and one so far in
2004. Erdemovic, whose case was the first involving a plea agreement, originally agreed to a plead
guilt in 1996 without a plea agreement, but had it struck down by the Appeals Chamber as being
uninformed. Subsequently in 1998, he pleaded guilty again, now as part of a plea agreement. He
provided information to the Prosecution and was described as being extremely cooperative without
asking for anything in return. The Trial Chamber took note of this and believed that such cooperation
warranted mitigation, pursuant to Rule 101. See Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, Case IT-96-22,
Sentencing Judgment, March 5, 1998. The Trial Chamber in the Jelisic case, the second involving a
plea agreement, noted that any cooperation by the defendant did not amount to the “substantial
cooperation” required for mitigation under Rule 101. See Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic, Case IT-95-10,
Judgment, December 14, 1999. The Todorovic plea agreement in 2000 included the defendant’s
agreement to provide information and to testify against his former co-accused. See Prosecutor v.
Stevan Todorovic, Case IT-95-9/1, Sentencing Judgment, July 31, 2001. Plea agreements have
evolved since these early cases to the point where they nearly always include a carefully tailored
cooperation clause to ensure that the defendant will provide information or testimony whenever
needed by the Prosecutor.
604 Recall that the move toward managerial judging began in July 1998. Of the 17 defendants who
have accepted plea agreements to date, only the Erdemovic plea occurred prior to this.
605 On the factors that would explain the harshness of U.S. sentences vis-à-vis European ones, see
JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE (2003). For a critical review of this book indicating other factors
that may explain these differences, see Carol S. Steiker, Why We’re So Tough on Crime,
<http://bostonreview.net/BR28.5/steiker.html> (website visited on May 10, 2004). On the
connection between procedural safeguards, harsh sentences and unfunded indigent defense services,
see William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice,
107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997).
606 On the death penalty in the U.S. see, STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN
HISTORY (2002); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan Steiker, Abolition in our Time, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 323
(2003); Carol S. Steiker, Things Fall Apart, but the Center Holds: The Supreme Court and the Death
Penalty, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1475 (2002); Carol S. Steiker, Capital Punishment and American
Exceptionalist, 81 OR. L. REV. 97 (2002); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan Steiker, Should Abolitionists
Support Legislative “Reform” of the Death Penalty?, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 417 (2002); Carol S. Steiker &
Jordan Steiker, The Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment since Furman v. Georgia, 29
ST. MARY’S L.J. 971 (1998); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on
Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355 (1995).
607 For instance, according to a 1991 report, there were more than 100 mandatory minimum
penalty provisions located in 60 different criminal statutes that accounted for 60,000 federal
sentences between 1984 and 1990. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES
IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 10, at 13 (1991), cited by Chippendale, supra note 533, at
462.
608 See Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179 (2003); and Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct. 1166 (2003)
(holding the constitutionality of California’s three strikes law).
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phenomenon.610
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imprisonment.611

The maximum penalty in ICTY is life
And
given the seriousness of the crimes involved, ICTY sentences generally have
been mild by the standards of the U.S. criminal justice system.612
Legal, ideological and institutional constraints on judges’ activism in
U.S. criminal procedure and ICTY, as well as the average complexity of
criminal cases and the different legal tools prosecutors can use in each of
these systems, thus mostly explain why two adversary criminal procedures
like those of the U.S. and pre-1998 ICTY have taken different paths when
subjected to similar pressures. Both systems faced pressures to handle cases
more swiftly. The U.S. adversarial criminal procedure has handled those
pressures by making the prosecutor a more effective manager of criminal
609 See, e.g., Recent Legislation, Corporate Law—Congress Passes Corporate and Accounting
Fraud Legislation—Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 116 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 728, at 734 (“because
prosecutors can already choose from a bevy of charges for securities fraud, the greater range in
penalties under the amended federal sentencing guidelines, including the threat of longer jail
sentences, will likely further expedite settlements. For high-profile cases in which the evidence is
weak, the prosecutor can use the increased penalties and sentencing guidelines to secure plea
bargains and avoid expensive trials.”); Darryl K. Brown, The Problematic and Faintly Promising
Dynamics of Corporate Crime, 1 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW 521 (2004) (“At the urging of
Congress, the United States Sentencing Commission has increased sentences for both individuals and
firms in white-collar crimes, making the value of cooperating with the government through
information disclosure even greater”).
610 Substantive criminal law in the U.S., with numerous and overlapping offenses, has also given
tools to prosecutors to negotiate pleas. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal
Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004); Daniel A. Oesterle, Early Observations
on the Prosecutions of the Business Scandals of 2002-3: On Sideshow Prosecutions, Spitzer’s Clash
with Donalson over Turf, The Choice of Civil or Criminal Actions, and the Tough Tactic of Coerced
Cooperation, 1 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW 443 (2004) (describing the prosecutor’s tactic
of ‘piling-on’: “In "piling-on" a prosecutor subdivides a basic charge of financial fraud into numerous
charges so as to increase the offender's exposure to a lengthy sentence and encourage a plea bargain.
Prosecutors also commonly use mail and wire fraud charges to "pile-on." Moreover, the many charges
increase a prosecutor’s flexibility in negotiating tailor-made plea agreements.”). In addition, statutes
like RICO have provided prosecutors with powerful tools to plea bargain—and also for trials. See,
e.g., Michael Kades, Exercising Discretion: A Case Study of Prosecutorial Discretion in the
Wisconsin Department of Justice, 25 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW 115, at 140-41 (1997)
(“prosecutors can use RICO, or by implication its state law equivalents, with its broad reach and
harsh penalties to force plea bargains and transform minor infractions into serious crimes.”); Barry
Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 165 (1980).
611 See ICTY Statute, art. 24.1 (“The penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to
imprisonment.”); Rule 101(A) (“A convicted person may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term up
to and including the remainder of the convicted person’s life.”).
612 See, e.g., Kelly D. Askin, Reflections on the Most Significant Achievements of ICTY, 37 NEW
ENGLAND LAW REVIEW 903, at 912 (2003) (“A recurring criticism of the Tribunals, especially from
countries allowing the death penalty or regularly imposing long or harsh domestic sentences for
persons convicted of crimes, involves the surprisingly low sentences handed down by ICTY and ICTR,
including for those convicted of crimes against humanity and genocide. Despite the Yugoslav Statute
allowing for a sentence of life imprisonment, and despite convictions for some of the most serious
international crimes committable, of the thirty individuals convicted thus far in ICTY, not a single
person has been sentenced to life imprisonment, and indeed the average sentence imposed is
approximately sixteen years.”)
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cases, including complex ones, and so did not need to move away from its
traditional adversarial structure. ICTY adversarial criminal procedure has
handled those pressures by moving to managerial judging.
The discovery of the managerial judging system as the best account of
ICTY criminal procedure, and the comparison between the evolution of this
procedure and that of U.S. criminal or civil procedure, have important
implications for a number of policy and theoretical debates. From a policy
perspective, it shows that an adversarial criminal procedure subjected to
external pressures to process cases more swiftly has at least two different sets
of options available to respond to those pressures; to maintain the
adversarial system by giving the prosecutor tools with which to manage cases
effectively, or to move toward managerial judging. I leave for the future an
analysis of which of these two options would be better from a normative
perspective. Here, the key point arising from the comparative analysis of
ICTY and U.S. criminal procedures—a point which deserves emphasis—is
that policy makers dealing with an adversarial criminal procedure that faces
these sorts of pressures have these two options available.
From a theoretical perspective, the analysis also has implications for
debates about globalization of law.613 The debate about the convergence
thesis is one of them.614 Again, this thesis holds that legal systems
throughout the world are gradually converging because they face similar
problems and pressures that ultimately will lead them to adopt similar
features and tools.615 The comparative analysis between ICTY and U.S.
criminal procedure actually shows that two similar systems may react very
differently to similar pressures and problems.616

613 The bibliography on debates about globalization of law is voluminous. See, for instance, David
G. Gerber, Globalization and Legal Knowledge: Implications for Comparative Law, 75 TUL. L. REV.
949 (2001); Duncan Kennedy, Two Globalization of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-1968, 31 SUFFOLK
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 631 (2003); Saskia Sassen, The State and Economic Globalization: any
Implications for International Law?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 109 (2000); Martin Shapiro, The
Globalization of Law, 1 GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL 37 (1993); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial
Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103 (2000); David M. Trubek et al., Global Restructuring and the
Law: Studies of the Internalization of Legal Fields and the Creation of Transnational Areas, 44
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 407 (1994); William Twining, Globalization and Legal Theory: Some Local
Implications, 49 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 1 (1996).
614 On the debate on the convergence thesis, see, e.g., THE GRADUAL CONVERGENCE (B.S.
Markesinis ed., 1994); Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converging, 45 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 52 (1996); Gunter Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying
Law Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998).
615 See, e.g, THE GRADUAL CONVERGENCE, supra note 28.
616 For a similar conclusion regarding the importation of plea bargaining by civil law countries,
see Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations, supra note 30 (showing that, being
subject to similar pressures coming from increasing and more complex caseloads, civil law systems
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Subject to similar pressures to process cases more swiftly, the
predominantly adversarial criminal procedures of the U.S. and ICTY adopted
divergent paths. Of course, one can explain these divergent reactions by
emphasizing the important differences between national and international
jurisdictions in general, and specific differences between U.S. and ICTY
criminal procedures and cases—differences that have been analyzed in this
article.617 But there are also similar differences between national legal
systems. So, at the national level, two adversarial systems may also take
different paths when subject to similar pressures.618 This does not mean that
convergence is not happening and may not happen in a multiplicity of legal
arenas, including criminal procedure.619 But such convergence is not
necessary or inevitable. As our case studies show, similar legal systems can
diverge in response to similar forces.

XI. CONCLUSION
This article has shown that ICTY procedure is best described as a
managerial judging system, and that this discovery has important
implications regarding the way we think about not only international
criminal procedure, but also domestic procedures.
Scholars and
policymakers have thought that international criminal procedure necessarily
has to be adversarial or inquisitorial or somewhere between these two poles.
However, ICTY has adopted a third type of procedure that fits in neither of
the two traditional models and cannot be described as a hybrid between
them. This third model—the managerial judging system—is familiar to U.S.
scholars and practitioners because it presents substantial similarities with
the way U.S. civil procedure has been handling complex cases.
have adopted different versions of plea bargaining that may take their formerly similar criminal
procedures in different directions).
617 See supra Section III.
618 There are indications that some adversarial criminal procedures at the national level may be
moving in the direction of managerial judging. See, e.g., Mr. Justice John H. Phillips, The duty of
counsel, 68 THE AUSTRALIAN LAW JOURNAL 834 (1994); and Melinda Brown, Pegasus II Makes Flying
Start, 73 LAW INST. J. 19 (March 1999) (both articles describing the implementation of reforms in the
management of criminal cases in the Supreme Court of Victoria, Australia, that seem to go in the
direction of managerial judging).
619 For discussion of the convergence thesis in criminal procedure, see, for example, Diane Marie
Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal Procedure in an International Context, 75
IND. L.J. 809 (2000); Craig M. Bradley, The Convergence of the Continental and the Common Law
of Criminal Procedure, 7 CRIM. L.F. 471 (1996) (reviewing CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN EUROPE: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY (Phil Fennell et al. eds., 1995)); Nico Jörg et al., Are Inquisitorial and
Adversarial Systems Converging?, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN EUROPE, supra 28; Langer, From Legal
Transplants to Legal Translations, supra note 30.
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The discovery of managerial judging in ICTY allows this article not only
to provide a much better description of what ICTY has been doing, but also to
articulate a more refined version of what the managerial judging system is
about, and to integrate international and domestic criminal procedures into
wider debates about managerial judging and the globalization of law. The
case of ICTY shows that managerial judging is a procedural system that can
be applied not only in civil cases, but also in criminal ones. This article has
explained why ICTY has followed this path, while U.S. criminal procedure
has remained close to the adversarial ideal. But it also has demonstrated that
for any adversarial criminal procedure facing pressures to process cases
more quickly, one of the central dilemmas is whether the prosecutor or the
judge should be put in charge of expediting and managing the docket. In this
way, the article has shown that procedural models such as managerial
judging and the adversarial system are useful platforms not only for
understanding individual legal systems and explaining how these systems
change over time, but also for exploring future modification and normative
analyses of international and domestic procedures. These are significant
considerations for scholars and policymakers interested in civil or criminal
procedure at either the national or the international level.

